Sunni Shia relations 010907

Most relevant daily items, translated:

According to Al Khaleej, Israel keeps on attacking Russian’s presence in Syria, explaining that at least one thousand military experts are in Damascus, Syria, and assisting in the modernization of military infrastructure. Russia also began providing anti-missile missiles earlier this month, selling as well to Syria ground-to-air missiles to protect the palace, and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.

Source: Al Khaleej

Peace preparations

The keys to peace lie in Arab hands, writes Amin Howeidi*

As the end of his second term in office approaches, President George Bush has decided to call for a peace conference to address the intricate problems of our war-plagued, justice-deprived region.

A peace conference would do just fine, but not a capitulation conference. A peace conference is where interlocutors seek a balance of interests, whereas a capitulation conference focuses on the existing balance of power. Now, power is an elusive thing. You can have it one day and lose it the next. The best thing power can get you is a temporary solution. A balance of interests, however, can achieve long- term results, for parties to the deal would want to make it stick.

In 1999: Victory without War, former US president Richard Nixon says that a perfect peace is one that involves a settlement of all disagreements, which is unlikely. But a real peace is one that gives everyone something worth keeping. Nixon argues that peace must bring about some justice and security for all those involved. Full security for one side can mean a lack of security for the other side, he warns.

Diplomacy has worked out in the past. The Camp David peace agreement of 1978, the Israeli-Syrian agreement of 1974, and the Israeli-Jordanian agreement of 1994 have all stuck. And yet there is no peace between Arabs and Israelis. The reason is that Israel is still refusing to give back Arab occupied land -- against all UN resolutions. Meanwhile, the US has rewarded Israeli intransigence with a $3 billion increase in annual assistance until 2017. The fact that Israel is still occupying Arab land, assassinating Palestinian leaders, and bombing residential neighbourhoods doesn't seem to bother American politicians much.

President Bush announced the increase in aid to Israel right after calling for an international peace conference. This reminds me of something one former US secretary of state once said. When you ask Israel to make peace it refuses because it has no weapons and feels vulnerable, Henry Kissinger proffered. And when you give it more weapons it feels so good about itself it loses interest in peace, he added. Now Bush seems to be calling on Israel to make peace while giving it the incentive not to do so.

Once the conference is held, everyone will come with their own list of demands. The US, which calls for the conference, is more interested in Iraq than the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US will come to the conference thinking of how to get the Arabs to help it out in Iraq, and perhaps even in Afghanistan -- which is fine, but only at a price. What exactly is the US ready to offer? Politics is an act of give-and- take, and we should always make sure that what we're taking is worth what we're giving. Politics is akin to a big marketplace where the only medium of transactions is interests. So before the conference is held, the Arabs, and perhaps Iran too, should ask the Americans what they're ready to offer. Iraq, Iran and the Arabs can help America out of its current ordeal.

In sum, the US is in a trap and we have the key.

Israel too needs the conference. Israel has been fighting a constant war and getting nowhere. Israel wanted to redraw its borders but couldn't, because of the resistance in both Gaza and Lebanon. Now Israel is tired of war but afraid of peace. It feels trapped in war and is afraid of getting trapped in peace. Again, we have the solution to Israel's dilemma, although the Israelis won't admit it. We should name our price before handing it the key. Israel has the land and we have the peace. Once Israel hands us the land, we can hand it the peace. The land that Israel controls is burning with fire, and only the peace that we control can extinguish that fire. Again, it's all give- and-take, peace for land, just as we said in the Arab peace initiative.

In sum, Israel is in a trap and we have the key.

Let's not forget that, or lose the key. Let's meet, discuss things, and get on the same page. We need to speak in one voice. We need to say "Open Sesame" for the door to open. But don't open the door before you name the price and cash it in. We need to stand our ground and keep what is ours. Look around you. Everyone is in a trap. Everyone is going through hard times, which goes for us as well. We're no exception to the rule. The only thing is that we have precious cards in our pockets and don't seem to know how to use them well.

The US has overwhelming power, and yet it walked into a mess and put itself at the mercy of the Iraqi resistance and Iran. Unfortunately, the US president is more of a Nero than a Metternich. He has more in common with the emperor who torched Rome than with the politician who brought 100 years of peace to Europe.

As for Israel, here is a country that believes that force is the only way of conducting politics, and is hurting as a result. Here is a country that finds itself, 50 years or more after its creation, clueless as to where its borders should be, unable to stand on solid ground. Israel has poisoned the land with hatred and is wondering why nothing grows anymore.

We, the Arabs, know we're weak. And yet there is strength in weakness, just as there is weakness in strength. We have precious keys in our hands, and we need great leaders to use them. We need peace just as others do. We need a new Middle East that is of our own making, not the making of others. We know our region better than anyone else. And we know how the relations among our neighbours should be. They may flex their muscles, but the real power is ours. We have a lot going on for us. We want peace, and we can get it.

Let's prepare well for the conference. Let's set our objectives and give each of us something to do. We need to focus on preliminary meetings. We need to know what we're willing to give and what we want in return. We have to have side-meetings: Arab- Arab, Palestinian-Palestinian, Arab- Israeli, Arab-Iranian, Arab-American, etc. Those side-meetings are very important, for this is where the real deals are made. Big conferences are too clumsy. We need those small meetings to agree on the details and fine-tune the outcome. Politics is neither black nor white. It's all grey, and we have to find the right hue.

The conflict will go on until a breakthrough is found: fight-fight, then talk- talk. Some people would say that nothing good could come out of such conferences. Maybe they are right. But keeping engaged is always preferable to keeping a distance. There is no harm in trying. And if things don't work out, we can always walk away and tell the world what we really think of the US president and of Israel. We're not going to give up our rights. We can be just as obstinate as everyone else.

* The writer is former defence minister and chief of General Intelligence.

Source: Al Ahram Weekly

Al Maliki blames Saudi clerics for clashes

09/01/2007 12:15 AM | AP

Baghdad: Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki on Friday tacitly criticised some clerics in Saudi Arabia whom he blamed for a share of responsibility for this week's clashes during a Shiite festival in Karbala.

Al Maliki did not point the finger at the Saudi government but alluded to some Wahhabist clerics in the kingdom who consider Shiites as infidels. He claimed their hostility contributed to clashes around the shrines of Imam Hussain and Imam Abbas in Karbala, which left about 51 people dead.

"We don't need any proof or evidence because these establishments, with deep regret, issued fatwas [religious edicts] calling for the destruction of the shrines of Imam Hussain and Abbas," Al Maliki said during a brief news conference.

Fanatics

"When I speak about foreign intervention in this matter, we speak about organisations, gangs of fanatics and ignorant clerics who have said in the past that Shiites are infidels, meaning they permit killing them," he said.

In December, a top Saudi cleric, Abdul Rahman Al Barak, declared Shiites to be infidels who should be considered worse than Jews or Christians.

Earlier that month about 30 prominent Saudi clerics called on Sunnis around the Middle East to support their brethren in Iraq against Shiites and praised the anti-American insurgency.

Earlier this year, Saudi Arabia refused to receive Al Maliki during a tour of the region.

Source: Gulf News

Sunni Shia relations 310807

Most important daily news, translated:

In Al Hayat, an article explains today that Israel is denouncing how Russia is selling advanced weapons to Syria and playing a Janus game, supporting Iran and its allies while denouncing their actions in front of the Security Council. Moscow would have also contributed to the promotion of Syrian military capabilities after the war in Lebanon, in order to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean basin.

Source: Al Hayat (Saudi Arabia)

The Logic of Arming the Saudis

By William R. Hawkins
8/31/2007

Even though the details of the deal are classified and far from being finalized, 114 members of the U.S. House, (96 Democrats and 18 Republicans) rushed a letter to President George W. Bush on August 2 declaring their intention to vote against any sale of advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia and the five other member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates). The letter was organized by New York Democratic Congressmen Anthony Weiner and Jerrold Nadler, who staged a protest outside the Saudi consulate in New York City on July 29 – timed to coincide with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns’ press briefing in Washington outlining how the arms sales fit into U.S. Middle Eastern strategy.

The thrust of their stated argument is that “Saudi Arabia has not been a true ally in the war on terror or furthering the United States interests in the Middle East.” Yet, the purpose of the estimated $20 billion arms deal is to draw the kingdom closer into an alignment to counter the most dangerous threat in the region, Iran. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on July 30 that the arms will “support a broader strategy to counter the negative influences of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.” The military aid to the Saudis and Gulf states will run in parallel with agreements to increase military aid to Israel ($30 billion, signed in Jerusalem August 16) and to Egypt ($13 billion) over the next decade. According to Secretary Rice, the arms sale to Cairo will “strengthen Egypt’s ability to address shared strategic goals” with Israel and the other Sunni Arab states. The best way to build new diplomatic and security alliances is to pull otherwise diverse states together against a common enemy.

