samedi 13 octobre 2007

Arabic Press - Nuclear related 131007

Syria Confirms Israel Destroyed Missiles With Nonconventional Warheads

Tel Aviv Maqor Rishon

12 Oct 07

Hagay Huberman

Yesterday, the Turkish Foreign Minister indirectly joined the ranks of "foreign sources" reporting on the Israel Air Force attack in Syria last month. A Turkish source, quoted on the Al-Haqiqah (The Truth) website, claimed that Syrian sources had told Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan during his visit to Damascus, that Israel had attacked a warehouse containing long-range SCUD-C missiles. According to the report, "the missiles were ready to be fitted with nonconventional warheads."

The website also quoted a senior source in the Syrian Ordnance Department confirming that the target of the attack had been a missile warehouse located near Halabiyah, about 45 kms north-west of Dayr al-Zawr. The source claimed that the warehouses were dug-in, in a mountainous area, not far from a well known archaeological site. The report, whose reliability has not been confirmed, noted that Israel used special bunker-buster missiles. Al-Haqiqah reported that the some 30-40 missiles stockpiled at the site were completely or partially destroyed.

Turkish sources reported that fuel tanks from one of the Israeli planes taking part in the raid were found near the Syrian-Turkish border.

Iran Is An Influential Power In Mideast: Egypt

Tehran Mehr News Agency

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit has said Iran is an influential Islamic power in the region, the London-based Asharq Alawasat reported on its website on Monday.

We do not see Iran as a threat, the minister told the pan-Arab daily.

Egypt supports Irans right to peaceful nuclear technology and insists on the need to avoid any military action against the country, Aboul Gheit stated.

He also said Iran should take the advice of Egyptian friends who are seeking peace in the region.

The West is trying to create the belief that Irans nuclear program is intended for military purposes, but actually no evidence has been found to that effect, he observed.

He also said Egypt does not follow the policy of creating division between Shia and Sunni and it is necessary to avoid terms like Shia crescent and the like.

Reflection on Russia's Position in Iraq; Playing With Iran Trump Card

Tehran Hezbollah

Hassan Bananaj

Russia's real policy (as one of the great powers of the world) in regard to the Iraq war always has been one of the skeptical questions and intellectual worries of many political analysts. Some of the ambiguous aspects of this question become clear through investigation and careful study of Moscow's behavior and political games in the Middle East region. One of these games is Russia's role in the controversies between Tehran and Washington.

Last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki traveled to Moscow to take part in the meeting of Joint Economic Commission between the two countries. He also met with Russian Atomic Energy officials and talked about the completion of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. According to Mottaki, the Russians have promised him favorably about the continued construction of the power plant. It was following this visit that Mottaki announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin is supposed to come to Iran in mid-October. The date coincides exactly with the Conference of Caspian Sea Littoral States. It seems that Putin not only has accepted to attend the conference, but he also has promised to hold meetings with senior Iranian authorities.

Such a visit and meetings is not what Washington expected in its wildest dreams. America knows well that Russia and China will not join it in imposing more sanctions against Iran. Hence, Putin's visit to Iran, at a time when Bush has announced a timetable for pulling out US troops from Iraq, seems more than a rebuttal to Washington's call for further sanctions. Rather, it seems to be a step that aims at gaining some points from America at the present critical situation.

From Moscow's point of view, the Americans are facing a myriad of plights and predicaments in Iraq, and are experiencing a situation similar to that of Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, the more precarious the US situation became, the better the opportunities provided for the Russians [Soviets]. The difference between the two wars is that many Russian resources have been destroyed, and Russia has lost much of its previous status and influence, especially among the former Soviet block countries. Hence, at present, the immediate objective of Russia is to regain much of its previous prestige and power in the region through the present Iraq war. Now, Russia has realized that the window to previous opportunities for which it has been for years since the collapse of former Soviet Union has opened up for that country and it must make the most of it.

Kremlin's Requests

On the other hand, by sending other signals to Washington including obstructing the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project, the Russians intend to show they can get along with White House policies, even though this cooperation will have a cost for Americans that has to be paid in advance. Some of this cost is for Washington to give up its victories of the past few years in the region traditionally under the influence of Russia. Hence, from Russia's point of view, Washington must undertake the following steps in order to show its goodwill.

First, it must end its support for Georgia. Considering the long-term hostility of Armenians to Turkey and their friendship with Russia, this measure will provide the grounds for a new era of Russian domination in the Caucasus.

Second, give up all their abetment and help for the NGOs in Ukraine and Belarus.

Third, put an end to the provoking of anti-Russian sentiment in the Baltic region, and restrain the role of NATO in that area.

Fourth, stop all efforts for granting independence to Kosovo within the framework of Serbia.

Fifth, prevent the expanded presence of foreign forces in the region.

Sixth, stop efforts to install antiballistic missiles in the region.

This list shows that Vladimir Putin in actual fact, and even if not officially, intends to reverse the consequences of former Soviet Union's disintegration. It does not seem that he is dreaming of the old domination of Russia in Central Europe or vying with America on a global scale, for the time being. Yet, he knows very well that; first, the condition of Russian Armed Forces has improved greatly compared to that of 2000; second, the continued occupation of Iraq by America is not a choice for America alone; and, third, once American forces have left the areas desired by Russia, no country in the region has the capability to resist the Russian Army. Russians are excellent chess players, as well and expert players in geopolitical questions. The game in chess and geopolitics is alike and follows the same pattern: when an opportunity offers a new opening, a good chess player takes advantage immediately, because the chance may not reappear for some time. Now the Russians have found this chance, and may well not be repeated for another two to three years.

What the Russians expect from Americans in the region has been put forward in different forms and ways to date, but the Russians never have had the means to pressure America to give in and surrender to their requests. However the Iraq war and the decisive role of that country's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, now can work as a means for the guarantee needed by Russia. Russia avoids facing America directly and eye to eye; to date, it has done nothing to escalate the crisis in Iraq and change it into another Vietnam for the Americans. Yet, this does not mean Russia is reluctant to act indirectly and use other trump cards, like supporting the policies of Iraq's neighboring states in this power rivalry. Putin's visit to Tehran can be seen as an outstanding sign of such a wish and policy. It is a visit that, doubtless, will entail new pledges of nuclear cooperation, and further confirmation of Russia's refusal to go along with future UN Security Council resolutions against Iran. These issues will be among the essential topics put forward by the Russians.

oil related 131007

Oil Prices Ignite

Melanie Lindner, 10.12.07, 6:00 PM ET

With oil inventories dwindling around the world, and tensions rising with Iraq's Kurds, crude oil hit a record in New York trading on Friday, topping $84 a barrel at one point during the session.

Analyst Phil Flynn of Alaron said, "The reason the market is strong is concern over increasing tensions between Turkey and the Kurds."

