Sunni Shia relations 150907

US kills two birds with one stone

By By Ansar Abbasi

9/15/2007

ISLAMABAD: Washington has cunningly but latently manoeuvred the Nawaz Sharif's exile to kill the proverbial two birds with one stone – it sowed a seed of distrust between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and smoothened the return of Benazir Bhutto by excluding her most potential political threat.

Although Washington constantly denies having played any role in what it publicly terms the internal affairs of Pakistan, reports of the American involvement in both the affairs are refusing to subside.

In case of Benazir-Musharraf future cooperation, both the Presidency and the Pakistan People's Party informally agreed to have been facing the American pressure to strike a deal for future cooperation. Ruling PML Chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain has once even said that the westerns (Goray) are pressing for the Benazir-Musharraf deal to which Shujaat's party is opposing tooth and nail.

In case of Nawaz Sharif's exile, some Middle Eastern countries had seriously tried to blackout the event from the private Pakistani television channels broadcasted there. A journalist in one of these countries was clearly told by the local authorities that they are under pressure from Washington to do this.

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif initially wanted to come to Islamabad after seven years of exile via Dubai but changed his mind after being warned that the Dubai authorities might divert him to Riyadh because of the American pressure.

But the way the Saudi government responded to Nawaz Sharif's decision to return wondered most if not all here. Believing in silent diplomacy and enjoying extremely good relations with Pakistan and its people, Riyadh not only sent its intelligence chief to Pakistan but also asked Islamabad to re-exile the PML-N Quaid as soon as he lands.

On the very day when Nawaz Sharif was exiled, Chaudhry Shujaat admitted in a Geo News talk show that not only he but President Musharraf was also of the view to allow Nawaz Sharif entry into Pakistan as per the decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Shujaat, however, disclosed that still the former premier was exiled because of Saudi rulers' insistence that Sharif should be deported back to Riyadh.

There is no doubt in anyone's mind here that the otherwise extremely cautious and never willing to get themselves involved into any controversy, Riyadh was under tremendous pressure from US to do this.

Riyadh is keeping a complete mum on the subject. However, Washington is denying to have played any role in Nawaz Sharif's exile. The US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte when asked told reporters the other day here in Islamabad that the deportation of Nawaz Sharif was "an internal Pakistani political and legal matter and it is for the government, people and authorities of Pakistan to decide".

Against this apparent distance from the internal affairs of Pakistan, the sources said that both Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State, and Negroponte even during their latest visits had discussed with authorities here the issue of Benazir Bhutto's deal with Musharraf and the forced exile of Nawaz Sharif.

As reported earlier, the Americans expect from the president to continue wooing Benazir for an understanding despite the "odd" demands put forward by the PPP chairperson whom they say they have already pressed to support General Pervez Musharraf.

Analysts believe here that ensuring the exile of Nawaz Sharif, the Americans on one side has smoothened the return of Benazir Bhutto, who would now find an open political field upon her arrival to benefit as much as is possible for her.

But through Nawaz Sharif's exile manoeuvre the Americans, it is believed, have tried to dent the unprecedented relationship between the governments and the people of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Never anyone in Pakistan had ever thought of uttering a word against Saudi Arabia neither was there any such reason available to them.

However, the Sharif's exile has generally hurt the Pakistani nation and the question is raised if relationship with a foreign country, no matter how deep and strong it is, could carry on if citizens of one state feel that their sovereignty and independence has been challenged by a friendly state.

Pakistan has almost one million of its human resource that include highly skilled professionals like doctors, engineers, computer scientists, bankers, accountants etc and the skilled and non-skilled labour, presently taking part in the development of Saudi Arabia. In return, Islamabad gets huge remittances from there.

In the backdrop of the May 1998 nuclear explosions conducted by Pakistan, it was Saudi Arabia that came to the rescue of Islamabad and offered free oil worth billions of dollars. This facility continued to be available for Pakistan for five years.

Pakistan has been of great help to Saudi Arabia on defence matters. The Saudi people and their government rely on Pakistan's defence capabilities in the need of the hour.

Nawaz Sharif's case is first-ever shadow on the cemented relations between the two countries. Now it depends on both the countries and their people if they would allow any evil design to create a rift between them.

Source: The News

Proxy war could soon turn to direct conflict, analysts warn

Julian Borger and Ian Black

Saturday September 15, 2007

The growing US focus on confronting Iran in a proxy war inside Iraq risks triggering a direct conflict in the next few months, regional analysts are warning.

US-Iranian tensions have mounted significantly in the past few days, with heightened rhetoric on both sides and the US decision to establish a military base in Iraq less than five miles from the Iranian border to block the smuggling of Iranian arms to Shia militias.

The involvement of a few hundred British troops in the anti-smuggling operation also raises the risk of their involvement in a cross-border clash.

US officers have alleged that an advanced Iranian-made missile had been fired at an American base from a Shia area, which if confirmed would be a significant escalation in the "proxy war" referred to this week by General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq.

"The proxy war that has been going on in Iraq may now cross the border. This is a very dangerous period," Patrick Cronin, the director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said.

Iran's leaders have so far shown every sign of relishing the confrontation. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared yesterday that American policies had failed in the Middle East and warned: "I am certain that one day Bush and senior American officials will be tried in an international court for the tragedies they have created in Iraq."

In such circumstances, last week's Israeli air strike against a mystery site in northern Syria has triggered speculation over its motives. Israel has been silent about the attack. Syria complained to the UN security council but gave few details. Some say the target was Iranian weapons on their way to Hizbullah in Lebanon, or that the sortie was a dry run for a US-Israeli attack on Syria and Iran. There is even speculation that the Israelis took out a nuclear facility funded by Iran and supplied by North Korea.

The situation is particularly volatile because the struggle for influence threatens to exacerbate a confrontation over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

The US has called a meeting of major powers in Washington next Friday to discuss Iran's defiance of UN resolutions calling for its suspension of uranium enrichment. It comes amid signs that the Bush administration is running out of patience with diplomatic efforts to curb the nuclear programme. Hawks led by the vice-president, Dick Cheney, are intensifying their push for military action, with support from Israel and privately from some Sunni Gulf states.

"Washington is seriously reviewing plans to bomb not just nuclear sites, but oil sites, military sites and even leadership targets. The talk is of multiple targets," said Mr Cronin. "In Washington there is very serious discussion that this is a window that has to be looked at seriously because there is only six months to 'do something about Iran' before it will be looked at as a purely political issue."

US presidential elections are due in November 2008, and military action at the height of the campaign is usually seen by voters as politically motivated.

Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA counter-terrorism chief who is now a security analyst, said: "The decision to attack was made some time ago. It will be in two stages. If a smoking gun is found in terms of Iranian interference in Iraq, the US will retaliate on a tactical level, and they will strike against military targets. The second part of this is: Bush has made the decision to launch a strategic attack against Iranian nuclear facilities, although not before next year. He has been lining up some Sunni countries for tacit support for his actions."

US and British officials have complained to Iran about the use by Shia militias in Iraq of what they say are Iranian-made weapons. The main concern is the proliferation of roadside bombs that fire a bolt of molten metal through any thickness of armour, which the officials say must have been made in Iran.