It should be remembered that last summer, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan openly criticized Iran’s Hezbollah proxy for raiding into Israel, triggering over four weeks of heavy fighting. The Arab states gave Israel the diplomatic space it needed to mount military operations aimed at crippling Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In his March 29 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Under Secretary Burns outlined the new regional dynamics in which Lebanon plays a pivotal role, “We are also working with France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and others to signal our strong support for Prime Minister Siniora’s democratically elected government in Lebanon, to enforce the arms embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 1701, and to prevent Iran and Syria from rearming Hizballah. We have stationed two carrier battle groups in the Gulf, not to provoke Iran, but to reassure our friends in the region that it remains an area of vital importance to us. And at the regional level, Secretary Rice last autumn launched a series of ongoing discussions with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners, as well as Egypt and Jordan, regarding issues of shared concern, including most especially the threat posed by Iran.”

Iran, with its support for militias in foreign lands, its nuclear ambitions, and its aggressive Shi’a faith, poses a much greater threat to the Sunni Arab world than does Israel, which has no intention of toppling Arab regimes and converting their people to its religious doctrines. Iran does have these ambitions, directed at both Jews and Sunni Muslims. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has said Israel will not lobby against the new arms sales to Saudi Arabia, as it has against previous sales.

On August 9, the Tehran Times, the self-proclaimed “loud voice of the Islamic Revolution,” highlighted a speech given in Lebanon by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, which attacked the proposed U.S. arms sales as an attempt to “drown the Mideast in wars.” The speech was given at an event marking the terrorist group’s alleged “victory” in last summer’s war, and follows Nasrallah’s claim that his fighters have been fully rearmed and trained for a new round of conflict.

The Congressional opposition to the Saudi-GCC weapons deal is primarily another aspect of liberal-isolationist opposition to the Iraq War, and to any continued geopolitical involvement of the United States in the region. Weiner and Nadler, in particular, have been in the forefront of the “cut and run” caucus. Those who signed their letter don’t just want out of Iraq, however, they want to withdraw completely from everywhere “east of Suez.” Such a retreat would leave a security nightmare in its wake.

Ever since the pro-Western, secularizing Shah of Iran was overthrown by the radical Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, the Middle East has been ripped by the Shi’a-Persian/Sunni-Arab divide. Far more have died in this sectarian struggle than have ever fallen in combat with Israel or Western “imperialists.” Iraq was the front line state against Iran under Saddam Hussein, who became the hero of the Arab world during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. But he brought disaster upon himself when he invaded his ally Kuwait in 1990.

The two countries with the strongest military potentials in the Gulf region are Iran and Iraq. Washington needs a friendly regime in either Tehran or Baghdad. Whatever the proximate cause cited for the invasion of Iraq, the real strategic objective was to replace Saddam with a new government with which the U.S. could cooperate against Iran.

But Iraq is still in turmoil, with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Shia dominated government in crisis. American commanders have made considerable progress in winning the respect of Sunni tribal leaders and turning them against al-Qaeda. But a key part of this improved relationship is a pledge to protect the Sunnis from genocidal attacks by radical Shi’a death squads and Iranian-backed militias.

U.S. forces are again engaged, as they have been during several prior phases of the Iraq campaign, in beating down the pro-Iranian militia of Muqtada al-Sadr, who also heads a powerful Shi’ite bloc in Iraq’s legislative assembly. It is not clear who will win the power struggle within the Shi’ite majority in Iraq, so it is only prudent to strengthen the next line of defense, either to support a unified Iraq or to sustain anti-Iranian forces in a fragmented Iraq.

Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states do not have the manpower to combat Iran, so they need superior weapons which are interoperable with those of the United States. Cooperation in the areas of missile defense, maritime patrol, counterterrorism, and energy security is moving ahead with U.S.-led joint exercises. American trainers, advisors and support personnel will also have to accompany the new weapon systems.

Though a minority in Iraq, the Sunnis are a majority in the Muslim world. In addition to providing material and diplomatic support for what is called by the State Department the Six Plus Two coalition (the GCC plus Egypt and Jordan), a tilt towards the Sunni would also help with Turkey whose governing Islamic Party has caused concerns about the future orientation of the country. But the Turks have long been at odds with the minority Alawi sect of Shi’a, which rules Syria, who people are majority Sunni.

For Congress to block the arms sales would undermine what trust there is between Washington and the Sunni world. It would also fuel the propaganda of both al-Qaeda and Tehran that alleges America is at war with all of Islam, when, in fact, U.S. security interests are in line with those of a majority of Muslims regarding the rising threat from Iran.

Source: FrontPageMagazine.com

Iran's Big Plans

August 31, 2007

By Jeff Emanuel

BAGHDAD, IRAQ - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Tuesday said that "a huge power vacuum" was imminent in Iraq and promised that Iran would be ready to fill it. This plainly-stated desire by the totalitarian regime in Tehran to overtly interfere in the affairs of a sovereign nation -- while simultaneously accusing the US of doing so, despite the fact that coalition forces are still present in Iraq at official invitation of that nation's sovereign government -- should come as no surprise to any who have followed the course of the Iraq war (and postwar) to this point.

From establishing training and base camps for both Shi'a and Sunni fighters (further proof - as if more was needed that sectarian lines are not an obstacle to cooperation if there is a common enemy to be fought), to funding and equipping insurgents within Iraq, Iran's ever-growing involvement in the fight against Iraq, and against the United States within that country, has been both real and pronounced for several years now. That involvement not only includes sending soldiers from the elite Quds Force of Iran's Revolutionary Guard across Iraq's eastern border, it also includes supplying terrorists in Iraq with rockets, assault weapons, and the materials necessary to assemble EFPs (explosively-formed penetrators -- an improvised explosive device which, in the past two years, has become the number one killer of American troops in Iraq).

Major General Rick Lynch, commander of the Ft. Stewart, GA's 3rd Infantry Division (whose 3rd Brigade is one of the ‘Surge' Brigades), which is responsible for the area of Iran from Baghdad south to Salman Pak and the Tigris River Valley, publicly stated that his soldiers are currently "tracking about 50 members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps in [their] area," saying that, while none have been captured at this point, they "are being targeted" like any other insurgent fighters.

Recently, a Public Affairs officer within Multinational Force-Iraq privately expressed his concern to me that the media were spiking or deliberately misrepresenting reports made by the military about Iranian involvement and the capture of Persian fighters within Iraq.

"We would arrest three members of the al Quds force (part of the Revolutionary Guard), and the story that would come out in the papers the next day would be, ‘Three Iranian diplomats arrested from embassy.' I'd call the folks at the papers and say, ‘Look, these folks weren't diplomats, and they weren't at an embassy. They're Iranian soldiers and they were taken while fighting against the coalition in Iraq.' I'd say to them, ‘We have evidence - from weapons to ID cards to uniforms - that proves beyond a doubt who and what they are,' and I'd offer to bring them in and walk through each piece of evidence with them.

"They'd never take me up on it, and would never correct their stories."

Ahmadinejad declared that Iran would work with "neighbors and regional friends like Saudi Arabia" to replace the US in Iraq should a withdrawal take place. Saudi Arabia has, as yet, issued no response to this claim, although common sense would suggest that any dealings the Sunni state had with Shi'a Iran regarding the future of Iraq would be approached with the lessons learned from Russia's 1939 treaty with Hitler's Germany freshly borne in mind. Given the demographics of Iraq (overwhelmingly Shi'a, especially in that southern area closest to Saudi Arabia) and of Saudi itself, whose sizable Shi'a population (located in its eastern oil fields) revolted during the Iranian overthrowing of the Shah, as well as Iran's highly-publicized calls for the destruction of a fellow United Nations member country, it is difficult to imagine the Saudis entering into any agreement with the Persian state -- a natural rival well before the Iraq situation became what it is now - without fully acknowledging the likelihood of the latter violating that good faith.

Add to this Iran's war on the Kurds in its northwest reaches -- a battle which has crossed over into Iraq, and which has caused a number of Iraqi Kurds to flee their mountain homes in search of safety from Persian artillery. Then consider the Iranian funding and arming of terrorists, both Sunni and Shi'a, in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and in Syria and Lebanon, and the picture of the Middle East becomes one of several states and regions. All of these are being interfered with, influenced, or taken on militarily by Iran. Iran appears to have far greater imperialistic and hegemonic designs than most in the area, let alone in the generally-out-of-touch West, have ever dared to contemplate and would ever dare to admit.