The price increase followed news of rising conflict close to major crude oil pipelines in northern Iraq, where Turkey has been combating Kurdish rebels. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has said he is willing to defy the international community's warning against crossing the boarder into Iraq, and is ready to take action against the region where the Kurdish Workers' Party, an armed militant group, presumably is located. (See: Is Big Oil Losing The Race For Iraq?)

Iraq currently holds the world's third-largest oil reserves. The majority of that oil is in the northern part of the country, which is predominately Kurdish. The Kurds have no official nation of their own, but they inhabit parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey in a geographic and cultural region known as Kurdistan.

Along with the Kurdish issue has been dwindling supplies. The U.S. Energy Information Administration noted in its weekly report that crude oil supplies slipped 1.7 million barrels in the week ending Oct. 5, despite analysts' prediction of inventories gaining 1 million barrels. Meanwhile, according to the International Energy Agency, oil inventories have fallen below their five-year average in the world's largest industrialized countries.

For the day, oil failed to hold the $84 level and ended at $83.69, still up 61 cents on the session at the New York Mercantile Exchange. Early this year, it was as low as $51.20.

In Friday's New York Stock Exchange trading, iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Total Return Index, an exchange-traded fund that tracks oil prices, was up 36 cents, or 0.8%, to $47.36. ExxonMobil gained 0.9%, or 82 cents, to $93.48, while Chevron was up 41 cents, or 0.5%, to $91.41.


Source: Forbes

Sunni Shia relations 131007

Hype and retrenchment

By Fawaz Turki, Special to Gulf News

Published: October 13, 2007, 00:23

If ever a time so well defined the shrinking universe the Arabs inhabit, and the progressive retrenchment of the diplomatic power it wields in world affairs, it is now, on the eve of the much-trumpeted Middle East peace conference scheduled to be held in Maryland late next month, to which delegates allegedly from 36 nations will be invited, including 12 Arab states and 3 non-Arab Muslim states, along with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the G8.

A fancy parley, you say? Sure, and what is even fancier still is the venue: the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, a 300-year old city, rich in history, that had hosted the Continental Congress and was one of the nation's early capitals.

The American Revolution drew to a close there, when Congress ratified the Treaty of Paris in 1784 and effectively established the United States of America as a nation.

The Bush administration chose it not only because it provides a secure facility, a stone-throw away from Washington, but, unlike the presidential retreat at Camp David and the Wye River Plantation on the Eastern Shore, it will not evoke memories of failed efforts to resolve the Palestine conflict.

The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will host the meeting and President George W. Bush will address it.

Fitting, is it not, that Annapolis would be hosting a summit aimed at founding a new nation, this time for the Palestinians, well over two centuries later. Fitting too to recall that the country sponsoring this summit invented hype. Hype for the sake of hype. Hype without substance.

Stay with me here. The term "summit" was coined, or given its current diplomatic twist, by Winston Churchill - that colonial bigot, counter-revolutionary and cold-warrior - in 1950, when he called for a meeting with Stalin. "It is not easy to see," he asserted, "how matters could be worsened by a parley at the summit".

But Churchill was wrong, as he had been more often than not in his long career as a statesman.

Parley

It is indeed easy to see how matters "could be worsened at the summit".

The parley at Munich in 1938 allowed Hitler to believe that Britain and France would not be concerned about his adventurism in Central Europe; the parley at Yalta in 1945 fed the illusion that the West could enjoy an entente cordiale with Stalin's regime; and the Kruschev-Kennedy parley at Vienna in 1961 led the former, to believe, mistakenly, that the American president was an immature and inexperienced statesman, which meant the Soviet Union could pursue an irresponsible policy abroad, including the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba the following year, a reckless move that brought the two superpowers a hair short of starting a world war.

Rarely have expectations been so low for a "parley" so hyped as the one in Annapolis. The Arabs will go there not only to negotiate from a position of weakness but to retrench further on their demands.

The Israelis, with their enabler and patron in Washington standing firmly behind them, have repeatedly made it quite clear that the illegal colonies they have built over the last 40 years will stay, the right of return is not an option open to the refugees, a Palestinian state will be considered but only as a truncated, fissured entity in what will be left of the occupied territories, and what will be conceded to Palestinians in occupied Jerusalem will be less than what they were offered at Camp David in 2000.

Inflation is just as prevalent a phenomenon in the diplomatic world, their argument goes, as it is in the financial world. What is remarkable, indeed what is so pitiful, about all this is how over the last 40 years the more Arabs retrenched on their position, the more that retrenchment was met with more demands from Israel.

Note how the Arab world went from its affirmative three "Nos" at the Khartoum Conference in 1967 to its plaintive Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 (offering Israel total recognition in return for its evacuation of the occupied territories), and the Palestinians went from their fanciful demand for a "secular, democratic state" in the whole of historic Palestine in the 1970s to their Johnny-be-good acquiescence to a separate state in the West Bank and Gaza in the 1980s. All, of course, to no avail.

In Annapolis - and put the name in your diplomatic lexicon for future reference - Arabs will be expected to retrench further still, and Israelis to have a free ride. If any agreement is reached, at best it will be an agreement on where to hold the next wretched summit. No more, no less.

The American media are trumpeting the Annapolis get-together (for that's all it is) as Bush's last and most dramatic effort to breathe life into the Middle East peace process. True, but what will be breathed there will be a lot of hot air.

And if your preference is hype, you'll find it there in spades. Hype without substance. And, yes, lest we forget, there'll be pressure by US officials to have a photo-op with the top Saudi diplomat shaking hands with his Israeli counterpart. Oh, the horror, the horror!

Source: Gulf News

Of banality and burden

Hamid Dabashi

Let's, then, be clear at the beginning, Mr. President you exhibit all the signs of a petty and cruel dictator . . . . I am only a professor, who is also a university president, and today I feel all the weight of the modern civilized world yearning to express the revulsion at what you stand for. I only wish I could do better. -- President Lee C. Bollinger of Columbia University addressing his guest Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran (24 September 2007)

The only reason that the world at large should care about the contankerous exchange between an irresponsible and sensationalist president of a beleaguered and increasingly illegitimate Islamic Republic and the racist president of an Ivy League university in the United States is that in the brief encounter between the two dwells the symptoms of a much more frightful malignancy now afflicting our globe--the fact and phenomenon of an Empire least equipped to rule the world and yet flaunting a vulgar audacity to issue pronouncements about its ills and afflictions--at once creating, promoting, and supporting undemocratic regimes in its domain of influence (from the Saudis to the Taliban) and yet unable to deal with their criminal consequences, while at the same time having the audacity to give itself the moral authority to be the arbiter of truth in the world, carrying the white man's burden to set the course of history aright.