A US military spokesman in Baghdad, Major General Kevin Bergner, raised the stakes when he said the 240mm rocket that hit the US military headquarters outside Baghdad this week, killing an American soldier and wounding 11, had been supplied to Shia militants by Iran.

Gen Bergner used to work in the White House, where he was aligned with administration hawks, and his dispatch to Baghdad was seen by some as a move to increase pressure on Iran.

"There are an awful lot of lower level officers who are very angry about the deaths from explosively formed projectiles said to come from Iran. There is a certain amount of military pressure to do something about this," said Patrick Clawson, the deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "That said, it is very difficult for us to do anything without much better evidence. In that respect, border control is a sensible solution."

Any US decision to attack Iran would force Gordon Brown to choose between creating a serious rift in the transatlantic alliance and participating in or endorsing American actions. British officials insist that Washington has given no sign it is ready to abandon diplomacy and argue that UN sanctions are showing signs of working. They point to the resurgence in Iran of Hashemi Rafsanjani, seen as a pragmatic counterweight to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Hopes that a new war could still be avoided have also been boosted by Gen Petraeus's claim that Iran's covert Quds force alleged to be supporting Shia attacks on coalition forces had been pulled out of Iraq. If true, it could be that in the stand-off between the US and Iran, Iran has blinked first.

Source: The Guardian

Iranian Baluchistan: The center's interest in development following security challenges. The place where three states meet: the ambition of a people or conflicts by mediation?

By Hassan Fahs

04/09/07//

The Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan (Sistan va Baluchistan) does not differ from other border Iranian provinces: Khuzestan (Arab majority), Kurdistan (Kurdish majority) and Western Azerbaijan (Azeri/Turkish majority). One could say that these provinces encircle the internal Iranian provinces with their Farsi majority.

Should one wish to emphasize the uniqueness of the province in its position at the Iranian-Pakistani-Afghani border triangle, with the tribal extensions between its citizens and those of the opposite provinces in the other two countries, other provinces do not obliterate this facet. The Kurdistan province is considered a tribal and religious extension of the Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan, while Khuzestan province is a tribal and religious extension of Arabs in the south of Iraq and the Gulf, and the Republic of Azerbaijan (with Baku as its capital), is considered an ethnic, religious and geographic part of Iran that separated from it almost a century ago because of the political shortcomings of Iranian sultans.

The Iranian regime has banned for years all talk of ethnic crises among the communities that make up the Iranian regime. However, the political and social challenges caused by the focus of western media and political circles on ethnic issues and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran motivated some Iranians to adopt the cause for balanced development, and initiate the debate on the necessity of dealing differently with ethnic groups in their own areas of geographic extension.

Those who were against opening this subject considered that it aggravated internal differences and dealt a blow to Iranian unity, whereas those who called for debate believed it reduced the intensity of security solutions. The intelligence and security minister in the current Iranian government Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie even voiced in a public parliamentary session a year ago his concern over ethnic issues and the puzzling situation it is passing through at the moment, which was a formal acknowledgement of the reality of the diversity, the rights of minorities and the connection of security to the radical solution of this issue.

American circles took notice of the importance of this issue in their confrontation with Iran, and the issue of Iranian ethnicities became an alternative option in the American strategy, instead of a direct military stand-off that may not yield certain results.

This is why Iranian officials, namely the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said that Iran's enemies were thinking of adopting the soft war method, i.e. stirring religious and ethnic minorities to hit the central government and weaken its positions on regional issues and the international scene, especially concerning the nuclear case, and trying to break up Iran from the inside to wipe out its Islamic regime. Khamenei expressed these fears directly when he spoke of a "cultural war between Iran and the NATO" based on the resemblance between border Iranian provinces and the provinces of neighboring countries, to strike the security stability and shake trust in the central authority. Iran believes that the United States operates according to a well laid-out plan to turn ethnic crises in Iran to ethnic conflicts and strengthen secession wills that could never amount to anything if the central government was not weakened first, through an emphasis on its economic and cultural shortcomings and through saying that it only cares for foreign politics.

Tehran accuses western states, especially the US, of assisting some elements of these ethnicities in their attempts to form ethnic parties that demand administrative and developmental decentralization. The direct American threat appeared according to Tehran's view in the "Baker-Hamilton" report that cited creating security worries inside Iran at once if it did not stop backing paramilitary factions in Iraq, building on the ethnic diversity and complex identities. To counter these threats, the Iranian leadership and authority thought it better to listen to the demands of ethnic groups in border provinces to safeguard the national cohesion, built on coexistence and peaceful and friendly ties between ethnic groups, since strengthening political and moral trust between ethnic groups and the central government strengthens the power of the regime and national security.

The first signs of these new directives in dealing with Iranian ethnicities and border provinces are expected to appear during the upcoming parliamentary elections (March 2008), through the increase of the number of people who will gain the trust of the Council of Guardians to participate in the elections , guaranteeing a higher level of public participation and a wider representation of political parties and movements in these regions. This will lead to the pacification of ethnic security tensions and the wide attention in answering the demands of these minorities. This explains why Sistan va Baluchistan province received the highest level of financial attention and assistance during the periodic tours of President Mahmoud Ahmadi Najad to Iranian provinces, in addition to the interest of the Parliament and other official departments in following up on the already finished developmental projects in the province.

Iranian security circles adopted preemptive measures to curb off eventual crises in border regions by monitoring all adverse movements and neutralizing their sources before they cause any crises that American military and intelligence forces spread along the Iranian borders (with their Israeli allies) could exploit.

The Iranian-Pakistani-Afghani triangle in the Sistan va Baluchistan province represents the most challenging area security wise, for it is the scene of sabotage operations and security tensions in Iran for several reasons:

First: its rugged mountains that turned since 2001 to a haven for those fleeing NATO forces after the fall of Taliban, like Al Qaeda members.

Second: The region's geographical location makes it a passageway for drug dealers and international smuggling gangs that grow drugs and produce their raw material in Afghanistan before moving them across Iranian territory to Europe.

Third: the religious difference with the center (Tehran) and its exploitation by extremist factions, especially Al Qaeda, to stir the population against the central-Shiite authority.

Fourth: the exploitation by political sessationist groups based in western capitals, mainly Paris, of the long suffering from economic and developmental neglect in the area to reinforce the confrontation with the central authority and get back at the regime.

Fifth: the emergence of crime and robbery gangs in the region under different names and allegiances, the most dangerous of which being the religious one. This sounds the bell for officials and residents over the security issue, compelling them to take the proper measures.

Sixth: the ease with which armed factions flee Iranian territory after they have carried off military operations, and head to Pakistani and Afghani lands where political groups opposing Iran are active.

Tehran says that American and British intelligence services are very active amid tribes along the Iranian borders and inside Pakistani territories, where they offer help and training to those who wish to perform sabotage activities inside Iran.

Iranian officials say that Abdel Malik Regi's group first began as a crowd of street gangsters, but intelligence services made them an opposition movement to the Iranian government.