Further threatening the region is Iran's blatant pursuit of nuclear weapons -- something which is untenable not only to the US and to Israel, but to Saudi Arabia, which has long depended on America's nuclear capability to act as its own deterrent. Should a rival state in such close proximity suddenly arm itself with nuclear weapons, the balance of power in the region would be even further skewed, resulting in (as the least of our worries) a new nuclear arms race among Muslim states.

This does not even take into account the crisis such a development would cause for Israel, as a nation whose leader has repeatedly and openly called for their destruction would be able to reach them with weapons capable of making that Muslim fantasy a devastating reality. The response by too many in the West to this last, of course, is at best to ignore it, and at worst to applaud the unspeakable barbarism required to commit such an act. In the end, those who swore to "never forget" Europe's own horrific crime against the Jews -- the Holocaust -- and who swore "never again" to allow such an act, are sitting idly by as the next one rapidly approaches.

Sadly, Tehran has chosen this course for itself, entirely independent of international action or of any need to do so. Their "foreign policy" of kidnapping soldiers, diplomats, and tourists for use as bargaining chips, of calling for the annihilation of fellow UN member states, and of sending money and materiel across their western border into a separate and sovereign nation, in hopes of killing as many American soldiers and Iraqi people as possible, is entirely -- and sickeningly -- self-directed.

No third parties or overly aggressive rivals are forcing them to act in such an overtly hostile manner not only toward their neighbors, but also toward the West. Iran has made every one of these choices on its own.

Given this, it is of the utmost importance that the people of America and her fellow Western nations begin to pay attention to the aggression being demonstrated by a hostile Iran. It is time to choose to accept, rather than to obfuscate, through chosen ignorance or through media distortion, the indisputable fact that, whether we like it or not, Iran is not only at war with the sovereign state of Iraq, as well as with America. We must also acknowledge tjay Iran has designs much grander and much more terrible than simply being a force of influence in its neighbors' internal politics.

Iran, quite simply, seeks regional hegemony and their oft-stated second goal of the utter destruction of Israel, along with every one of its citizens.

Iraq is simply the first battleground in a much larger war not only for the Middle East, but for the West as well. Along with this larger war (as has been repeatedly promised by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself) a second Holocaust is coming.

To all of those who promised "never again": wake up now - it is coming. It has already begun in Iraq, and will only grow from there. It is not too late to stop it; however, if the West does not overcome its complacency in the very near future, then it may not be too long before it is in fact too late.

Source: American Thinker

Iran and Syria: Alliance or Legacy?

Hassan Haydar - 30/08/07

Iranian leader Ahmadinejad's call to Saudi Arabia to join him in "filling the void" that will follow American's departure from Iraq implies a recognition of a new regional balance of power. This new status quo follows what Tehran sees as its successful attempt to penetrate the Arab camp - including its managing to replace one of its previous pillars, Syria, which has lost much of its maneuvering room and influence in a formerly wide arena and whose recent moves - particularly in Lebanon - have narrowed this arena.

Damascus and Tehran never cease to remind us that their alliance is deep and coordination between them ongoing. This may be true - but it also may be true that Iran, which used to be a card played by Hafez Assad according to the requirements of his regional power game, now holds Bashar Assad's Syria as a card - both politically and economically. Ahmadinejad's invitation is a clear and unmistakable sign that Damascus is no longer considered a true Arab player - and that his country is its replacement.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 all eyes were on Damascus, whose leader Hafez al Assad seized an opportunity to participate - albeit symbolically - in the war effort but was careful to keep his troops out of Iraqi territory. Thus, Assad ensured a role for his country in the arrangement that followed and reaped the rewards on both a national and international level. Today, however, in the wake of the American occupation of Iraq, attention is on Tehran, who trains, arms, mobilizes and controls a number of Iraqi factions - much as Syria used to do in Lebanon.

The same is taking place in Lebanon, Syria's historical sphere of influence and preoccupation. Step by step, Tehran is replacing Damascus as the power most able to sue for dialogue or confrontation - whereas recent events such as the Hizbullah demonstrations in downtown Beirut or outbreaks of violence at the Arab University show that Damascus's abilities are limited to causing mischief rather than exercising meaningful control over developments. For the power that arms and enjoys close ties with a major sect is the one that makes decisions - while the weaker ally must play along, often at its own expense. Hizbullah's rockets come from Iran's arsenal, its financing from her treasury. Thus, its decisions of war and peace are Iran's, despite the fact that Hizbullah is not neglecting its relations with or the role of Syria. This does not necessarily imply a fundamental mismatch between the interests of Iran and Syria in Lebanon - but it does mean that timing and execution are linked to the formers' calculations.

On the Palestinian front, Hamas is increasingly an arm of Iran - both financially and militarily. The New York Times quotes IDF chief Moshe Kablinsky as saying that Hamas has sent hundreds of fighters for training in Iran and is building a war infrastructure in Gaza consisting of fortifications, tunnels and weapons depots much like Hizbullah built - and continues to build - in southern Lebanon.

Tehran has even 'inherited' Syria's capacity for superficial pronouncements. Just as Syria reaffirms its willingness to seek peace and negotiate for the Golan Heights, just as it sets an example by keeping that border quiet and blaming the conflict on Tel Aviv's intransigence, so Iran beats the drums of war with Zionism and threatens Israel with an early end - to the extent that the listener begins to see Tehran as the "beating heart of Arab nationalism."

Source: Al Hayat

Sunni Shia relations 300807

Mideast power vacuum ‘benefits Iran’

By Najmeh Bozorgmehr

August 28 2007 23

Iran’s president said on Tuesday that diminished US political influence in the Middle East was creating a ‘power vacuum’ that would benefit Iran and other countries in the region.

Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad went on to say that that the US’s “weakening” of the Iraqi government – an apparent reference to recent criticism of prime minister Nouri al-Maliki by senior US politicians – would not help the US maintain control over the country.

The comments are a reminder of Iran’s long-standing ambition to be the top power in the Persian Gulf, as it was before the 1979 Islamic revolution – a nightmare scenario for some of the other countries in the region.

Iran’s nuclear programme – which Tehran says is purely for peaceful purposes – has fuelled Sunni Arab countries’ fears of Shia Iran.

Mr Ahmadi-Nejad was speaking before US president George W. Bush launched a fresh verbal attack on the Tehran regime’s nuclear programme which the US and other western powers believe is designed to produce nuclear weapons.

“Iran’s actions threaten the security of nations everywhere, and the United States is rallying friends and allies to isolate Iran’s regime to impose economic sanctions,” Mr Bush told a US Veteran’s rally. “We will confront this danger before it is too late.”

But Mr Ahmadi-Nejad called for co-operation with some of the regional nations who have expressed concern at its growing influence.

“With the help of neighbours and regional friends like Saudi Arabia, we are ready to fill up this vacuum to the benefit of regional nations and Iraq,” Mr Ahmadi-Nejad said in a press conference. “This is happening… and those who close their eyes are fooling themselves.”

Mr Ahmadi-Nejad downplayed the differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia over Iraq and Lebanon and added that regional co-operation was feasible.

Iran supports the Maliki government and opposes efforts to remove him.

Mr Ahmadi-Nejad warned that changing the Iraq government could “further complicate” the situation for the US accusing the US of fomenting ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq to “loot” Iraqi and Middle East oil “under the pretext of insecurity” in Iraq.

However, he said Iran-US talks over security in Iraq could still continue.

Responding directly to Mr Ahmadi-Nejad’s comments, US state department spokesman Tom Casey said on Tuesday that the US wanted to see Iran play a more positive role in Iraq but that the president’s remarks reflected “just more of the same Iranian rhetoric that claims to hold down support and friendship for the people of Iraq, while actions, unfortunately, take them in the opposite direction.”

Tensions between Iran and the US have been mounting over Tehran’s nuclear programme and its alleged involvement in backing Shia militia in Iraq, while Mr Ahmadi-Nejad once again reiterated that suspension of uranium enrichment - as demanded by United Nations resolutions - was out of the question.

Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, reached an agreement on Monday according to which UN questions about tests with plutonium – fuel for atomic bombs – which Iran says it has no intention to make, were resolved and the UN watchdog considered the issue closed.

Mr Ahmadi-Nejad also shrugged off any possibility of military confrontation but was careful not to make any threats even when he was asked about closing the strategic strait of Hormuz – through which more than 25 per cent of the world’s oil flows: “Intensifying and expanding tensions is not on anyone’s agenda.”

He also doubted the US would put Iran’s revolutionary guards on their list of “terrorist” organisations – a move advocated by some in Washington.

Source: Financial Times

Commentary: The next war?