The forum to which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was invited for a talk at Columbia University in New York, where I teach, is one of the inanest ideas of President Lee Bollinger--something called "World Leaders Forum," to which he invites the most notorious warmongers around the globe (among the most innocuous and irrelevant leaders), so they will have yet another forum to reiterate their nonsense. The world suffers the terrorizing predicament that it does precisely because these so-called leaders have altogether too many forums on which to talk, and some of them the inordinate power and the necessary wherewithal to put to action the nonsense they thus speak. They should never be invited to any university, and if they are they are to be sat down and talked to and not to listen to--they have scarce anything important, new, or significant to say.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited to come to Columbia University and address our community on 24 September 2007. Neither I nor any one of my colleagues in the Department of Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures (MEALAC), the principle home of Iranian Studies, knew, was consulted, or approved of this visit. In his opening statement, President Bollinger said, "This [Ahmadinejad's visit] is just one of many events on Iran that will run throughout this academic year, all to help us better understand this critical and complex nation in today's geopolitics." So far as my colleagues and I in MEALAC know, we are party to no such "project" in understanding Iran, outside our regular teaching and scholarly projects reading and writing on diverse aspects of Iranian history, politics, culture, arts, cinema, literature, and geopolitics none of which is of any immediate use to the US military or the neocon chicaneries trying "to understand" Iran. In fact, ever since Lee Bollinger has become our president, our department has been systematically sidestepped and undermined precisely because we do not cater to such self-promoting and megalomaniac projects.

Ahmadinejad's September 2007 visit to Columbia was overwhelmingly dominated not by the inanities that he repeated in his talk, nor indeed by the horrors the Islamic Republic has perpetrated against its own citizens over the last three decades, but in fact by the rude and racist remarks that Lee Bollinger made when introducing him. In his own remarks, Ahmadinejad said nothing outside his regular nonsense--yet again effectively denying the suffering of millions of human beings and their descendents during and in the aftermath of the Jewish Holocaust, denying that there are even homosexuals in Iran, denying Iranian women are the second rate citizens in their own country. No amount of footnotes or linguistic, political, or cultural fine- tuning can excuse these inexcusable obscenities. No degree of solidarity with the Palestinian cause can ever translate into denying or belittling the monumental suffering of other human beings viciously murdered in their millions by the German Nazis in European concentration camps in the course of the Jewish Holocaust. No cultural explication of the difference between the varieties of homoeroticism in Iran and outside Iran can explain the fact that non-heterosexual practices in the Islamic Republic are severely repressed, denigrated, or even punished. No amount of cultural finagling can change the fact that Iranian women live in a legally sanctioned gender apartheid system. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the representative of a brutal theocracy that has systematically and consistently repressed, imprisoned, and even cold-bloodedly murdered those opposed to its very theocratic foundations. Having said all of this, I must immediately add that only Lee Bollinger's mind-numbing racism when introducing Ahmadinejad could have made the demagogue look like the innocent bystander in a self- promotional circus.

A close reading of Bollinger's statement when introducing Ahmadinejad is today the closest text analogue of what exactly happens when the legitimate criticism of the atrocities of the Islamic Republic quite imperceptively degenerates into the propaganda warfare against a soverign nation state, to be waged by the self-proclaimed moral authority of the United States, and from there further mutating into the oldest racist assumptions of the white man's burden to civilize the world. Reading Bollinger's statement is to witness a closely-knit packing of assertions of fact about the horrors of the Islamic Republic, combined with the most ridiculous clichés of the neocon propaganda machinery, wrapped in the missionary position of a white racist supremacist carrying the heavy burden of civilizing the world.

From the very first sentences of his speech, Bollinger went on a rampage against his guest: "It should never be thought that merely to listen to ideas we deplore in any way implies our endorsement of those ideas, or the weakness of our resolve to resist those ideas or our naiveté about the very real dangers inherent in such ideas. It is a critical premise of freedom of speech that we do not honor the dishonorable when we open the public forum to their voices. To hold otherwise would make vigorous debate impossible." The man sitting in front of Lee Bollinger, the elected president of a soverign nation state, had not yet open his mouth and he was already branded deplorable and dishonorable. It makes no difference how abominable some of Ahmadinejad's utterances may have been or how massively documented the human rights abuses of the Islamic Republic are. Ahmadinejad was sitting there as the elected official of a soverign nation state. Bollinger would not dare call any of the monarchs of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Morocco (all allies of the United States and all medieval potentates ruling undemocratically), or above them all call George W. Bush anything resembling what he did Ahmadinejad--and yet Bush is now chiefly responsible for the unconscionable poverty of millions of Americans, most of them children, as well as for an illegal invasion of a soverign nation- state that has caused the death of almost one million Iraqis, maiming of millions more, and turning four other million Iraqis into refugees. Bollinger would never dare calling Ehud Olmert anything remotely resembling what he did Ahmadinejad, and Olmert is chiefly responsible for destroying the entire infrastructure of a sovereign nation state (Lebanon), killing thousands of innocent civilians, and adding even more refugees to the already deplorable condition of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This is to say nothing about the apartheid state of Israel continuing to maim and murder even more Palestinians and stealing even more of their homeland on a daily basis. If Ahmadinejad has uttered a nonsense about "wiping Israel off the face of the map," Bush and Olmert have actually wiped the economic, moral, and political infrastructures of three nations (Iraqis, Lebanese, and Palestinians) off the face of the map--and yet Bollinger will roll the red carpet for them if they ever deigned to grace our campus.

Further prejudicing his audience, Bollinger solemnly declared, "to those among us who experience hurt and pain as a result of this day, I say on behalf of all of us we are sorry and wish to do what we can to alleviate it." But even this was not enough: "To be clear on another matter," Bollinger added, "this event has nothing whatsoever to do with any "rights" of the speaker but only with our rights to listen and speak. We do it for ourselves." "Unfortunately," Michael Ignatieff once famously said, "terrorists even have human rights too." But not according to Lee Bollinger. The President of the Islamic Republic sitting in front of him had no such rights. This makes Bollinger indistinguishable from Ahmadinejad who presides over an Islamic Republic that denies its citizens such rights, if not on practical then certainly at theoretical level. The key question that someone should have asked Bollinger (but no one did) is that do we have those rights on our own campus at Columbia--can we criticize whomever we want (Israel for example) as we deem necessary, without immediate and enduring repercussions? Nothing short of the devil incarnate, the Christian Fundamentalist in Bollinger thought, was sitting in front of him: "It is consistent with the idea that one should know thine enemies, to have the intellectual and emotional courage to confront the mind of evil and to prepare ourselves to act with the right temperament." What is the difference between that sentiment and the idea of an "Axis of Evil," as promoted by George W. Bush? What is the point of inviting a head of state, no matter how much his ideas and practices are deplorable, to heap racist insult upon him and by extension the people that he may even misrepresent?