What follows are the main security incidents in the region over 2 years:

1- the attack that "Jundullah" group, led by Abdel Malik Regi, waged on a border checkpoint, kidnapping 8 members of the police, with the commander of the site, before releasing them after months and killing the commander.

2- The 15 March 2005 attack in the Tasuki region, which killed 22 people miles from a police station, while 7 others were wounded and 7 taken hostage. One of the hostages was later killed and the rest freed progressively

3- The attack by Abdel Malik Rigi's group close to Bim city in April 2006, which killed 11 people

4- The assassination of 4 police members, including a colonel, in February 206 in one of the capital Zahdan city streets

5- The bombing of a bus transporting land forces, which led to the murder of 13 people and the injury of 20 (15 February 2006)

6- The murder of4 hostages kidnapped by "Jundullah"

7- The attack on a bus for mobilization forces and recruits of the Islamic revolutionary guards and the murder of 11 members in June 2007.

Two weeks ago, gangsters kidnapped a group of Belgian tourists, and demanded that Iranian authorities release one of their imprisoned members in exchange for the tourist release.

Last week, Iranian sources said that a gangster group (there are signs it could be Jundullah) kidnapped a number of Iranians, which official stories count between 12 and 22, after an ambush it set up o the road between Chabhar and Iranshahr, before transferring them to Pakistani lands where they were freed following a military operation for Pakistani forces and sent home.

Source: Al Hayat

Iranian Sisyphus

Mustafa El-Labbad looks at the significance of the return of Rafsanjani to high position in Iran's ruling elite

If Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's recent election as chairman of the Assembly of Experts restores some balance between various camps of the Iranian regime, it by no means signifies a radical change in tack. After all, Rafsanjani has been an integral part of the ruling order since the victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. His influence would ebb at times, but never to the degree of exclusion from the narrow circle of decision-makers in Tehran.

Rafsanjani's star began to rise in Iran's post-revolutionary skies while they were still lit by Ayatollah Al-Khomeini. He was Iran's de facto commander-in-chief during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) and it was he who issued the decision to accept the ceasefire. Following Khomeini's death, it was Rafsanjani who orchestrated the transfer of power to the current supreme leader Sayed Ali Khamenei, whose extensive powers over executive decisions, the armed forces, the judiciary, the Guardian Council, the national media and the clergy dwarf the powers of the president.

Rafsanjani served as the first speaker of the Majlis of Iran, the post-revolutionary parliament, after which he was catapulted to the presidency, from 1989-1997. He was then appointed head of the Expediency Discernment Council, which resolves legislative differences between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians.

With his recent appointment as chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani added a new post to his impressive CV. It is not an insignificant position. This 86-member body, consisting exclusively of clergymen elected by popular vote, is the sole authority empowered to elect or dismiss a supreme leader. Yet, in spite of the fact that he is now both the head of this assembly and the head of the Council of Guardians, his combined constitutional authorities are still not as extensive as Iran's number-two man, the president, let alone the supreme leader.

The Iranian political order is curious for the diversity and subtle shifts of tides beneath its seemingly uniform surface. Because this order encompasses different camps of opinion, it has generally succeeded in manoeuvring through the shoals of domestic and external changes and in accommodating varied and sometimes conflicting interests, thereby retaining an even keel and projecting an impression of conformity and widespread popular support. Perhaps for this reason, as stable as the helm has been -- since the revolution there have only been two supreme leaders, Khomeini and Khamenei -- the posts below that have been in constant flux, their occupants coming and going in tandem with the rise or fall of the influence of this political wing or that in light of developments at home and abroad. As a result, no analysis of "the contemporary situation in Iran" can stay afloat for long, unable as it is to withstand the perpetually shifting variegations in the Iranian political map and a seesawing in the balances of power experienced by few other Middle Eastern regimes.

The constant/variable dynamic does not apply only to Iran's ruling elites. For example, in contrast to Tehran's regional policy of expanding its sphere of influence in promotion of its national interests, its domestic policies transform and remould themselves with the same fluidity as the rise and fall of its ruling elites, albeit within the same parameters. One imagines the mythical roc, casting the shadow of its wings over the void below, yet whose very wings are forever mutating as it tilts and swerves in the air.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad soared to the forefront of the political scene in Iran following his victory in the presidential elections two years ago. His foremost rival in those elections was Rafsanjani. His victory signified a major transformation in the balances of power in Iran, for henceforward it was no longer possible to draw that customary distinction between "conservatives" and "reformists", as the remnants of the latter were driven from the Islamic revolutionary establishment. Henceforward, the "reformist/conservative" classification was firmly consigned to the past as the roc tilted irrevocably to the right. However, in deference to the dynamics of Iran's laws of equilibrium, the "wing" that remained diverged into three: moderate conservatives led by Rafsanjani, to the left; urban radicals centring around Ahmadinejad and strongly allied to the Revolutionary Guard, to the right; and traditional conservatives as represented by the Ayatollahs in Qum and Tehran and leaders of the "bazaar" making up the tail wing in the centre. In the pilot's seat remains the supreme leader, hands firmly at the controls of the levers regulating the balance between political forces, for which the terms "left" and "right" serve more to locate their relative positions on a geopolitical territory than shades of political opinion.

Although Rafsanjani had effectively served as co-pilot from Khomeini's death in 1989 until the presidential elections of 2005, and although he holds the posts of chairman of the Assembly of Experts and head of the Council of Guardians, his influence now barely exceeds that of a speaker of a major party in parliament, in this case the moderate conservatives. In large part this is due to the rising power of the Revolutionary Guard, which stands in the way of Rafsanjani's return to centre stage. In sum, his relatively restricted powers in the two positions he currently occupies are insufficient to lever him back into the co-pilot's seat or even a higher position yet.

Rafsanjani has tasted almost all the senior offices in the Islamic Republic of Iran. He's been minister, speaker of parliament, president, head of the Council of Guardians and, now, chairman of the Assembly of Experts. However, if he has set his sights on it, the position of supreme leader remains well out of reach. He has risen again within the fold of senior Iranian decision-makers, in spite of his relatively advanced years and his reverberating defeat in the presidential elections against Ahmadinejad. However, his rise is reminiscent of Sisyphus, the legendary Hellenic king doomed for all eternity to push a rock up a hill only for it to go tumbling down to the bottom again.

Source: Al Ahram

Arabic Press - Nuclear related 150907

Sources in Brussels, within NATO, described the Israeli air force raid in Syria, as a «warning test» not aimed at causing widespread destruction or sparking a war.

According to Al Hayat, Israel was surprised by Syria's initiative to declare the incident, while they did not reveal past events such as the raid on the Ein Saheb in October 2003, or overflight of President Bashar Assad’s palace in June 2006. They noted that Israel was the first to leak incidents.

Al Hayat’s sources added: «Israeli aircraft dropped four missiles on the region, which Israel believes to include installations for the development and production of missiles with Iranian experts and some coming from North Korea, including the Institute for Research on modernizing Syria's arsenal of weapons, as well as the missile arsenal of the Lebanese Hezbollah». Sources confirmed that Israeli planes «fired four missiles, one struck one building without causing human casualties».