By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE

After a brief interruption of his New Hampshire vacation to meet President Bush in the family compound at Kennebunkport, Maine, French President Nicolas Sarkozy came away convinced his U.S. counterpart is serious about bombing Iran's secret nuclear facilities. That's the reading as it filtered back to Europe's foreign ministries:

Addressing the annual meeting of France's ambassadors to 188 countries, Sarkozy said either Iran lives up to its international obligations and relinquishes its nuclear ambitions or it will be bombed into compliance. Sarkozy also made clear he did not agree with the Iranian-bomb-or-bombing-of-Iran position, which reflects the pledge Bush made to his loyalists and endorsed by GOP presidential candidate Sen. John McCain and independent Sen. Joe Lieberman. But Sarkozy recognized unless Iran's theocrats stop enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection, we will all be "faced with an alternative that I call catastrophic."

A ranking Swiss official, speaking privately, said, "Anyone with a modicum of experience in the Middle East knows that any bombing of Iran would touch off at the very least regional instability and what could be an unmitigated disaster for Western interests."

Leaks about the Bush administration's plan to brand Iran's 125,000-strong Revolutionary Guards a global terrorist organization are widely interpreted as a major step on the escalator to military action. Belatedly, Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer, has signed a contract with Lockheed Martin for the training of 35,000 elite guards to be assigned to the protection of the kingdom's widely scattered oil installations. With 25 percent of the world's oil reserves, Riyadh has earmarked $5 billion to train and field what will be a high-tech force ASAP. Eighteen months ago the desert kingdom was jolted by an al-Qaida terrorist squad that managed to penetrate the first two layers of defenses at Abqaiq, the nerve center of the entire oil infrastructure.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has now stated publicly his country holds the key to the conditions of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, much criticized by the United States for his lack of leadership and deserted by half his Cabinet, is much praised in Tehran, where he has gone twice in 11 months to confer with Iranian leaders. Ahmadinejad also says Iran is ready to fill the power vacuum in Iraq following a U.S. withdrawal. "The political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly," he said, "and soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region." The United States is not alone in trying to prove Ahmadinejad's geopolitical weather forecast wrong.

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council allies in the Gulf, Egypt and Jordan are terrified at the idea of Iraq falling under Iranian domination. Hoping to head off a U.S.-Iran military confrontation, European countries are still pinning their hopes on major Iranian concessions at the IAEA in Vienna. Iran is back to cooperating with the IAEA -- but only one comma or semicolon at a time. The three EU countries acting as U.S. surrogates on nuclear matters with Iran and IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei detect progress where the United States sees only stalling. Iran is still resisting short-notice inspections of sites that are not officially declared nuclear facilities and where secret nuclear work is believed to be taking place.

Tehran's only objective at the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council is to head off further economic sanctions by its major EU trading partners -- thus, the mantra that its only interest in nuclear matters is as an alternative source of energy in a country already awash in oil taxes credulity.

Both the Bush administration and Israel are painstakingly fashioning a casus belli with Iran. For Israel, the training and weapons support Iran furnishes Hezbollah in Lebanon (now with more rockets of all kinds than it had before the 2006 war when it fired 4,000 into Israel) and Hamas in Gaza (now equipped with Katyusha rockets and a range of 10.6 miles), coupled with Ahmadinejad's existential threats against the Jewish state, are sufficient evidence to justify airstrikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. And for the White House, there is daily evidence of Iran's Revolutionary Guards meddling in Iraq, from improvised explosive devices made in Iran to behind-the-scenes dominance in the affairs of the oil-rich south.

Source: UPI

Arabic Press - Nuclear related 280807

Most important daily news, translated from arabic.

Director General of the Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Ziyad offered to proceed with the first nuclear reactor Jordanian within ten years from now, he will devote part of the company's revenue from the sources of energy and from the production of uranium for a nuclear reactor, which will be devoted to peaceful purposes.

[…] The uses of nuclear energy will be in the desalination industry, and medical uses, in addition to electricity generation.

He stressed that the Kingdom was committed to all international treaties in this regard, pointing out the government's full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

He pointed out the establishment of a department of nuclear engineering in the University of Science and Technology, together with the development of a master's program in nuclear physics at the University of Jordan.

Source : Al Ghad (Jordan)

An official source told "Ad Dustour” the government's intention to develop a new ministry called "Ministry of nuclear energy" shortly, and is expected to assign its functions to the Minister of Education and Higher Education and Scientific Research, Dr. Khalid Touqan.

[…] This topic is linked to the completion of the draft of the peaceful nuclear program and the provision of alternative sources of energy and development of local sources of renewable energy. According to the Ministry of Energy , the first operation of a nuclear reactor for peaceful production is expected by the year 2015, Jordan is attempting to build a nuclear reactor (capacity of 400 megawatts and electric power generation and water desalination of 200 megawatts for a total capacity of 600 megawatts).

Source : Ad Dustour (Jordan)

Reports, Analysis

The Emirates Center For Strategic Studies and Research has been publishing three reports worth reading:

Israel and Arab Peace Initiative: Changing the Text to Effect Normalization

by Ibrahim Abdel Karim

27 Aug 2007

The Israeli official position on the Arab Peace Initiative, which was ratified at the Beirut summit in 2002, has undergone two distinct phases. Initially, the Sharon government rejected the initiative outright and was unwilling even to discuss it. Thereafter, the Olmert government gave it qualified acceptance, based on certain terms and conditions. However, on closer study, one can deduce that these responses have not been at variance with the general Israeli approach toward the issue of peace with Palestinians and Arab countries. How?

Israelis have studied the timing of the Arab peace initiative, its structure, and its related implications. They have looked into the reasons for the decision to “reactivate the initiative” at the Riyadh summit of 2007, and have deliberated on the “change” in circumstances since the launch of the Initiative five years ago. They have studied developments on the Israeli and Palestinian fronts over this period: the results of the second Lebanon war, the effects of the Iraqi war on the region, and the US efforts to control the regional situation to guide it toward a coalition against Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Consequently, an Israeli stance has emerged that was summed up by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert when he said that important decision-making Arab countries now understand that Israel is no longer the “biggest calamity for the Arab world.” He said that the Middle East was witnessing strategic changes and that some moderate Arab countries were ready to confront what he called “radical Islam,” which he considered as the main threat to stability in the Middle East. Olmert also saw that “these changes would have a big influence on the will to make peace with Israel.”

A review of the published material on the Arab Peace Initiative in Israel reveals an emerging Israeli consensus that admits the initiative is based on what it proclaims in its introduction—namely, that Arab countries believe a military solution to the conflict has failed to achieve peace or security for both sides of the conflict. While Israelis do not object to the first paragraph of the Initiative that wants Israel to reconsider its policies, move toward peace, and declare that it desires a just and fair peace as a strategic choice, they object to three demands specified in the second paragraph and deem them as inapplicable. First among these demands is the call for complete withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab lands, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to borders existing on the 4th of June 1967—along with the lands that Israel presently occupies in south Lebanon. The second demand seeks a fair and just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194. The third demand is for the acceptance of a Palestinian state that enjoys full sovereignty over Palestinian territories that have been under Israeli occupation since 4th of June 1967, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as the capital.

Israeli officials have weighed Arab demands against the proposed gains for Israel, as detailed in the Initiative. The third paragraph of the Initiative states that on the fulfillment of the demands listed in the Initiative, the Arab-Israeli conflict would be considered resolved by Arab countries. It also states that Arab countries would then enter into peace agreements with Israel after the security concerns of all countries in the region have been settled, and would normalize relations with Israel within the framework of a comprehensive peace. However, Israelis have claimed that the “the value of the merchandise does not match with the proposed price.” It has raised its concerns over the formula for solving the refugee problem that seeks a resolution on the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution 194, or in accordance with the fourth paragraph of the Initiative that specifically indicates the refusal of any kind of Palestinian settlement in contravention of the special circumstances of Arab countries that host the refugees.

Israel criticizes the initiative on the pretext that it does not leave room for Israeli negotiations on the three traditional Arab and Palestinian demands, and that their complete acceptance by Israel alone would prepare Arab countries to negotiate peace and normalize relations with it. Majority of Israelis, who are ready for negotiations, want to see discussions over the issue of borders for a future Palestinian state and with Syria. However, the Initiative does not hint at an exchange of territories or border alterations that could allow the presence of some settlers. This entails that Israel would have to agree, even before the start of negotiations, to evacuate over 200,000 Israeli settlers from the West Bank.