When Bollinger finished with his preamble and turned his attention directly to Ahmadinejad, we begin to witness the precise manner in which the legitimate criticism of the Islamic Republic invariably and ever so imperceptively degenerates into an illegitimate propaganda manifesto for the missionary position of the United States to save the world and for its client Jewish state of Israel to do its share in this civilizing mission. Bollinger began his jeremiad against Ahmadinejad with the senseless and unconscionable arrest of scholars like Haleh Esfandiari and Kian Tajbakhsh, referred to reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch of the persecution and even execution of political activists, pointed out the wider range of the persecution of students and scholars opposing various policies of the Islamic Republic, identified Iranian women in particular, the Baha'is, as well as homosexuals, as the victims of Ahmadinejad's policies, and then specifically pinpointed the letter that Akbar Ganji, a leading Iranian dissident, has written to the UN Secretary General, and had it signed by over 300 non-Iranian public intellectuals, writers and Nobel Laureates, expressing concern about civil liberties in Iran. To top it all then, Bollinger added, "Let's, then, be clear at the beginning, Mr. President you exhibit all the signs of a petty and cruel dictator."

Now, where did that come from? Almost everything that Bollinger has said is true, in fact truisms. Even worse is true about the Islamic Republic, and nothing that Bollinger said is hidden to anyone in or out of Iran. For over a decade, a massive, grassroots, Reform Movement inside Iran has shaken the degenerate and corrupt foundation of the clerical rule to its foundations. Thousands have been killed, more have been imprisoned, many more forced into exile. Iranians in and out of their homeland, as well as anyone else slightly interested in their fate, have known these and some have fought valiantly to bring them to world attention. So what is the point of repeating them here by Bollinger--that Ahmadinejad is a "petty and cruel dictator"? It is a sign of sheer illiteracy in basic politics to confuse an elected President (no matter how outrageous his politics or how retrograde the republic he represents) with a "dictator," who is an unelected monarch or potentate who rules whimsically and as he pleases. I am against Ahmadinejad and the system over which he presides, but he is an elected official, not a "dictator" in the technical sense of the term. The republic that he represents is a theocracy, but that theocracy works through a very complicated division of power in various official and unofficial, elected and unelected, democratic and despotic, centers of gravity, of which Bollinger seems to know next to nothing.

Just a few years after the CIA sponsored a vicious, malicious, and criminal coup to topple the democratically elected premiership of Mohammad Mussadiq in 1953, Columbia University, to its everlasting shame, gave the real Iranian dictator, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, an honorary degree. Ahmadinejad is a weak demagogue, today the elected president of a republic, tomorrow forgotten by the history of his own homeland. But as a signpost in the continued saga of millions of Iranians fighting over decades and centuries for the cause of democracy in their country he is infinitely (infinitely) superior to that degenerate Shah whose cruel monarchy was the predicate of this even more degenerate band of mullahs who have stolen the hopes and aspiration of an entire people. Did this people in their entirety have to wait for this upstart career opportunist to come and tell them that centuries of their struggles for freedom and democracy has been futile and useless? Not really. Bollinger may have secured an infamous place for himself today, but he has brought my university unsurpassed shame with his "either brazenly provocative or astonishingly uneducated" remarks about the history and political struggles of a people I proudly call mine, and of which, judging by his pestiferous and illiterate statement he knows absolutely nothing.

The real point of Bollinger in presiding over this charade, however, gradually emerges after these futile and entirely useless references to all sorts of human rights abuses in Iran--abuses that Iranians themselves are both its immediate victims and at the forefront of fighting against them. Bollinger though raises them for an entirely different objective. He soon turns to Ahmadinejad's inexcusable, scandalous, and simply outrageous remarks about the Holocaust. Bollinger's scolding Ahmadinejad's outrageous statements about the Jewish Holocaust, however, points to something entirety different. He wants to use it to drum up unconditional support for his beloved Israel.

Referring to an inane conference that Ahmadinejad's government had organized on the Holocaust, Bollinger declared, "For the illiterate and ignorant, this is dangerous propaganda. When you come to a place like this, this makes you, quite simply, ridiculous. You are either brazenly provocative or astonishingly uneducated." Now who exactly is this "illiterate and ignorant" refers to? Iranians, right? All of them, the entire nation? This is by far the most shamelessly racist comment of Bollinger in a statement replete with racism, for here "the illiterate and ignorant" categorically refers to some 75 million Iranians in whose country this conference was organized (entirely against their will)--an attribution made to differ markedly from Ahmadinejad's having "come here" to the United States, to Columbia University, where not just Ahmadinejad but in fact those 75 million people that he (whether we like it or not) represents are told to be "illiterate and ignorant." "They do not exist," the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir used to say about Palestinians. She denied the very existence of an entire nation. Would Bollinger ever dare to call Israelis in their entirety "illiterate and ignorant"?

Bollinger's easy targeting of Ahmadinejad's inanity about Holocaust soon moves into his comment about Israel and its right to exist. Here Bollinger is in his home territory defending the cause of the Jewish state not just against the stupidity of Ahmadinejad's statements but against all other legitimate criticisms of the colonial settlement as well. "Columbia," Bollinger solemnly declared, "has over 800 alumni currently living in Israel. As an institution we have deep ties with our colleagues there. I personally have spoken out in the most forceful terms against proposals to boycott Israeli scholars and universities, saying that such boycotts might as well include Columbia. More than 400 college and university presidents in this country have joined in that statement. My question, then, is: Do you plan on wiping us off the map, too?" Really? Now this is all fine and dandy for New York Zionist diehards to hear and applaud. But what about the rest of us? Where is the representation of the fact that scores of us at Columbia, faculty and students, are also signatories to statements boycotting the academic institution of the Jewish apartheid state? Where is the acknowledgment of the fact that even more of us have signed a petition calling on Columbia to divest from companies selling arms to the Jewish state? Where is the acknowledgement of the fact that Lee Bollinger killed our petition before we even had a chance to articulate it? He is of course entitled to be the born again Zionist that he is. But where is his responsibility in representing all of us at Columbia with views radically different from his? Is he only the president of diehard Zionists at Columbia, or the president of the rest of us as well?

By this point, Bollinger has moved completely into the neocon chicanery of the Bush administration and staged his nauseating show as if he could care less about human rights of Iranians at large, whom he considers categorically to be "ignorant and illiterate." "According to reports by the Council on Foreign Relations," he says, "it's well documented that Iran is a state sponsor of terror that funds such violent group as the Lebanese Hezbollah, which Iran helped organize in the 1980s, the Palestinian Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad." Really? Hezbollah and Hamas are the legitimate grassroots organizations of two nations, Lebanon and Palestine, and no matter for what abusive reasons the Islamic Republic is pretending to side with them to further its own loss of legitimacy at home, they remain legitimate political organizations defending the sovereignty of their respective nations. Is this president of a university or the propaganda officer of American neocons? What exactly is the role of a university president--simply to reiterate the most worn out clichés of a belligerent and pestiferous culture of militarism and global domination?