The sources said that «the purpose of the raid was to inform Syria that Israel was informed of the efforts to develop a missile arsenal, and the transfer of missiles to the Hezbollah in Lebanon, and ability for Israel to reach its goals within Syrian».

Israeli raid was aimed at testing Syria’s defense, and whether if Damascus had already installed Russian surface-to-air rockets and put them in active service, especially since Israel had been denouncing the deal of advanced Russian missiles. They believed that the raid was also aimed at testing the new conditions of the Syrian radar network, which was re-tailored for the Syrian by Moscow, after Israeli planes had been flying over the presidential palace in Latakia.

According to American Source, North Korea experts are in Syria, and this means that involvement in a network can not be ruled out, especially the one that was led by former Pakistani nuclear world Abdul Qadir Khan.

An American official in Italy to attend a meeting on the «international treaty to prevent nuclear proliferation», was responding to press questions about the Israeli raid on Syria last week. He said «There are indications that something is happening there. We know that a number of foreign technical experts are in Syria. We know that there could have been contact between Syria and some undercover nuclear equipment suppliers ». He continued «it required monitoring the matter closely, and this is what we do. It is clear that the Israelis were also closely watching ».

In Washington, the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice comment on the recent reports on Syria building nuclear facilities, that «we must have policies to prevent dangerous countries in the world to possess the most dangerous weapons».

Fox News said that Israeli intelligence had helped in the collection of this information and develop intelligence file under the name «prairie», and deals with the details about sending North Korea specialists and scientists in nuclear technologies to Syria. A.Q. Khan network could still be active in Syria according to the specialists.

Source: Al Hayat, Al Khaleej

Al Hayat keeps on with another point of view, trying to give another explanation to this strike:

Israeli Strike Aimed to Break the Syrian-Iranian Alliance

Raghida Dergham

14/09/07//

NEW YORK - The media blackout imposed by Israel - about its violation of Syrian airspace last week in an attack whose objectives, messages and consequences remain obscure - has been suspicious. It's clear that Israel violated Syrian sovereignty. The strange part is the timid Syrian response to what the government in Damascus called "a clear violation of its airspace and an aggression" against Syrian territory.

There have been several versions of what happened. One is that American, and not Israeli, planes entered Syrian airspace via Turkey. Sources in the American administration told the media that Israeli aircraft had struck an area in northeastern Syria, perhaps hitting "Syrian nuclear facilities" sold by North Korea to Damascus and Tehran. Israeli sources told the media about the bombing of a joint Syrian-Iranian rocket base in northern Syria, funded by Iran, which was successfully destroyed.

There has been another group of leaks about what happened, and these versions have spoken of the targeting of weapons warehouses that the Israeli government believes Iran has sent to Hizbullah in Lebanon, via Syria, and destroying weapons shipments headed for Hizbullah, in order to rearm the party and enhance its arsenal. Some stressed that there had been a warning by Israel to Syria regarding Hizbullah, while others have spoken of messages meant to split Syria from Iran, through military intimidation, after a policy of enticements and rewards has not led to a dismantling of the Damascus-Tehran alliance.

These analyses and assumptions do not remove the doubts about the Israeli silence and what lies behind Syria's hesitation to lodge a meaningful protest with the Security Council or respond to a violation of Syrian sovereignty with more than just hiding behind the event. If the government of Ehud Olmert was flirting with Damascus by shrouding the operation in obscurity and official silence, hoping that it would understand the message, a violation of sovereignty is not something that falls in this category. However, if the motives were politically justified, then Israel should stop covering up and explain what happened, instead of proceeding ahead in this de facto partnership in this strange and suspicious relationship.

The Israeli operation won't recover the prime minister's lost popularity, or the prestige of the Israeli army, as long as it remains secret. If the target was the infrastructure of the network of Iranian weapons transiting to Hizbullah, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, then Israel would find some sympathy for its action, as French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner noted when he said, "If true, as it is believed now, that (Israel) hit a weapons shipment being transported via Syria to Hizbullah, we can understand the motives." In addition, disclosing this kind of operation, if it really destroyed warehouses of Iranian weapons headed for Hizbullah, would embarrass Damascus and Tehran, exposing them and robbing them of the ammunition of self-defense, as the matter involves the Security Council. Even more, such a revelation might lead to gathering enough evidence to impose sanctions on Iran and Syria for violating a resolution that was adopted by the Security Council under Chapter Seven of its charter, which forbids countries from smuggling weapons to anyone in Lebanon.

Perhaps Syria's failure to request the convening of the Security Council to discuss the aggression is due to considerations having to do with repercussions such as this. It's also possible that Damascus' timidity in beating the drum in the Security Council is based on advice it has received from its allies, such as Russia, who might be implicated if the story of North Korea and Iran's nuclear aspiration via Syria is confirmed.

Through its sources, Damascus denies all of this and limits its version to the Israeli violation of its airspace and the aircraft's dropping "some ammunition and empty fuel tanks in uninhabited areas." The Syrian leadership, in taking the decision to soften its tone and lodge a light protest, might have decided that it would like to avoid playing up the matter, because it doesn't want to respond in a way that would escalate the matter, because it is keen to be conciliatory in Syrian-Israeli relations, or because it was surprised by Israel's destruction of its rocket capacities.

In exaggerating its delight over the operation, via a blackout on the incident, Israel has revealed its accumulated complexes and the obvious mystery regarding the type of relationship that it wants with the Syrian government. Olmert might be afraid of his shadow, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak comes to his position with a complex of rage and failure toward Israel. Both of them, as well as the majority on the Israeli scene and in the ranks of the Israeli lobby in the US, believes that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime constitute the safety valve guaranteeing that Syria won't turn into an arena for Islamic extremism; it also guarantees that "nationalist" Arabs won't arrive in office, insisting on opening the Syrian-Israeli military front, which is in practical terms "put to sleep" by a Syrian-Israeli understanding.

There isn't much difference between Israelis and American Jews about the relationship with the Syrian regime. However, there is a split when the issue involves evaluating the Syrian-Iranian relationship. Some believe both to be made of the same stuff, and that there is no room at all for a division in the two countries' strategic relationship. There are those who insist that there must be a means, whether political, military or diplomatic, or one of intimidation, or a warning, that leads to breaking the contract between Tehran and Damascus.

The majority believes that merely informing Damascus of the Israeli decision to protect the regime, guard it and prevent it from being toppled is enough to strip it away from Iran. However, other warn of the visceral strategic relationship that the Syrian government has taken on for itself, through the Arab equation, and note that Damascus is now working against this formula and the Arab interest, linking itself with Iran for strategic and existential objectives. Therefore, the two countries will not be split, no matter how much Israel desires this, threatens, or is conciliatory, in one way or another.

Perhaps the Israeli strike was an attempt to break the Syrian-Iranian relationship itself, in its most important and basic dimension, through Hizbullah, after it became clear that the option of enticement did not prevent the flow of Iranian weapons and rockets to Hizbullah in Lebanon.
Perhaps Israel - and with it the United States - wanted to deprive the Syrian government of its bargaining chips, which Damascus believes it can use to conclude deals. These chips include the weapons and rockets coming from Russia and Iran. The Syrian leadership does not hide or deny that it is enhancing its military capabilities to give the impression that it can inflict damage. President Bashar al-Assad, according to those familiar with this thinking, has concluded that he needs these bargaining chips to improve his negotiating position.