At the memorial ceremony for David Ben-Gurion on November 27, 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at Sde Boker in the Negev stated that Israel partially accepted the Initiative, despite the fact that the Sharon government had rejected it four years ago. In his speech, he sought assistance of neighboring Arab countries toward solving the conflict in a peaceful manner so that it promotes direct negotiations, and partially accepted the move to “impress upon these countries the necessity of accepting the existence of Israel for normalizing relations.”

In various statements and meetings by Israeli officials, the Arab Peace Initiative has been discussed in order to produce a solution that could be acceptable for Israel—a solution that accepts Israel’s right of existence and for ensures normal relations with Arab states, but leaves out issues related to the Palestinian state, its borders, and Palestinian refugees. Many Israeli experts also emphasize that no side has the right to define “Israel’s borders,” and that this matter needs to be agreed upon by both sides. Moreover, it is averred that the solution of the Palestinian problem should be negotiated between Israel and Palestinians, and that Israel should not be asked to negotiate with Syria due to the complexities of the problem, both inside Israel and between the two sides.

However, a paper released by the Israeli Foreign Ministry (dated 16/05/2007) states that it considered the Arab League Initiative a positive step toward normalizing relations with Israel, although it contained problematic features—like the insistence on the Palestinian “right of return” and the “premature” demands on border-related issues. The document states that the establishment of a Palestinian state should be seen as a solution to the demand of Palestinian “right of return,” as the establishment of Israel was a solution for the historical aspirations of the Jewish people to return to their homeland. It also stated that the ceasefire line of 1967 was never considered a permanent border and that there never was a regional connection between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The paper also stated that the insistence of Arab countries on settling the issue of refugees and the land reveals their unrealistic desire for gains that are inconsistent with the realities that existed in 1967.

The solution of the refugee issue as formulated by the initiative, say Israeli analysts, is a “recipe for Israel’s destruction.” According to Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the Israeli solution is based on the concept of two states, Israel as a homeland for the Jews, and Palestinian state that would be the solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees. She added that consultations among Arab countries should aim at garnering Arab support for negotiations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Livni also proposed to her Egyptian and Jordanian counterparts, Ahmed Abu El-Gheit and Abdul Elah Al-Khateeb, the necessity of changing provisions of the Initiative. She stated that the normalization of relations between Arabs and Israel should not be linked to the latter’s acceptance of the peace initiative. According to Livni it would be important to normalize relations first, so that normalization becomes the road to peaceful coexistence.

As regards Israel’s response to the Arab Peace Initiative, there appear two views on the subject. According to the first view, the Arab Peace Initiative is not acceptable in its current form because it only benefits Palestinians and allegedly even gives a pretext to Palestinians to wriggle out of the first stage of the “Roadmap” peace process. It also considers the Initiative worse than other peace plans, including Security Council Resolution 242, the “Clinton plan” of 2002, and the provisions of the “Roadmap.” From the Israeli perspective, it contains the seeds of a new war and the current Israeli government must cure itself of the disease of “self deceit,” which had earlier led it to the signing of the Oslo agreement with Arafat, the second Intifada, and thousands of causalities.

The Arab Peace Initiative has also aroused a second view in Israel, whose proponents are keen on negotiating over the Initiative. Their eagerness stems from the fact that it is the first time that Arab countries have offered themselves as mediators, not only in solving issues related to the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, but also on regional issues. They have shown their readiness to deal with Israel as part of the solution, and not just as part of the problem. Again, these thinkers link the initiative with the “roadmap” and the Bush vision for two states (Israel and Palestine). They urge that the current golden opportunity should not be missed in the wake of a looming potential threat to Israel, especially with the weakening of the “moderate” Arab regimes and the emergence of radical Islamic movements that are driven by ideology, and not politics. Consequently, it would be unwise to block the road and lose the current opportunity for peace.

In addition to these two visions, several academic proposals have been circulating in Israel that call for the adoption of a policy that welcomes Arab readiness to normalize relations, and accept negotiations on contentious issues. However, it is proposed that the policy should reject any Arab precondition before the start of negotiations, seek to create a rehabilitation fund for assisting refugees outside of the ambit of negotiations, and gradually convince the Arab world against harboring the illusion of the return of refugees. Calls have also been made for a special Israeli peace initiative that should be on par with the Arab Peace Initiative, which Israel could use as a guideline for finding a solution.

Through their ploys of acceptance, refusal, hesitation, and vagueness, Israeli policies have sought to sell misleading concepts, and promote phony formulas that only tickle the toes and fail to treat the headache. This is our problem with those who want to create their history at the expense of others’ rights.

Source : ECSSR

The Collapse of Saudi-Syrian Relations!!

by Bishara Nassar Sharbel

23 Aug 2007

For a long time, Saudi-Syrian relations have been witnessing a downturn, and it now seems that only a miracle could halt the steady decline. It has become clear that points of disagreement between the two countries over the three flashpoints in the region—Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine—have become stronger and deeper than the elements of convergence between them. The commonalities between the two sides, which previously used to compensate for the incompatibilities, have also suffered and it is becoming difficult for both sides to restore them pragmatically.

In fact, it is not strange to find that differences in Saudi-Syrian relations have become public. However, it is indeed unusual to note a break in the conservative and pacifist style of Saudi diplomacy that was evident in its unexpectedly strong response to the criticism by Syrian Vice-President Farouk Al-Sharaa, who called Saudi diplomacy as “virtually paralyzed.”

However, there has been more than one reason for Riyadh to give up on the possibility of forging an understanding with Damascus. Perhaps, the most important among these appears to be Syria’s final decision to enter into a strategic alliance with Iran, which is incompatible with Saudi and Arab interests. The move has a bearing on developments on the Iraq front, which has witnessed a growth in Iranian influence with the rise of Shiite community there, and the introduction of Iran as a player on the Arab-Israeli front through Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. In fact, the latter launched a coup in Gaza—at the instance of Khaled Mashaal from Damascus against the authority of Mahmoud Abbas—even before the ink had dried on an agreement for which the Kingdom had risked its prestige.

The third factor that has contributed in Saudi-Syrian tensions is the situation in Lebanon. Saudi-Syrian relations have suffered since the assassination of President Rafik Al-Hariri, whose family accuses Damascus of the crime. These differences became evident in an unpleasant meeting between Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, as well as in Saudi displeasure at a statement by Syrian president, in which the latter described Arab leaders as “half-men,” following the July war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.

Saudi officials blame Damascus for their failure in fulfilling their commitments, made in their direct talks and with Egyptian officials, over playing a constructive role on all controversial issues. They also blame Damascus for encouraging all that contravenes Saudi interests and for thwarting attempts at rebuilding an Arab system, which seeks to secure the interests of all players in the region. It seems that Riyadh has given up on the idea of bringing Damascus into the Arab mainstream. After the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri and in spite of the reverses it had suffered as a result, Riyadh had gambled on the renewal of a Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian axis, which had survived for 25 years in trying circumstances. However, the Saudi venture achieved little, exactly as Egyptians had previously warned it. One Saudi official summed up the situation by quoting the famous Egyptian phrase, “It is of no use.” The same day, Egyptians disclosed documents that allegedly proved Damascus’ involvement with organizations that seek to destabilize Iraq. They stated that President Bashar Al-Assad had finally opted for the Iranian camp, as he sees his alliance with Iranas indispensable for his regime.

In the past few months, several developments have impeded Saudi Arabia’s will for reconciliation with Syria. Firstly, the collapse of “Mecca agreement” between the Palestinians and Hamas’ invasion of Gaza has undermined ties with Syria and, secondly, Riyadh believes Syria has become a gateway and a training base for Saudi “Al-Qaeda” extremists. Some of these extremists were recently arrested in Lebanon and in Iraq and others were killed in “Fatah Al-Islam” battles against Lebanese army or against the Iraqi and American forces in Iraq.

The third critical development has been the visit of President Ahmadinejad to Damascus and the establishment of a Syrian-Iranian front that includes both Hamas and “Hezbollah”—an axis that is fundamentally incompatible with the Saudi policies in the region. The fourth, and perhaps the most important factor, is that Saudi Arabia is certain that Syria will not facilitate the election of Lebanese president and will not help in stabilizing Lebanon as long as the threat of the international tribunal on Hariri’s assassination hangs over its head. Riyadh had pressed for the tribunal’s establishment by the Security Council, and thus it refuses to bargain over it since it is a means for achieving justice, preventing assassinations, restoring peace in Lebanon, and a way for drawing lines of interest.

In light of these differences, the last meeting of Arab foreign ministers that took place at Arab League headquarters was unsuccessful and was followed by the absence of Riyadh from regional international meetings, which was held in Damascus to discuss the security situation in Iraq.