"Your government," Bollinger further added, "is now undermining American troops in Iraq by funding, arming, and providing safe transit to insurgent leaders like Muqtada al-Sadr and his forces." Really? What are the Americans doing in Iraq in the first place, having caused the maiming and murdering of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and making millions more homeless, and then these Iraqis need to hear from Bollinger that the Islamic Republic is undermining the US presence in their homeland? If the Islamic Republic has no business doing anything in Iraq, and it does not, then what in sanity's name is the US doing illegally and immorally occupying that soverign nation state--and where exactly is General Bollinger's condemnation of that atrocious act of criminal imperialism?

"Why," Bollinger asked forcefully from Ahmadinejad, "do you support well-documented terrorist organizations that continue to strike at peace and democracy in the Middle East, destroying lives and civil society in the region?" Evidence? "In a briefing before the National Press Club earlier this month," President Bollinger stated, "General David Petraeus reported that arms supplies from Iran, including 240mm rockets and explosively formed projectiles, are contributing to 'a sophistication of attacks that would by no means be possible without Iranian support.'" Is this the president of a university talking or a spokesman for the Bush administration's shameless refusal to accept responsibility for the mayhem it has caused in Iraq? If the Islamic Republic is to be reprimanded for smuggling arms to Iraq to give to its allies, and it must, then what should be said and done about the United States and it amassing of the army of Attila the Hun in Iraq, or about the gargantuan military aid the US gives to Israel on an annual and regular basis (while millions of Americans live under the poverty line, and their homes, their schools, their medical care and livelihood and sheer dignity are in ruins)? Are we allowed to ask this question from Bollinger, and does he have the "intellectual courage" to answer them?

Finally, Bollinger took Ahmadinejad to task about the Iranian nuclear program. "You continue to defy this world body by claiming a right to develop peaceful nuclear power, but this hardly withstands scrutiny when you continue to issue military threats to neighbors." And where is the reference to the massive Israeli nuclear stockpile in this splendid analysis of the geopolitics of the region? Does Bollinger himself have "the intellectual courage" that he thought Ahmadinejad lacked in answering these questions?

And the finale: "I am only a professor, who is also a university president, and today I feel all the weight of the modern civilized world yearning to express the revulsion at what you stand for. I only wish I could do better." I have no doubt that Lee Bollinger's speech in front of Ahmadinejad and thousands of our students on Columbia campus in September 2007, particularly this last line, will go down in history as one of the most racist documents at the height of American renewed claim to world hegemony, a document that we will have to go all the way back to the time of Rudyard Kipling and his infamous poem, "The White Man's Burden" (1899), originally composed on the occasion of the US conquest of the Philippines and other adjacent areas. The fact that this speech was delivered at the same university where Edward Said used to teach, where Gayatri Spivak is now a University Professor, and where its current Vice President, Nicholas Dirks, has assembled by far the most distinguished array of postcolonial and subaltern theorists and scholars all go to show that the political import of these bureaucratic functionaries called "university presidents" is entirely severed from any organic link to the actual content of these institutions and has assumed a political reality sui generis, geared entirely to the apparatus of power in the United States. Is that also the reason that Bollinger can utter the most racist statements about an entire people and get away with it, without a single voice of dissent from my colleagues? Criticizing President George W. Bush on our campus is quite rampant and easy. Because on our campus criticizing Bush is a mere exercise in futility, for there the US president is an easy target and a mere abstraction. It does not cost anyone anything to criticize him. You even cash a certain amount of liberal credentials for doing so. But criticizing President Bollinger, who is no abstraction on our campus, is a whole different kettle of fish. It costs you things, particularly in these renewed days of academic and civil McCarthyism in the United States.

But by far the most atrocious aspect of Bollinger's statement is that because of the slanted relation of power it flaunts it ipso facto shifts the center of gravity of contemporary Iranian political predicament away from Iran and Iranians themselves and places it in the self-righteous domain of a white man and his civilizing mission. It is precisely the same colonial attitude that is perpetrated in the statement written by Akbar Ganji and circulated for signatures among exclusively non-Iranian signatories. Not a single Iranian was allowed, even if he or she insisted, to sign that statement. Akbar Ganji's deeply colonized mind, denying Iranians themselves the right and responsibility to have a say in their national destiny, tallies perfectly well with Bollinger's deeply racist mind to presume that he is telling Iranians something they do not know. Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of Lee Bollinger's statement is the appearance of the name of Akbar Ganji in it, for in that single reference Lee Bollinger and Akbar Ganji appear as the two-sides of the same colonial coin that denies nations agency and assigns to white men the authority and audacity to civilize the world. Is it even conceivable for Gandhi to launch his movement to liberate India and systematically deny Indians a say in the affairs of their homeland, or for Mandela to write a statement on behalf of civil liberties in South Africa and disallow South Africans to sign it? This is precisely what Akbar Ganji has done, and that is precisely the reason why he is so easily incorporated into Bollinger's racist assumption that he has to bear the heavy burden of liberating Iran and civilizing the world. To avoid that trap, it is long overdue that people like Akbar Ganji look at movements led by Gandhi and Mandela as example of their struggle, rather than come to the United States, go on a Shi'i pilgrimage of collecting white talismans of names he considers worthy of defending the cause of liberty in his homeland. The circus around Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visit to Columbia in September 2007 has now been packed and removed. Both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and even more so Lee Bollinger are irrelevant footnotes in the long and noble struggle of people around the world for a pride of place. What remains are the measures of truth and agency we hold inviolable and sacred when it comes to nations and their prolonged struggle for dignity and freedom.

Source: Al Ahram Weekly

Leverett: A ‘Formula’ for Lifting America’s Standing in the Middle East

Interviewee:

Flynt Leverett, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation

Interviewer:

Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor

October 12, 2007

Flynt Leverett Flynt Leverett, who was a counterterrorism analyst on the Policy Planning Council in Colin Powell’s State Department, and senior director for Middle East affairs from 2002 to 2003 on the National Security Council, says the United States’ standing in the Middle East has fallen sharply because of the perception in the region that the United States is now “an occupier.” He says this started after the first Gulf War when U.S. forces were based in Saudi Arabia, and persists because of the Iraq war. He says the “formula” for ending this is to promote stability in the area, including a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, and to be willing to hold comprehensive talks with all the parties in the region with everything on the table.

The United States is held in very low esteem in the Middle East these days according to every conceivable poll. What’s caused this?