Al-Assad wants to be taken into consideration, especially by the US administration and the US President George W Bush, and by the Israeli government and its prime minister, Ehud Olmert. According to those close to him, al-Assad wants to be taken seriously. It pleases him to see his picture in every part of the country, even though it embarrasses him. Being pleased with himself, perhaps due to a bit of vanity, has become a part of the personality of the Syrian president, compared to the beginning of his rule, when he appeared shy and timid. Thus, he is a bit excessive in displaying his self-confidence.

David Lesch, an American expert on the Syrian president, who has conducted a number of interviews and spent considerable time in his presence to prepare books about him and explain Syria's position in the US, recently spoke at a seminar to a number of individuals well-versed in foreign policy. The event was sponsored by the Century Foundation in New York, under the title "The Syria-United States-Israel Triangle and Prospects for Middle East Peace." According to the rules of the seminar, only part of the event was permitted to be made public.

Lesch, a professor at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, and described al-Assad in 2004, when he met him for the first time, as "perplexed," unaware of why Syrian-American relations were in the state they were in. In 2005, al-Assad had "resigned" to his conclusion that the US administration wanted to get rid of him. In 2006, the Syrian president had become "cocky and angry" in describing Syrian-America relations, saying: "I do not need anything from the US, I do not want anything from the US, I am very popular." After the Israel-Hizbullah war in Lebanon last year, he had the same level of confidence. During May and June, he was relaxed and confident," convinced that time would prove him to be correct regarding developments in Iraq and Lebanon.

In the estimation of Lesch, al-Assad felt that he was "secure in power, had brought stability to Syria, and that people were extremely grateful to him for keeping the country together" to fend off the pressure of the US and the United Nations.

Lesch saw al-Assad speaking in the language of "strategic assets" and that Iran had given him "strategic depth," especially in Lebanon via Hizbullah. The professor believed al-Assad to be "feeling good about himself," and that the White House had lost a true opportunity to cultivate Bashar al-Assad early on." The only way to move forward now, he believed, lay in the US giving up its "arrogance" in believing that dialogue with al-Assad would give him legitimacy.

Lesch's message is that Assad no longer wants "back channels" for dialogue, and is insisting on an open dialogue; therefore, one of his top priorities is for the US to send its ambassador back to Damascus.

The important part of Lesch's remarks at the seminar, in front of leading foreign policy thinkers, was that Assad is going to stay for the foreseeable future and that the Syrian opposition is dispersed and fragmented. The Bush administration should listen to him and others when they say: Bashar Assad is going to be with us for a long time.

The only thing that might disturb Assad's tranquility is the international tribunal to try those involved in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his fellow companions, as well as other political assassinations, which the investigation has shown to be linked to the Hariri killing. Lesch acknowledged this when cornered, after getting a free pass when he used the term "clumsy behavior" to describe the actions of Assad and the Syrian regime in Lebanon.

Revealing another interesting aspect of the Syrian president's thinking, Lesch related an incident from May, before the Security Council adopted Resolution 1757, which set up the international tribunal under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, after the failed attempts to block the move by Syria through its allies in Lebanon. Lesch said that he was sitting with Assad in Damascus and asked him about the tribunal. Assad replied: The Russians will not let it happen. The surprise came when Russia abstained during the vote instead of using a veto to prevent the establishment of the tribunal. Their abstention allowed the body to be created. Assad was behaving like Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, misreading the positions in the Security Council, and miscalculating the developments and course of the resolutions that helped end his career.

Lesch said that the Syrians want to appear as if they're not worried about the tribunal, but added that there is an awareness, at the bottom of their hearts, that the tribunal has taken on a life of its own. Lesch believes that the Syrian wager is on America's need for the Syrian regime in Iraq, and that the Israeli wager is on the Syrian regime. The military establishment in Israel believes that it is better with the "blunderer" they know than the unpredictable successor.

Thus, the confusing military strike was not the knockout punch to Syrian-Israeli relations, but it does represent an important turning-point, that should not be taken lightly.

Such a turning-point means there should be intensive study and monitoring of the development in the tripartite relationship between the US, Syria and Israel. Talk about a peace conference, and Syria's participation or non-participation, is merely a distraction in the considerations of these three actors. Since Damascus discounts the US Secretary of State to the extend that it removes her from the equation, its focus on Iraq is aimed at surpassing Rice since its concentration on the Syrian-Israeli relationship leads to a de facto containment for any actor within the US administration who might want to drift away from the conciliatory relationship, as understood by Damascus.

The transitional policies in Israel have a life and pace of their own, just like the air strikes, or the international tribunal. One should be cautious about exaggerating one's comfort level and self-confidence and self-admiration at a time of predicaments and entanglements. One should be wary about silly and secret joy over the artificial "prestige" of an Israeli operation that lacked the courage to reveal the supposed achievements involved.

We will finish with another article published in Al Ahram in Egypt, it deals with another subject, the reasons to go nuclear for Egypt:

Going nuclear

Entering the nuclear era is no longer a luxury, writes Sherine Nasr

A year has already elapsed since the National Democratic Party (NDP) raised the call for Egypt to enter the nuclear era. The ruling party's proposal was unveiled during its fourth conference last September, and is similar to other initiatives made over the past 50 years. Naturally, Egypt's proposed next "national project" was in the headlines for several months, but eventually enthusiasm dampened and the idea slipped into oblivion once again.

Nevertheless, the NDP's initiative seems to have opened an endless debate among concerned bodies about the immense political, economic and environmental challenges which face a developing country trying to catch up with its nuclear superiors. For their part, energy experts are convinced that sooner is better if Egypt is ever to meet its growing developmental needs. "Egypt has no choice but to generate energy using nuclear power and encourage renewable energy such as solar and wind," asserted Hussein Abdallah, former senior under-secretary at the Ministry of Petroleum and an expert in energy economics, during a recent seminar organised by the Higher Council of Culture. "It should start immediately."

Abdallah believes that Egypt's oil and gas resources are rapidly depleting, therefore the nuclear option is vital. Unlike the optimistic figures given by the Ministry of Petroleum regarding oil and gas consumption, proven reserves and exploration, Abdallah sees the picture as gloomy. Domestic oil and gas consumption has been increasing by an average annual rate of five per cent since 2006, according to a recent study conducted by Abdallah. The research on Egypt's energy strategy for the next 20 years concluded that consumption will rise from the current 52 million tonnes to 103 million tonnes by 2020.

Also, while the Ministry of Petroleum asserts that total proven oil and gas reserves are currently estimated at 2.15 billion tonnes, Egypt's share would only be about 1.075 billion tonnes, noted Abdallah. The remainder goes to foreign companies operating in Egypt in cost recovery and net profit. "Egypt's share of oil and gas production is already not enough to cover our domestic consumption," he argued. "Therefore, we have to purchase part of the [foreign] partner's share at world prices."