Within the framework, a campaign has been initiated by allies of the Syrian regime in Lebanon over the Kingdom’s role and its quest to secure the election of a president through consensus—which is certainly not General Michel Aoun. Damascus seems to be supportive of Aoun’s election to counter “March 14” forces and to ensure Christian backing for Hezbollah.

The collapse of Saudi-Syrian ties is not just the result of rivalry between two Arab countries that is engendered by the media, which would cease with the end of campaigns and reconciliatory visits. It marks the end of hopes for the revival of an Arab system that could ensure protection of the Arab world from all challenges. These include the challenge of the US war on terrorism, the challenge of domestic terrorism, the challenge of Iranian ambitions, the challenge of Israeli arrogance and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the challenge to the stability of Arab states.

For Saudis, Syria has lost its ability to be a force for stability, which had been the reason behind their long-standing cooperation for over a quarter of a century. All that remains now are sordid details of boycotted meetings, sporadic verbal exchanges—such as the unexpected criticism as expressed by Riyadh in reference to reported statement by Farook Al-Sharaa. Sharaa has become one of the hard-line figures in the Syrian regime and a strong advocate of an alliance with Iran, who favors regional confrontation as opposed to a stagnant stability.

Source : ECSSR

American Military Deals… Restructuring Alliances in the Region

by Shehata Mohammed Nasser

09 Aug 2007

Recent developments in the Middle East region highlight a general trend toward restructuring political and military alliances, and the building of new fronts of confrontation. The recently held conference in the Egyptian city of Sharm El-Sheikh falls within this ambit, wherein foreign ministers of Arab countries—the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt and Jordan—conferred with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, under what has become known as the (1+2+6) formula. This conference was held in the context of building a “moderate axis,” that would include many Arab countries, as opposed to a “hard-line axis,” which includes Iran, Syria and the Lebanese movement, Hezbollah. With clear US suggestion of an “Iranian threat” to the security of the region, the final communiqué of the conference reiterated the pledge of taking a strong collective stand, in case any Gulf state is subjected to foreign threat.

The important fact to be noted here is that the United States has been working on building a “coalition of moderates” along side Israel against the oft-repeated “Iranian threat.” Meanwhile, the US has also announced new military deals and aid for Gulf States, Egypt, and Israel to the tune of $63 billion—with $20 billion worth of arms sale to Saudi Arabia, $13 billion in military aid to Egypt, and $30 billion in military subsidies to Israel. These grants, the US Secretary of State stated explicitly, are aimed at confronting the threat posed by Iran and Syria. It is also noteworthy that Israel, for the first time in its history, has not objected to the military deals between Washington and Arab countries. On the contrary, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that his country understood the position of the United States in supporting “moderate Arab states.”

Washington has been working on developing two principal tacks for drawing alliances and for carrying out historic moves to promote its proposed alliance in the region. The first relates to promotion of the idea that Iran is the main threat to the security of the region, and not Israel. The US is projecting the view that Iran is interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq, that Iran is spreading the Shiite influence in the region, that it is preventing a breakthrough in the Lebanese political crisis, and that it is also interfering in regional affairs with its support for Hamas and Hezbollah. To top it all, Iran is said to be acquiring nuclear weapons that will enable it to impose its hegemony on the Gulf region, and even the whole of Middle East. On the other hand, the US is mooting the idea that it is possible to achieve peace with Israel, and that it is possible to coexist with Israel’s nuclear capabilities because the latter is a democratic state where decisions are taken by democratic institutions, as opposed to Iran where individuals and religious ideology dictate political and military decisions. In this context, the reason for US drive to push Israel into making more concessions for peace with the Palestinians becomes clear. It is in this backdrop that the international peace conference called on by US President Bush should be viewed, as well as the visit of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Arab countries, where his talks about the “Iranian threat” has been interspersed with statements about reviving peace prospects.

The second tack is to change the conflict in the region from an ‘Arab–Israeli’ struggle to an ‘Iran-versus-the region’ clash, whereby it would be important to underline the threat posed by Teheran to Arabs and Israel alike. Based upon this rationale, Arab countries that are wary of the Iranian threat are candidates of this alliance. This explains why Arab countries—such as the Gulf States, Egypt, and Jordan—are part of the “moderate axis,” even as other more moderate Arab countries do not feature in this alliance. Therefore, the criteria for membership of this alliance are not actually related to the standards of moderation, but on how concerned an Arab country is about the “Iranian threat.” Based on this reasoning, Washington has now included Israel into its “coalition of moderates,” through the planned activation of the peace process.

Thus, Washington is reverting to its old method of countering Iran by engaging it in a regional confrontation. This method was employed soon after the Iranian revolution of 1979, when the US had pushed Saddam Hussein into a war against Iran for eight years, which with the backing of Arabs. This is happening again, through moves to forge a coalition of moderates that includes both Arabs and Israel. In fact, a recent study published Brookings Institution advised the US administration to support its regional allies and to push them into confronting Iran.

With the new coalition that the United States is trying to forge in the Middle East, the Bush administration has backed out on the three policies that it had espoused for the region soon after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. These policies included support for democracy, formation of a Greater Middle East, and an alliance with Shiite Islam. However, after less than three years of her famous speech at the American University of Cairo—in which she said that her country’s policy in the region will be based on supporting democracy— by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has backed out of the policy and has forged alliances with the very countries she had earlier demanded to reform. Similarly, the vision of “Greater Middle East,” which along with Arab countries was supposed to cover countries, such as Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan among others, has faded out and Washington is now talking of a “lesser Middle East,” which would include a few “moderate” Arab countries, along with Israel. Similarly, the United States had earlier forged an alliance with Shiite Islam, which it had then termed as a “flexible and peaceful Islam,” as opposed to the radical Sunni “Bin-Ladenism.” This alliance was clearly in evidence in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. However, Washington again changed its Iraq policy, and it now seeks to forge a coalition of “moderates,” that in reality is a “Sunni coalition” to counter the raging Iranian “Shiite tide” in the region.

This turnaround reveals the state of disarray in which the Bush administration find itself and highlights the drawbacks of its policies in the region, which have been largely guided by unrealistic ideological convictions and theorizing. In fact, the plan for a new coalition against Iran may end up as another failed policy, and may reconfirm the US inability to understand the complexities of the region.

Despite the fact that the Iranian policy and many political speeches emanating from Iran raise the specter of danger for Arab and Gulf countries, one does not find a collective vision emerging from “moderate” Arab countries over the “Iranian threat,” because GCC member countries do not have a common position on Iran, or even the threat it poses. In fact, the Foreign Minister of the Sultanate of Oman does not see it as a source of danger. The same applies to Egypt and Jordan where positions differ regarding the nature of this threat. Even if a consensus over the Iranian threat is evolved, it will still pose a danger, as there will be a difference between the Arab and the US perspectives.

As for Israel, many factors make it difficult for Arab countries to forge an alliance with it against Iran. The most important factor is that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, and occupies Arab countries. Moreover, there are still no signs that it seriously intends to establish a viable Palestinian state, on account of its technological and military supremacy. In addition, a clear contradiction is evident in the US proposal on this matter, because just as it is trying to form an alliance with moderates to confront Iran, we find it holding dialogue with Iran as well. In fact, it has been insisting on the continuation of its dialogue with Iran, and is also supporting Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, one of the main allies of Iran in Iraq and the region.

The problem with the US policy in the Middle East, under the presidency of Bush Jr., is that it has adopted significant and radical measures that are based on unrealistic and ideological precincts. For this reason, they have failed on implementation. However, instead of forcing US policymakers to better understand the region, These failures have driven them into ensuring that progress on the new proposal of an Arab–Israeli coalition against a common threat is made before the end of Bush’s second term in the White House. However, all signs indicate that this scheme will not prove to be more successful than any of the previous ones, diversely labeled as the policies of “constructive chaos,” “Greater Middle East,” the “democratic domino effect” etc., which eventually failed and have led the region to its current state of tensions and instability.

Source : ECSSR

Sunni Shia relations 280807

Bush to say Iraq is front line against Iran, Al-Qaeda

Mon Aug 27, 10:16 PM ET

US President George W. Bush on Tuesday will describe Iraq as the front-line against Shiite extremism championed by Iran and the Sunni extremism of Al-Qaeda, an aide said Monday.

Bush was due to level the charge in a speech to the American Legion veterans group, the second of two presidential addresses meant to bolster support for the war in Iraq ahead of a critical September 15 progress report.

"The president will talk about Sunni extremism and Shia extremism. Neither represents Islam. They represent a brutal and heartless ideology of death and destruction," a senior aide told reporters in a preview of the speech.

"Sunni extremism is embodied by Al Qaeda and its many affiliates. Shia extremism by Iran and its support of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban and its pursuit of nuclear technology," the official said on condition of anonymity.