A principal reason for the decline in America’s perceived standing in the region stems from the war on terror, which had very substantial support in the region, and internationally as well, when it was launched. But when we shifted course from a fairly directed campaign against al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan and moved to Iraq, we lost a significant measure of support in the region. The way the Iraq war unfolded, with a prolonged U.S. occupation coming in the aftermath of the war, seriously hurt the United States in the region, and is really the principal grievance. It is the perception of occupation, and at this point, remarkably, the grievance is not occupation of Palestinians by Israelis, or other Arabs by Israelis, it is occupation by the United States.

This grievance did not begin immediately in the post-9/11 period, but is a problem we have faced ever since the first Gulf War, when, rather than revert to the “over the horizon” military posture from which we had fought the first Gulf War, we made a commitment to keeping significant numbers of forces on the ground in Saudi Arabia and in other places in the Gulf region. That began to create this sense of America as occupier.

Once we went into Iraq—and we are now into the fourth year, of a seemingly very open-ended occupation of a major Arab state—the perception of the United States as occupier has gone through the roof. That’s a very important reason for the decline in American standing.

The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia was started in the Clinton administration, so you are saying both parties are responsible for the decline in American popularity?

The extent of the mistakes that have been made by this administration certainly exceeds that of its predecessors, but the Clinton administration made many of the same mistakes. Not going back to an over-the-horizon posture in the 1990s was a fundamental mistake.

Any other factors?

The other big reason why we’re held in such low repute is the Arab-Israeli issue, particularly the Palestinian issue. This is perceived in the region to be not just our neglect of that issue, but an American empowerment of continued Israeli occupation, the dismantling of the Palestinian Authority, and the rejection of a Hamas government that won internationally supervised elections. The way we’ve handled the Palestinian issue over the last several years has done real damage to our standing, because at this point it’s not just, “Oh, the United States is neglectful, the United States is not willing to put enough pressure on Israel.” There’s a perception that the United States is actually empowering an Israeli project to destroy the prospects for Palestinian statehood.

At the time of the Iraq war and in the first few years after it started, the Bush administration pushed hard for democracy in the Middle East. This program clearly has gone nowhere, and now the administration seems to have dropped that as a major policy. Did this have an impact?

That was a major strategic mistake as well. As far as regimes, like the Saudi and Egyptian ones, it was one more reason to begin to doubt the unquestioned benefits of a security partnership with the United States. The democratization push has had that effect on elite circles, certainly within Saudi Arabia, but in other places within the Arab world as well. So it in some ways alienated regimes that we actually need as vital security partners.

But at the same time, we hear criticisms that the United States did not push hard enough for “democratization.” What’s your feeling about that?

In terms of those parts of the public that actually care about democratization, it makes us look hypocritical: We say we’re going to promote democracy, but then when regimes push back, when regimes control elections, when regimes put real limits on the space available to political oppositionists, the perception is that we’ve basically folded. So we’ve lost credibility with the regimes on the one hand, and at the same time we’ve also managed to lose credibility with some segments of Middle Eastern public that care about democratization.

It was a colossally bad strategic choice for this administration to make that a priority of its Middle East policy in the post-9/11, post-Iraq world.

Now the president has called for a Middle East conference in Annapolis at the end of November, which is supposed to deal primarily with the Israeli-Palestinian issues. Does this have any chance of success at all, do you think?

No. In order to create momentum toward any kind of potentially viable political process, you really are going to have to have the United States sketching out a political horizon to define parameters for resolving final status issues—perhaps like President Clinton did in his last months in office. It is necessary to state it as a matter of policy that this is America’s best judgment of how these issues need to be resolved. I guess I could be surprised, but I frankly don’t believe this administration is going to be up to that.

They’ve had the option of doing this since 2002 but they’ve turned away from it every time and I expect they’ll turn away from it again. Without that, there’s no way that the conference and what it produces will get enough regional support to make a difference.

A second reason to expect failure is, you don’t have a unified Palestinian political structure at this point and, with the continued boycott of the Hamas government, even if you can come to an understanding about a communique or statement coming out of this conference, you’re not going to be able to move on it because you don’t really have a unified Palestinian partner.

And a third reason is more strategic. At this point the Palestinian issue is one of a number of budding crises in the region. Iraq, obviously, is one. Iran, in its various dimensions is another. And Syria and Lebanon, which also lapse over into the Arab-Israeli arena, is another.

At this point, these issues have all become bundled up with one another. You can’t deal with any one of them with any effectiveness in isolation. In order to deal with the Palestinian issue you’re going to have to do something about Hamas, you’re going to need to get involvement from Syria, which means you’re going to have to do something on that front, and you’re going to need to get cooperation from Iran. You’re going to need to have some very broad-based, strategic understandings with Iran, and that will also get you into regional diplomacy in Iraq. You can’t get into any one of these problems at this point if you’re really serious about resolving them, without having to deal with all of them.

All right, so let’s jump ahead a year, assuming your gloomy prognosis holds. A new president is going to be elected in this country. What’s the “formula” for changing all of this around, what are the high priority items?

The “formula” consists of two things: First, stability is not a dirty word. Stability in fact should be the watchword for American policy in the region. This means stability in terms of key states, but also stability in terms of the balance of power between, broadly speaking, radical and moderate forces in the region. The primary goal of American policy to recover from this hole we dug ourselves into is stability—that is the only way that we recover.

Now, this gets us into the second element of the formula: comprehensiveness. At this point you can’t deal with any one of these problems in isolation and be serious about resolving it. Take Iraq: You can’t come up with a political settlement in Iraq, unless you are prepared to involve a number of important regional states, including Iran, and including Syria. And there’s no way that you get that kind of regional compact unless you’re also prepared to deal in a very strategic way with the issues that divide those countries from the United States.

You can’t just try to do something nebulous on the nuclear issue with Iran, you need to be able to put on the table, the nuclear issue, Iran’s role in the region, including its role in Iraq, and its attitude towards the Israeli conflict, all the things that we find problematic about Iran. You should put on the table all of the things the Iranians find problematic about our position towards them: sanctions, unwillingness to accept legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. You’re going to have to pursue a grand bargain. You can’t do this incrementally; you can’t do it step by step or issue by issue. You’re going to have to do something to reorient America’s relations with problem states like Iran and Syria on a strategic scale comparable to Nixon’s reorientation of our China policy, while you’re also working on Iraq and while you’re also working in the Arab-Israeli arena.

Let’s talk more about Iraq. The next president is going to have to deal with Iraq in a major way. We’re going to still have one hundred thousand troops probably in Iraq, so what do you do with these troops?