Based on the above estimates, the anticipated accumulation of domestic oil and gas consumption would be around 1.1 billion tonnes over the period 2006-2020. Depending on the highest estimate of Egypt's share of reserves, this share will be entirely consumed by 2020 or a few years afterwards. However, if Egypt plans to export part of its share, production must increase remarkably to cover domestic and export needs. But then this implies that reserves would be depleted well before 2020.

At the current level of domestic consumption of 52 million tones per year, and a world price of $60 a barrel, the real value of domestic consumption would be worth $20 billion. Abdallah noted that the price of oil would escalate by at least an annual rate of three per cent to cover for inflation. Therefore if Egypt's share of oil and gas reserves is depleted by 2020 and Egypt is forced to import its total needs, it should be ready to pay a rising import bill of no less than $65 billion every year.

The expert called for immediate action to build a sound energy strategy and ration oil and gas production, with a growth rate that matches the five per cent of domestic consumption. This would also be a fair and just reward for foreign oil companies, considering sky rocketing oil prices which give them a lot of windfall profits, he added.

Abdallah's call to curb gas exports is further supported by the fact that net export gas prices are no more than $3.75 per million British thermal units. This means that the price of an oil equivalent barrel of gas does not exceed $22 -- a miserly one-third of the export price of oil. "The ABCs of gas economics make it more profitable to use it at home due to its low export price, higher environmental qualities, ease of use, and the fact that it does not need to build refineries which require heavy capital and operating costs," advised Abdallah.

Abdallah is not the only expert concerned about Egypt's energy security and sustainability. An NDP discussion paper entitled The Future of Energy and the Right of the Coming Generations, submitted during the party's conference last year, underlined the growing needs of different energy sources to satisfy an ever increasing appetite to produce electricity. According to the paper, the electricity sector consumed 38.1 per cent of total fuel produced in 2004-2005; almost 87.5 per cent of total electricity depends mainly on natural gas; while 59.2 per cent of total natural gas produced is used to generate electricity. The study concluded that an efficient alternative to produce electricity should be used, namely nuclear energy.

Egypt's first step on the road to nuclear power was taken in 1953, when a nuclear energy committee was established. The first attempts to use nuclear energy to generate electricity and desalinate sea water started in 1964, when a tender was held to build the first nuclear reactor in the coastal city Borg Al-Arab. But the national project was stopped in its tracks in the wake of the 1967 setback. The idea was revived after the 1973 victory, and the Carter-Sadat report issued in 1978 studied the possibility of establishing nuclear reactors in Egypt.

"The aim of the report was to study the possibility of establishing five nuclear reactors in Egypt by 2000, to cover 80 per cent of the country's energy needs," explained Karima Korayem, professor of economics at Cairo University and head of the Egyptian delegation which worked closely with American counterparts to conclude the report. Although nothing has yet materialised, most of the obstacles cited by the study no longer exist as a result of immense advances in nuclear technologies over the past two dec a des.

According to Korayem, the construction phase of a nuclear reactor is down to four years instead of ten years in the 1970s estimate. "Construction and operation costs have also been reduced dramatically," she added. Moreover, the average cost for generating electricity using nuclear energy has now become cheaper than the average cost of any other form of energy. In 1987, for example, one kilowatt of electricity using nuclear energy cost 3.36 cents, while in 2004 the cost is 1.68 cents. "In twenty years, the cost of nuclear generated electricity was reduced by 54 per cent," noted Korayem. "Further reductions in cost are most likely with the introduction of the third generation of nuclear reactors."

If using nuclear energy is generally more beneficial, it is the wisest choice for Egypt. Mohamed Mogahed, a nuclear energy expert, noted that uranium -- the basic ingredient needed to operate a nuclear reactor -- is abundant in Egypt. Also, building a nuclear reactor is perhaps one of the best ways to create new job opportunities. "It takes at least 4,000 construction workers and some 400 highly qualified technicians to work continuously for four to seven years to build a reactor," explained Mogahed, adding that it is hard to ignore the human development element included in the scheme.

"In a country where the unemployment rate is hovering around 10 per cent, and where there is urgency to bridge the technological gap with the rest of the developed world, the issue takes broader dimensions than simply trying to satisfy a growing demand for energy," he asserted.

Source: Ahram Weekly

Sunni Shia relations 140907

Iran's Hell

Jamil Theyabi

10/09/07//

The media in the Gulf and in the rest of the Arab world have not covered the recent Iranian threats that were voiced by the naval commander of the Revolutionary Guard in which he warned that in the event of an American invasion, Iran would respond by turning the Gulf countries into "hell." They merely posted the news story without subjecting its content to any political, military, security or strategic analysis.

I think that some of those media are just weary of an aggressive Iranian response; the accusation that they are promoting conflicts, spreading the venoms of political instability in a region already plagued by an environment of civil wars that many are trying to ignore. A simple but tough question has to be asked: What dark mask is Iran putting on and trying to impose on its so-called allies who follow its lead at the expense of their Arab identity? What role does Iran want to play in the Gulf and other countries? Where exactly does it want to draw the line for its regional influence?

I only hope that the Gulf governments are not going to wear 'plastic' hats to protect their heads from the burning sun, especially that the Iranian threats specifically target them and no other. Perhaps the Gulf governments are hoping that the threats expressed by a Revolutionary Guards Naval Commander Ali Razmjoo are nothing but casual talk or nothing more than empty but intimidating threats that aim at nothing more than putting the US military appetite in check and to push the Gulf countries to reconsider their relationships with Washington. I believe that the six Gulf nations should take these Iranian statements very seriously as they represent the naked truth that Iranian politicians do not usually express publicly.

Instead, these statements are often made within Iranian political circles before they are voiced by the military leaders who are planning to carry out these threats in the event of a military attack on their country. The Gulf governments, moreover, should be aware that the first step in the Iranian military response will be the launching of simultaneous missile strikes (if possible) against Al-Udeid Air Base and Sayliyah Base in Qatar. Strikes against Gulf oil fields will also be launched before, after, or while attacking those two targets.

In fact, Iran may as well drop leaflets saying that since things are going down anyway, then let it be down all the way. In that case, the entire region from the Gulf coast to the Atlantic coast will plunge into a state of chaos that lingers for many years.

I hope that those few Arabs who are drowning in Iranian "dollars" will not go too far in glorifying and defending Nejad's policies. Rather, we would all be better off if we resorted to common sense, put Arab interests ahead of personal considerations, and put an end to desperately defending Iran's agenda and its nuclear project. I know that many Arabs believe that the Iranian nuclear project will be for the good of our international causes. However, they ignore the fact that the opposite is true, and that like Zionism before it, the Iranian nuclear program will be nothing more than a sword that imposes a cruel yoke upon our necks without ever threatening or reaching the Jewish state.

Let us analyze smartly and put an end to stupidity. Let us identify those who are defending and touting the aggressive Iranian policies in return for selfish and immediate benefits at the expense of Arab national interests.