"Iraq is at the heart of where these two extremisms must be dealt with," the official said as Bush traveled here for a political fundraiser.

"Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian armed and supported Shia militias continue to undermine the Iraqi struggle for security and stability and continue to kill Americans forces," the official said.

Bush will plead for patience from lawmakers pending an assessment on the war from the US commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, and the US ambassador to Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, the official said.

Bush is to deliver the speech in Reno, Nevada, after attending a political fundraiser here.

Source: AFP via Yahoo News

Huge Saudi force to defend oilfields from al-Qaida

Ian Black, Middle East editor

Tuesday August 28, 2007

Anxieties about al-Qaida attacks and a US-led war against Iran have prompted Saudi Arabia to establish a special force - being trained by an American defence contractor - to protect its oilfields. Saudi authorities have already recruited 5,000 members of the Facilities Security Force and plan to raise the number to 8,000-10,000 over the next two years, in a project being run by the Lockheed Martin Corporation, officials confirmed.

Nervousness has been growing recently about the impact of attacks by al-Qaida-related groups and possible retaliation by Iran in the event of US or Israeli strikes on its nuclear installations.

Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil producer and home to 25% of its proven reserves. It has more than 80 oil and gas fields and 11,000 miles of pipeline.

The plan to set up a force that will eventually number 35,000 to guard oil and other installations was announced in July by the country's interior minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz. The Middle East Economic Survey (Mees) reported: "The scale of the latest security initiative is immense and several years are likely to elapse until the new force is fully capable." The total cost was likely to reach $5bn (£2.48bn), it said.

According to Mees, recruits are being trained in the use of laser security and satellite imaging surveillance equipment, countermeasures and crisis management under a programme managed by Lockheed Martin. Members of the force are being heavily vetted and largely recruited from outside the Saudi security forces. The protection of oil facilities is currently the responsibility of a 15,000-strong force run by Aramco, the state oil corporation.

Saudi Arabia has seen several attacks on its infrastructure, but none has so far disrupted the flow of oil. In February 2006, al-Qaida attacked the Abqaiq oil facilities in Eastern Province, which supplies almost 10% of the world's oil. The attack did not stop exports, but pushed up oil prices by $2 a barrel.

Saudi officials say the kingdom, the birthplace of Osama bin Laden, has foiled 180 operations by al-Qaida since 2003. In April, the interior ministry said 172 terrorist suspects had been arrested, and weapons and cash seized. Some had gone abroad to learn to fly aircraft and were allegedly plotting attacks on oil facilities and army bases. The most sensitive energy targets are Abqaiq and the refining and export facilities at Ras Tanoura and Juaymah on the Gulf and the Rabigh and Yanbu complexes on the Red Sea.

The US recently announced it had put together an arms package worth at least $20bn over 10 years for Saudi Arabia.

Source: Guardian Unlimited

About-face on Iran coming?

A new US strategy for victory in Iraq may be in the works, warns Hassan Nafaa

That the US is knee-deep trouble in Iraq is hardly in dispute. Few inside or outside the US contest that fact or doubt the reasons that led to it. And yet, some still argue that the whole thing is little more than correctable "mistakes" by a reckless administration. Others wonder if a face-saving exit is still possible. But at least a few maintain that a "strategic victory" is attainable in Iraq.

For a long time, the current US administration refused even to admit committing mistakes in Iraq. For a long time, it maintained that victory was around the corner. The admission that a real problem exists came hesitantly and late. It came only after the Baker-Hamilton Commission issued its well-known report last year. Even then, the current administration kept arguing that the problems it was facing in Iraq were no more than "snags" attributed to "tactical errors" that can be corrected and that a complete and unambiguous victory was not to be ruled out. In short, the US administration rejected the prognosis offered by the Commission and went on doing things its own way.

The commission said that the situation in Iraq would get worse unless a major policy change occurred. It reviewed a number of options, but ruled them all out because of concern for the US reputation and Iraq's stability. Those options included: quick withdrawal from Iraq, maintaining the current policies with no change, increasing the number of troops, or dividing Iraq into three parts. After excluding those options, the report suggested a new policy based on two components. The first component was external, involving a "new diplomatic offensive" to rally international support and help Iraq.

The second component was internal, focusing on helping Iraq help itself. The commission made 78 recommendations, suggesting that the US launch a diplomatic offensive in an attempt to reassure the world that the US was not after Iraq's oil and didn't want to have military bases in that country against the wishes of its people.

It made two main conclusions. One was that the US couldn't get out of the Iraqi morass without the help of others. The second was that the Middle East crises were interlinked, and the US needed to address all of them simultaneously. The report urged the current administration to build bridges with both Syria and Iran and make a renewed bid to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

But the US administration went for the exact opposite. Instead of gradually reducing its fighting troops and redeploying them outside turbulent Iraqi towns, the US administration decided to increase troops and send them into more battles inside turbulent areas in the hope of quashing or at least weakening the resistance.

Instead of courting Iran and Syria, the US administration decided to tighten sanctions against them and isolate them internationally. And instead of doing more to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, a matter that would have required serious pressures on Israel and attempts to unify the Palestinian position, the US administration decided to alienate Hamas and impose a stricter blockade on the Palestinian people. The US administration blocked all attempts to unify Palestinian factions and encouraged Israel to adopt hard-line and belligerent policies.

This approach, which hardly differed from earlier US policies, deepened the dilemma of the US administration. As a result, the security and military situation in Iraq got worse. And the Lebanon war last year didn't, as some hoped, weaken "the axis of the extremists" in the region. On the contrary, Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas, and Jihad emerged stronger, while pro- US forces looked hapless and lame. Consequently, the US administration found itself in a more awkward place than it was at the time the Baker-Hamilton Commission was issued two years ago. All the US administration did was waste time and money to no avail.

Because the US administration knows that time is running out, it has to do one of two things. Either it accepts defeat and pulls out immediately, which would damage the US standing as a superpower. Or it escalates the confrontation through an all-out attack on the "axis of the extremists." The latter option cannot be ruled out, considering how rightwing and dogmatic this administration is and how inept is the man who leads it. The only problem is that this second option is too perilous, for the prospects of a decisive victory are nil in the long run.

Some members of the neoconservative US elite, who haven't yet despaired of winning the war in Iraq, are now busy looking for a third option. Among the barrage of ideas that surfaced of late, the views of William S Lind are interesting. Lind is the director of the Centre for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. He summed up his views on the Iraqi debacle in an article published 30 July in The American Conservative under the title, "How to win in Iraq".

In that article, Lind notes that the US administration still defines victory as it did at the war's outset: an Iraq that is an American satellite, friendly to Israel, happy to provide the US with a limitless supply of oil and vast military bases from which American forces can dominate the region. None of these objectives, he argues, are now attainable. Lind believes that the attempts to quell urban disturbances in Iraq are based on the wrong assumptions. He argues that the war can still be won on a strategic level, not through "small tactical gains." Lind suggests that the new US strategy must employ what the British military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart called an "indirect approach."

The threat facing the US is not coming from any state, but from a collection of groups using non-conventional methods commonly labelled "terrorism", Lind argues. Such groups can only flourish in situations where governments are weak. He calls for a new strategy of three elements to win the war on a "strategic" level.

The first element is to engage Iran in a rapprochement, just as the US did with China in the early 1970s. At the time, China was creating more than one Vietnam in order to sap the US power. Likewise, the groups hostile to the US are trying to create more than one Iraq in order to baffle the Americans. Lind believes that it would be hard to undermine such groups without having a strong government in Iraq, which requires rapprochement with Iran. He admits that pro-Iranian Shiites may end up dominating the Iraqi government, but that should not be a problem so long as a strong Iraqi state evolves.

The second element of Lind's strategy is to allow the Sadr group, which is popular in Iraqi streets, to achieve its full political potential. The US will have to pay a price for that, such as giving up the prospect of military bases in Iraq. So far, the US has been trying to suppress the Sadr group while favouring unpopular, pro-American groups. This approach, Lind says, has weakened successive governments and reduced their ability to control the situation on the ground. Lind admits there is no guarantee Al-Sadr would be able to form a strong Iraqi government, but the chance is worth taking. The US administration, he says, must allow Al-Sadr, or anyone who can, to establish a strong government in Iraq.

The third element of the strategy is to withdraw all US forces within 12-18 months. This move would provide enough time for Al-Sadr or other parties to put together a government. This wouldn't be the withdrawal of a defeated army, Lind argues, but a step toward strategic victory. Withdrawal would be good for the army and for the US public, he argues.

The above strategy may exacerbate the Sunni- Shiite divisions not just in Iraq but across the region, but Lind is not worried about that. In fact, he believes those divisions might prove beneficial to the new US strategy in the region.