The argument of the leading Democratic candidates—that we’re supposed to keep some residual force in there to train Iraqi security forces and do counterterrorism—is nuts. In the end we should be aiming at a zero ground presence. In Iraq we need to return to the over-the-horizon military posture from which we fought the first Gulf War. We can defend everything we need to defend in the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere in the region, from that posture. All you accomplish by keeping residual forces in Iraq on the ground or on the ground elsewhere in the region, is to help al-Qaeda recruitment and underscore this perception of U.S. occupation in the region. You need to be prepared to get those troops out—I don’t say you need to get them out immediately, just in some kind of logistical order—which would take at least a year. And I would argue you need to link the withdrawal to a serious diplomatic effort to negotiate the kinds of understandings inside Iraq and between Iraq and its neighbors that you’re going to need to move to a more stable political platform there.

The keys will be robust regional diplomacy and a commitment, over a certain period of time, to moving from where we are now in terms of the troop presence on the ground basically to an over-the-horizon military presence.

You’re not afraid that Iraq will just erupt into a sort of cataclysmic civil war?

No, actually I’m not. The level of violence could increase. It’s not going to be pleasant in much of Iraq for a considerable period of time to come. But, if you look at the history of this region, it is not a region that is unacquainted with civil wars. We’ve had them in Algeria, we’ve had them in Lebanon, we’ve had them in Yemen. You might even argue we’re having them in the Palestinian area, and the history is that the civil wars in this area remain contained. They do not serve as the catalysts for a region-wide conflict, even in the case of Lebanon, where you had Syrian and Israeli forces intervening inside Lebanon. Even then the conflict was kept confined to Lebanon.

Source: CFR

Nuclear related 131007

Litmus test for Saudi-Pak ties

By N JANARDHAN


WHEN THE Saudi Intelligence Chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, addressed a press conference in Islamabad last month, it appeared to raise more eyebrows in Pakistan and the Gulf than the news of former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s deportation to Saudi Arabia.

Following a meeting with President General Pervez Musharraf, just ahead of Sharif’s return, Prince Muqrin – brother and special envoy of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia – and Lebanese politician Saad Hariri showed a document which mentioned that Sharif should not return from his exile for 10 years.

It is now seven years since the “deal” was struck to spare the former Pakistani premier from life imprisonment after he was overthrown in a military coup by Musharraf in 1999. Sharif spent most of these years in the kingdom, where he was forbidden from any political activity, and then moved to London, from where he plotted his comeback, which ended within a few hours with another exile on September 10.

An official Saudi statement tersely said: “Nawaz Sharif will stay in the Kingdom as a guest. The Kingdom welcomes him again after his return to Islamabad, disregarding his pledge that he will stay away from Pakistan and politics.”

Analysts claim that this was “a major deviation from the Saudi government’s policy to stay away from controversial political matters especially those which relate to the internal political affairs of other countries.”

In recent years, however, Saudi Arabia has used its status as an Islamic and economic powerhouse to play a proactive role in a number of domestic political crises in the Muslim world – Palestinian territories, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan and Somalia – as well as engaged in dousing the tension between Iran and the West.

The kingdom’s mediatory roles in the Muslim world have, indeed, brought Saudi Arabia back into the centre of Middle East and world politics, especially with Egypt nowhere on the diplomatic radar.

This was reflective in Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan Ali Awadh Asseri’s assertion that the Muslim world was confronted with unprecedented challenges and was struggling for its very survival against ever-increasing threats.

Riyadh’s real intention in mediating in the Pakistani political crisis could well be about stability in a country of great importance to the region and a frontline nation in the war against terror, and not about favouring any particular leader.

Further, Pakistan has witnessed an upsurge of extremist activity in recent years and has the potential to further contribute to the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Such a situation would not only affect Pakistan and Afghanistan , but all the Gulf countries, chiefly Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

More importantly, Saudi Arabia is also concerned about the possibility of Pakistani-Afghan extremists and Al Qaeda taking advantage of any political instability to gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, putting the entire region in danger.

Following a week of Saudi bashing in Pakistan, Riyadh defended the kingdom’s role by saying that his country got involved because the Sharif issue was likely to threaten Pakistan’s peace and unity.

“This support has been extended not as a favour to another country, but as a fulfillment of responsibility towards a friend and a brother. PPakistan’s strength has been our strength and Pakistan’s problems our problems,” the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan said.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia share a multi-faceted strategic relationship. Over a million Pakistanis reside and work in Saudi Arabia and another 600,000 visit the kingdom to perform the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages every year.

Bilateral trade stood at $2.83bn in 2005, and Pakistan has benefited a great deal from the kingdom’s relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities during natural calamities.

In the military sphere, Pakistan – the only Muslim country possessing nuclear weapons – has been special and a great source of strength to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan ‘s military has a history of performing security duties in the kingdom and training Saudi military personnel.

All these strategic considerations and relations, however, didn’t cut much ice with critics after Sharif’s deportation. “It makes one wonder whether Saudi Arabia would allow a Pakistani intelligence chief to address a press conference in Riyadh and pass judgment on an internal political issue concerning the Saudi kingdom?” one Pakistani analyst questioned Prince Muqrin’s role in the political drama.

While such harsh words against Saudi Arabia are unprecedented in Pakistan, the kingdom was also accused of colluding with the United States in determining the future of Pakistani politics. “If he (Sharif) just wanted to go to Saudi Arabia, he could have bought a ticket to Jeddah instead of Lahore ... (The) deportation is in accordance with the agenda of America (and Saudi Arabia),” another Pakistani analyst vented. The United States wants a “liberal” leader in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is always at the US’s “beck and call ... Saudi Arabia is Guantanamo Bay for Pakistanis. That the most sacred country of the Muslims should be used this way is most unfortunate.”

As the place of Islam’s two holiest shrines, Saudi Arabia has a special place in the Muslim world. But many in Pakistan now feel that following the Sharif deportation incident, Pakistanis are unlikely to ignore the “exploitation of Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia or the uninhibited hunting sprees of Saudi princes in Pakistan,” thereby affecting bilateral relations.

Sharif’s party has indicated that the Saudi government has conveyed to Islamabad that it will have nothing to do with the former premier after Eid, especially if it may damage the reputation of Saudi Arabia among Pakistanis.

Whether this happens or not isn’t as important as what is likely to happen in the years ahead. The political course is yet to crystallise in Pakistan. But, with Pakistan certain to return to full-fledged democracy sooner or later, allowing all aspiring politicians to contest in elections thereafter, Sharif’s return to the top job at some point could make the strain with Saudi Arabia manifest in one form or another.

Source: thepeninsulaqatar


Israel's Syria Strike 'Not Signal for Iran': Parliamentary Speaker

09 Oct 07

GENEVA, Oct 9, 2007 (AFP) -- Israel's air strike inside Syrian territory in early September was not a message for Iran despite claims by some US conservatives, Iran's parliamentary speaker said on Tuesday.