Official Arab news agencies did not report the Iranian threats exactly as they were broadcast by the official Fars News Agency which quoted Razmjoo as he said, "With the power the Revolutionary Guard has obtained now, if the enemies want to start a military confrontation, the Gulf will become a hell for them." He added, "By using modern systems, no activities and threats by the enemies in the Persian Gulf would be hidden from us." Does such a statement not constitute a good reason to worry and to read farther into its objectives and intentions? What give reason for more concern are the expectations of Iranian dissident Mohsen Sazegara, a Harvard researcher who is close to American politicians, anticipating American intentions to inflict a painful blow to the Iranian regime, warning about the threats of escalation and retaliation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran.

I find Iran's 'continuous' intervention in Iraq and Lebanon interesting, with Syria following its lead while some Arab and non-Arab states ignore these interventions and underestimate their impact on the demographics and stability of the region. Iran's objectives go far beyond establishing a few settlements or cleansing the Arab identity of a few southern Iraqi provinces by violating and murdering their inhabitants and turning them into homeless refugees. Even more interesting is that some Arabs have become self-proclaimed lines of defense for Iran, adopting the aggressive but fake Iranian discourse. Strangely, while some of these Arabs claim to have nationalist beliefs and to be defending the Arab identity, they refuse to stand up to the aggressive Iranian attitude that can no longer be accepted or ignored. In fact, they want the Gulf countries to express positive reactions toward the Iranian position instead of asking the Iranian regime to stop intervening in Iraqi, Lebanese and Gulf affairs or to return the islands that belong to the UAE and which Iran occupied in 1971 without ever agreeing to negotiate their fate.

I have no clue how the defendants of Iran's policies will respond if Iran pointed its missiles to the Gulf countries and the oil fields. Isn't this an innocent question that merits an answer?

Source: Al Hayat

Arabic Press - Nuclear related 140907

Most of the Arab Press is still covering the Syrian issue today. The «Washington Post» article seems to have quite an important impact in many media. It explains that American sources stressed that, according to new information gathered by the United States during the past six months, North Korea may be cooperating with Damascus to establish nuclear facilities in Syria.

The report stated that the evidence of this cooperation came mainly from Israel, including satellites pictures which prompted some American officials to believe that such facilities can be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons.

The Syrian Information Minister ,Mohsen Bilal, said the day before yesterday that the American accusations about any nuclear cooperation with North Korea «are another novelty America comes up with to cover up the Israeli impasse».

The sources stated that the new information, especially pictures available during the last thirty days, has been confined to a small number of senior officials without the knowledge of the intelligence community.

This threat was issued through the American Korean talks held in Beijing in March 2003, where it seems that a North Korean official told aside part of this nuclear transfer to his American counterpart.

The Syrian deputy Foreign Minister, Fayssal Mekdad, said yesterday that Syria is not contemplating to reply «militarily» to the Israeli airspace invasion.

Moscow chose to condemn Israeli “aggression” into Syria. Syrian President Bashar Assad in Damascus yesterday met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Sultanov.
They talked about the situation in the Middle East, and reviewed the situation in the region and "viewpoints were convergent about what is happening in Iraq and the occupied Palestinian territories”. .Sultanov also met with Syrian Vice President Farouk Al-Shara and Foreign Minister Walid Muallim.

About the Israeli intrusion of the Syrian airspace, which happened last week, Sultanov stressed that Russia is against any violation of Syrian airspace and stressed the importance of States commitment to international legitimacy. Replying to a question regarding the nature of the Syrian response to the "Israeli" intrusion of the Syrian airspace, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Fayssal Mekdad said: "despite this aggression we have orientations that will always maintain the strength of the Syrian position, and our confidence in us, and we will continue to respond to any Israeli movement, now and later. "

"Ha'aretz" quoted yesterday Bolton as saying in a telephone conversation with the newspaper at the end of last week that he suspected that North Korea already secretly transferred nuclear materials to Syria or Iran.

In the meantime, the television reported, Israel maintained yesterday high "alert" on its northern border with Syria and Lebanon.

Source: Asharq al Awsat, Al Khaleej

A really relevant analysis , from Al Hayat, explained I think part of this issue.

New Alliances and Possible Reactions

Hazem Saghieh 11/09/07//

The recent Syrian-Israeli tension, whose source and nature have been vague, has been met by an untold number of predictions and conjectures. However, one obvious point is that we - at least in the Arab Mashreq - might be headed for many such incidents of tension which can not be concealed.

In fact, we are observing a new strategic division into opposing camps. A comparison with most of the years of the Cold War suffices if we wish to understand the dangerous circumstances in which we live.

Until 1979, one could draw a general map of alliances showing the Soviet-Syrian alliance against the US-Iranian-Turkish grouping. This latter alliance had strong roots that went back to the post-World War II period, and specifically the post-Korean War period, and the 1950s pacts and alliances, when Damascus was the focus of the warring factions. Although Khomeini's revolution removed Iran from the American camp, without bringing it into the Soviet side, Egypt's move toward Washington, begun by Anwar Sadat, limited Washington's loss of Tehran. A decade later, the Soviet Union began its rapid collapse, demonstrating that the Syrian-Iranian alliance suffered from isolation and a lack of any international reach. To this map we can add, after a decade and a half, America's direct presence in Afghanistan and Iran.

Today we can see an unprecedented overturning of the situation: the Syrian-Iranian alliance has an extension that leads to Putin's Russia. This doesn't prevent the possibility of a misunderstanding or miscalculation regarding the Bohshar nuclear reactors or the level and quality of armament, or other items. However, the three countries' interests converge and there is a considerable resemblance among their regimes - this is enough, most probably, to do away with difficulties such as the above mentioned. However, it is also observed that the two "American" pillars - Egypt and Turkey - are weak in terms of taking the initiative, if not paralyzed under the weight of self-contradictions and political party-related factors (Turkey) and/or the small range of maneuver produced by the embarrassing alliance with Israel (Egypt).

If we add the two American quagmires - the small one in Afghanistan and the big one in Iraq - and the fact that the "war on terror" has gone astray (today being the sixth anniversary of the 11 September attacks), not to mention the rise of non-state forces and their armed involvement in border and cross-border conflicts (Hizbullah and last summer's war), we come closer to realizing the nature of the American predicament in the region. It has been cited often, with irony, that Washington has waged two wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have resulted in removing two rivals of Tehran, and strengthening the mullahs' regime.
Perhaps it is natural and understandable to doubt the limits to which the Syrian-Russian-Iranian alliance can travel, as the structurally weak points of this alliance are well-known concerning everything that goes beyond mere weaponry. However, it is obvious that it can prevent the Americans and their allies from achieving any progress. All of this involves a worse scenario: it's as if the US is thinking about breaking this new three-way gathering of elements hostile to America, either directly, or via Israel.

Source: Al Hayat

The last analysis I think is quite biased. It does not even talk about the Russian reaction, but it doesn’t consider the fact that U.S. could be pushing behind the scene. But it is worth reading.

Why Did Israel Air Force Enter Syria And Why Is The World Quiet?
David Storobin, Esq.

9/14/2007

So why did the Israel Air Force (IAF) fly deep inside the Syrian territory? Some have suggested that it was done to gather intelligence, to attack terrorists and even to bomb the embryonic Syrian nuclear facilities. All of these may be true and I have no way to either confirm or deny these claims. But it is possible to gauge Jerusalem's desired long-term effects, and the reason why the world has remained silent.