These are quite disturbing proposals. Lind's ideas entail certain risks to the Arab world and Iran. Admittedly, Tehran may be temporarily pleased to see a friendly government in Iraq, but the cost may prove too high. The US is likely to use Shiite-Sunni divisions to turn Sunni Arab countries against Iran. The main beneficiary of Lind's proposed strategy would be Israel and the US. The implications for the Sunnis and the Shiites are frightening. It seems that the US is heading toward a dual containment policy of both Shiite fundamentalism and Sunni Wahhabism. So perhaps this is time for Shias and Sunnis, as well as Arabs and Iranians, to sit together and talk.

Source : Al Ahram Weekly (Egypt)

The Gasoline Crisis in Iran

By: Y. Mansharof and A. Savyon

In late June 2007, the Iranian government launched a comprehensive gasoline rationing policy, necessitated, in part, by the growing demand for gasoline in Iran's domestic market that could not be met by its oil production infrastructure.

Although Iran is among the world's major exporters of crude oil, it has limited processing and refining facilities, and thus must import most of its refined oil for domestic use. There has been no significant investment in developing its oil refining facilities since the Shah's era, and Iran depends entirely on imported gasoline.

It also appears that the gasoline rationing was launched in anticipation of additional sanctions against Iran, including a ban on oil imports and exports, which may be imposed in response to Iran's refusal to freeze its uranium enrichment. [1] Additionally, there have been recent reports that foreign companies are significantly curtailing their investment in developing Iran's oil fields, with the result that many projects have been suspended. [2] The reduced activity by foreign companies is probably the result of heavy pressure by the U.S., as part of the sanctions against Iran.

Iran was subjected to sanctions against oil trade as early as 1951, following the nationalization of oil resources by Iran's then-president MohammadMossadegh. Though the Iranian economy was able to withstand these sanctions, and the resulting oil crisis, they had a lasting psychological impact on Iranian society. [3]

Iran has recently extended the duration of the rationing. Originally, a monthly ration of 100 liters per private vehicle was imposed, for a period of four months. However, in July 2007, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's advisor Ali Akbar Mehrabian, the newly appointed minister of industries and mines who is in charge of implementing the rationing, announced that the new policy would remain in effect until March 2008. [4]

Despite the rationing, it seems that per-capita gasoline consumption has not falled. On August 19, 2007, the Iranian news agency Baztab reported that "most of the citizens, especially in the large cities and in areas with heavy traffic, exceed their monthly ration by about 100 liters." [5] Figures posted by the reformist online daily Rooz indicate that, during July 28-August 3, 2007, Iran's gasoline consumption reached 416.6 million liters, and in the following week, it rose even further, to 431.9 million liters. [6]

Nevertheless, the rationing system is impacting all areas of life in Iran, [7] and has led to the emergence of gasoline black market as well as to profiteering, which the authorities are trying to stamp out.

Following is a review of reactions to the gasoline rationing in Iran.

Public Protest and Official Reactions

The decision to ration gasoline sparked riots in Tehran, resulting in the arrest of 80 individuals. According to reports, over 40 gasoline pumps were torched, public facilities were severely damaged, and shops were looted. The conservative new agency Fars posted a video showing a mob looting a supermarket following the authorities' announcement of the rationing program

(http://switch3.castup.net/cunet/gm.asp?ClipMediaID=1140593&ak=null ). [8] There were also unconfirmed reports that a number of people had been killed during the riots. [9]

By order of the authorities, the Iranian media is not permitted to cover the negative effects of the gasoline rationing, or to publish analyses or criticism on this issue. In a July 5, 2007 article in the reformist daily Rooz, dissident journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi condemned the government censorship, saying that "the restrictions have increased to such an extent that it is no longer possible to write or to publish [articles] on any issue that affects [life] in Iran. These days... in addition to the prohibition against [publishing] reports or op-eds on the nuclear crisis [or] on the possibility of an American [military] attack... there is a prohibition against writing [anything] serious about the gasoline rationing, about Ahmadinejad's visits [to the provinces], about the inflation - or, in short, about any important issue that affects the fate of our society..." [10]

While placing restrictions on the media, the authorities have been waging a propaganda campaign touting the benefits of the rationing, stating that it allows the channeling of resources into developing the country. [11] Ahmadinejad said that the program "is an opportunity to make great changes in Iran's economy and industry." [12] He also asked MPs to support the government on this issue and to refrain from discussing the option of permitting gasoline to be sold on the free market. [13]

The rationing program is also supported by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. On June 30, 2007, he declared that "the present conditions in Iran are excellent... The decision to ration gasoline was one of the government's courageous steps. We must continue to implement it, while examining all its aspects..." [14] At the same time, Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai criticized the "unsatisfactory" way in which the program was being implemented, and proposed that citizens be allowed to buy high-priced gasoline on the free market to supplement the rations. [15]

Protest in the Majlis

Despite Ahmadinejad's demand, Majlis members have been protesting against the rationing program and against how it is being run. MP Sanati Mehrabani, who, following the rioting proposed a bill to cancel the rationing, said during a Majlis session to Iranian Interior Minister Mostafa Pour Mohammadi: "If the purpose of your gasoline rationing [policy] is to destroy the country - you have succeeded, and I congratulate you on your success. But if the purpose is to help the impoverished farmers, the government has not succeeded [in attaining this goal]." [16]

MP Hassan Shojaee asked, "Do you know what problems the people are forced to face in their daily lives because of the gasoline rationing?... Do you think that busing [companies] haven't stopped transporting tourists around the country because of the rationing, causing substantial losses to owners of hotels, rental houses, and shops catering to tourists? Do you know that after months of toil in the fields, the farmers need to use their vehicles to bring their produce to market, but [that since they are prevented from doing so] the crops remain in their possession, and they can find no one to buy them, even at a reduced price?... Ambulances have no fuel to carry the sick... Was it a courageous [step] to inflict all this damage and catastrophe upon the people?..." [17]

An article on the Iranian website Alef, which is affiliated with MP Ahmad Tavakkoli, head of the Majlis Strategic Research Center, criticized the fact that the implementation of the rationing program was entrusted to associates of Ahmadinejad who lacked the necessary experience: "Fifty days after the introduction of the rationing policy… the reports of its implementation… are worrying and despairing… It seems that the honorable president [Ahmadinejad] either does not assign enough importance to this issue or is unaware of how the program is being run. In light of the security and ethical ramifications [of the rationing program], and its [grave] ramifications in the lives of the people, the people's representatives in the Majlis should give the government a resounding slap [in the face]… Today, the honorable president must explain to the nation's representatives why he has entrusted the implementation of the gasoline rationing program… to individuals who lack experience." [18]

Iranian Website Warns of Impending Crisis

An analysis posted July 22, 2007 on the Alef website criticized the government propaganda, which is emphasizing the achievements of the rationing program while disregarding the hardships that the people are experiencing under it. The following are excerpts:

"The reports concerning the implementation of the gasoline rationing program and the policy which disregards [the difficulties faced by the population]... are becoming increasingly disturbing. If we liken the public transportation system and the [problem of] gasoline consumption to a [hospital] patient, and the gasoline rationing [program] to surgery, [we can say that] 24 days after this complicated surgery, the patient's condition is deteriorating. Instead of keeping watch at the patient's bedside around the clock and monitoring his vital signs, the medical team (the senior officials in charge of the rationing program)… have left him on his own, and are busy discussing the initial benefits of the surgery (i.e. the significant decrease in gasoline consumption, the elimination of smuggling, traffic improvements, and reduced air pollution). They do not realize that if the healing process does not continue rapidly and under close supervision, their patient will expire, and all those initial benefits of the surgery will be lost.

"During the past two or three weeks, confidential reports have given an alarming picture of the state of the urban and intercity public transportation: [Public] services are shutting down; some taxi drivers are trading in gasoline [rationing cards], while others do not [even] receive [the cards]; taxi services are gradually coming to a standstill; prices of intercity public transportation have significantly risen… The public is feeling the effects of this [crisis] directly.

"Right now, in mid-summer, when the demands on urban public transportation are minimal, [these] reports may appear negligible. However, each one of them is a piece of a puzzle which, if put together, would present an alarming picture of impending crisis: torched buses, looted banks and shops, gas stations set on fire by people fed up with the inflation, apartment shortages, and interminable lines of [standing] buses, trains and taxis - [and all this] by mid-September 2007 (when the demands on public transportation will be at their peak)." [19]

* Y. Mansharof is a Research Fellow at MEMRI; A. Savyon is Director of MEMRI's Iranian Media Project.

Source : MEMRI