First, let’s consider the known facts and the known desires of Israel.
After the less-than-satisfactory effort in Lebanon, the Jewish state needs to:

1. re-establish itself as a major power that scares others, which in turn also requires it to\

2. win a war.

Additionally, it is well known that both the US and the EU believe that Iran’s nuclear program is for military purposes, which must be stopped at all costs.

We also know that the IAF entering Syrian territory is a clear violation of international law that would normally be condemned. It is particularly true for Israel, which is the official punching bag of the United Nations. Not only was Israel condemned more than any other state in the world, including those guilty of genocide and legal slavery, but it was often condemned for every trivial complaint Muslims had, complaints that often proved to be false. While the United States has been mostly (though certainly not always) Israel’s protector in the UN, Europe has often taken the lead in anti-Israel resolutions to the point that most actively pro-Israel Jews are convinced that European governments are outright anti-Semites who’d engage in pogroms if the opportunity ever presented itself. Yet, after Israel openly violated international law, there was not a word from the European Union or any of the governments, liberal or conservative. In fact, nobody is willing to confirm on the record that IAF even did what we all know it did. So why?

During the Lebanon War last year, both the US and EU not only allowed Jerusalem to attack, but some countries, like France, actually encouraged it to be more aggressive during the war. Israel got all the time it needed until it became clear that its strategy is failing and the plug was pulled on the war.

It is true that over the last few years, as Yassir Arafat proved himself an unreformed terrorist, as the World Trade Center went down, and as Europe came under attack from its own Muslims, there had been a very significant shift towards Israel. A generation ago, the Jewish state was a pariah only slightly ahead of apartheid South Africa. The peace agreements led many to warm their relations with the Jewish state, but it was actually the faltering of the Oslo process couple with anti-American and anti-European terror that made many realize that the Jews aren’t uncontrollable rascals, but rather part of the Western front against Islamist Jihad.

But that is only a small part of the reason why no government in Europe condemned a clear violation of international law by Jerusalem.

EU, as well as the US and Israel, realize that Iran presents a problem and that its nuclear program must be dealt with. But a military attack or even economic sanctions against Iran would trigger terrorism. Last year, I was shown classified European documents on the hundreds of people suspected of being Iran-linked terrorists. Hizballah, the largest Iran-sponsored terror groups, depends on Tehran – as well as Syria – for money and arms. If Iran doesn’t like the West’s actions, Hizballah will be told to attack or face the cutoff of Iranian arms and money. This much is not in dispute according to any intelligence and military sources I’ve ever met.

It is likewise clear that it isn’t going to be Norway or Portugal dealing with Iran and its proxies. Since its independence in 1948, the Jewish state’s main service to the West is to be its attack dog. Israel was used for that purpose by London and Paris when Egypt nationalized British and French property, and cut off the Suez Canal.\

The United States had a lukewarm relationship with Israel until 1967, maintaining at least a partial arms embargo for most of Israel’s first 19 years of independence.

But after Egypt and other Arab states turned away from Washington – despite President Dwight Eisenhower’s clear support for Egypt during the 1956 war against Israel, Britain and France – United States needed a reliable ally that can be relied on to permanently serve as an American base and as a vanguard against Communism and later Islamism.

During the 1967 war, Israel established itself as a regional superpower. The hostility the Jewish state faced from the Soviet Union made it a logical partner for the United States, which realized that even if Israel wanted to ally itself with Moscow, unlike the Arabs, it would be unable to do so.

Europe meanwhile engaged in Charles De Gaulle’s “Eurabia” fantasy where Western Europe would join with Arab states to create a third superpower against the US and the Soviet Union. The Eurabia dream collapsed in recent years as Muslims flooded Europe, and not only changing its national character, but also engaging in anti-Western rhetoric that inevitable led to terror amongst the more extreme elements.

Awaken from a dream that turned into a nightmare (“It’s not cool anymore to support the Arabs,” told me a young parliamentary aide in London), Europe reverted back to its old policy of using Israel as a Western military base.

Useless rhetoric aside, European politicians on both the left and the right realize that at least a threat of military action is necessary to get Iran to surrender the military program it so dearly wants. Europe likewise realizes that it is Paris, Brussels, Oslo, London and Rome that will fall victim to terror in response to any serious sanctions against Iran. Again, this much is not in dispute except by arm-chair radicals on the far-left.

More than anyone, EU needs Israel to reign in Hizballah to cut off Iran’s means to harm European capitals.

It is for that reason that EU and the US both supported Israel in last year’s Lebanon war. Even after Jerusalem’s original strategy failed, the IDF got a second chance to get it right. It was only when it became clear that Defense Minister Amir Peretz was incapable of handling his job (which he only got because everyone was afraid to appoint him as a Finance or Foreign Minister, but had to give him a major portfolio as a leader of the second largest party), that the West finally ended the war. It is doubtful Israel would’ve continued the war even if the US and EU let it.

But the Hizballah problem remains and needs to be resolved. Ehud Barak, Israeli hero and former Defense Minister (and Prime Minister) is once again the country’s Defense Minister, giving new hopes to the IDF. The IDF also has a new chief of staff General Gabi Ashkenazi, who has the trust of the soldiers. (“This one is good, we all like him, but the previous one is an Air Force guy who knows nothing about the army,” was a response to my question to an active-duty Israeli soldier about the new Chief of Staff.)

The one lesson learned from the last Lebanon war is that the Air Force cannot win the war alone, at least not one as small as Israel’s. (In fact, many countries going back as far as WWII have failed when using the Air Force as it’s primary power, rather than as a supporting force).

To win the war against Hizballah, Israel will have to go deep into Lebanon, crossing more than half of Lebanese territory into the Beqqa Valley. The danger to Israel is that either the Lebanese or even worse, the Syrian military might strike it in the back.

Thus, Syria must understand in no uncertain terms that its only ally is Iran. Europe will no longer side with the Arabs in a military confrontation with Israel. All the Western powers, from Australia to the EU to the US, will be squarely in Israel’s corner. Screaming and crying won’t help. It won’t be Israel who’ll get sanctioned, it will be Syria if it gets involved.

The only way to avoid a total destruction by the IDF is to stay out of the war. Let Israel come after Hizballah. Cry and scream if you choose, but keep your military within your borders.

Another Israel-Hizballah war is coming. Probably next summer.

Meanwhile, the West will let Tehran know that the fly-over above Syria is a first step to the destruction of Hizballah, which itself is a stepping stone to the destruction of not only Iranian nukes, but its Revolutionary Guard as well.

The information will be “leaked” to Iran as an intelligence scoop from a “double agent” or by a supposedly gullible government official who opens his mouth after drinking too much with an Iranian diplomat who he pretends not to know belongs to Vevak (Iranian intelligence agency).

The left went along with it because it realizes that such a threat will make the Mullahs much more amiable to negotiating a settlement. Whether you believe that what is needed is negotiations or sanctions or war, this first step is necessary to show Tehran that the West is united and determined to prevent it from becoming a nuclear power.

And that is why nobody in Europe (or the United States) is willing to criticize Israel for its blatant violation of international law.

Source: Global Politician