"The violation of the airspace of Syria by Israeli planes was not meant to be a signal for Iran," Hadad Alel told reporters on the sidelines of the annual meeting of the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) in Geneva.


"Israel is not in a position to have the illusion of attacking Iran," he added.


Israel last week lifted a veil of silence over its September 6 raid, with army radio reporting that "Israeli combat planes attacked a military target deep inside Syrian territory."


Amid the Israeli blackout, most of the speculation on the raid had come from foreign media, with one version saying that Israel bombed a suspected nuclear facility that was allegedly being built with the help of North Korea, reports denied by both Damascus and Pyongyang.

The hawkish former US ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, told Israeli television last month the raid was a signal not only to Syria but also Iran, amid growing tensions between Tehran and the West over its alleged nuclear programme.


"I think this is a clear message not only to Syria, this is a clear message to Iran as well that its continued efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are not going to go unanswered," Bolton said.


Iran's parliamentary speaker denied however that his country had any ambitions to develop nuclear weapons.

"Our position has always been opposing the military use of nuclear energy," Alel said.

Source: AFP


vendredi 12 octobre 2007

Sunni Shia relations 121007

How to Cope with Global Jihad

By Ariel Cohen

The conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan and the global Islamist insurgency have revealed that Western democracies and their political and military leaders do not fully comprehend the multifaceted threats represented by radical Muslim nonstate actors. In this, they violate the most famous dictum of Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategic genius of 2,500 years ago: "If you know yourself and understand your opponent you will never put your victory in jeopardy in any conflict."

The broad support that al Qaeda jihadis and radical Islamist militias such as Hamas and Hezbollah enjoy in the Muslim world and in the global Muslim diaspora, as well as among non-Muslim anti-American political forces around the world demonstrates that describing the global Islamic insurgency as a fringe or minority phenomenon is unrealistic and self-defeating. Since 9/11, democracies have fought three wars against nonstate Islamist actors. The West needs to draw important lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the clash between Israel and Hezbollah to address these strategic deficits. Lack of clarity in defining the enemy and delays in formulating political and information strategy severely endanger U.S. national interests and the security of the West.

Fighting the wrong enemy

The bush administration lost valuable time before it finally defined radical Islam as the premier national security threat in October 2005. Initially in the post-9/11 period, the president targeted "evildoers" and "terrorism" as the enemy. Moreover, Islam was declared a "religion of peace" and Saudi Arabia, which has spent the last 30 years spreading its Wahhabi/Salafi gospel, was labeled as"our friend." Unsurprisingly, the nation and the military were somewhat disoriented.

The U.S. military quickly and successfully destroyed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. After that, however, the menu of enemies became slim: Saudi Arabia, from which 15 out of 19 hijackers came, was considered too important an oil supplier and too pivotal a state in the Middle East to be engaged. Pakistan, both the parent and the nursemaid of the Taliban, promised cooperation. Most important, the U.S. did not know (and still does not know) how to fight nonstate actors, be they sub-state terrorist organizations, militias, or supra-state religious/political movements.

The jury is still out as to all the reasons for the Soviet collapse, but it was defeated in part through an indirect strategy formulated by the Reagan administration, and in part because it disintegrated due to its own internal weaknesses. If we are to believe one who was "present at the destruction" -- Russian Prime Minister Egor Gaidar -- a key reason was the flooding of the world market with cheap Saudi oil. The Soviet Union was also bankrupted by its unsustainably expensive military-industrial complex. In addition, it was burdened with ideological fatigue and cynicism, torn by ethnic centrifugal forces, and being bled in Afghanistan by the U.S.-supported mujahedeen.1

For over a century, the U.S. military and other arms of the government have been designed, nurtured, and financed to fight nation states, from Spain in 1898, to Germany in the two world wars, to Japan in 1941-45. Working with insurgencies or counter-insurgencies hasn't been Washington's forte for a long time. The U.S. military did not succeed in defeating the North Vietnamese insurgency, nor did its Cold War guerilla allies prevail in Angola or Mozambique. Beside the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, and support of Afghan mujahedeen, U.S. insurgency and counterinsurgency successes have been limited and peripheral to war-fighting. The current conflict is fundamentally different.

The wars that went awry

The U.S. entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan are exactly where the jihadis want the United States to be. According to Ayman al Zawahiri, in a taped interview at the second anniversary of 9/11, "If they withdraw, they lose everything, and if they stay they will continue to bleed to death."2 In other words, damned if you do and damned if you don't.

U.S. abandonment of Iraq would be seen as a major victory for anti-American and Islamist forces in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world. After Iraq, jihadis may target Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and eventually Egypt and nuclear-armed Pakistan for takeover. It is the belief of al Qaeda leaders from Osama bin Laden all the way down that Iraq is going to do to America what Afghanistan did to Russia. And this would be a major accomplishment for a nonstate actor in a confrontation with the mightiest state on earth.

Meanwhile, the future of NATO operations in Afghanistan remains uncertain, with many European allies foretelling the Alliance's defeat there. A resurgent Taliban, supported by al Qaeda and by elements within Pakistan, is threatening to overwhelm the NATO effort. At the same time, many in the Middle East believe that Israel, which they see as America's proxy, was defeated in Lebanon by Hezbollah; and Iran remains defiant, bringing on line batteries of 3,000 centrifuges capable of enriching uranium for nuclear weapons as well as funding Shiite extremists in Iraq and Lebanon.

Islamist extremist/jihadi organizations, including movements and militias from Egypt to Afghanistan, represent clear and present dangers to American homeland security, our vital interests, and to our Arab and Israeli allies. If and when victorious, today's terrorist organizations, global Islamist movements such as Muslim Brotherhood or al Qaeda, and "civil militias" such as Hezbollah or the Mahdi Army, are likely to take over countries and acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. With their implacable anti-American and anti-Western agendas, they will represent dangers comparable to, or greater than, those presented by the fully armed and mobilized nation states which topped the threat hierarchies of the twentieth century. Hezbollah's relative success against Israel in the summer of 2006 is an important case study, worth analyzing in greater detail.

The Hezbollah war as jihadi war

The Israeli-Hezbollah front, which had been relatively dormant since the hasty Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, erupted as world leaders gathered for the July 2006 G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russia. Hezbollah's unprovoked killing of eight Israeli soldiers and kidnapping of two resulted in 34 days of fighting. The hostilities will have long-term repercussions for Israel and other states confronting terrorist organizations, militias outside of state controls, and other nonstate actors.

The main lesson of the Hezbollah war is that military responses are simply not enough. The jihadi threat needs to be defeated by a combination of political, ideological, media, military and intelligence measures. The good news is that the potential does exist for a broad coalition between Western, non-Western and Sunni Muslim and Arab nation-states to get the job done. The bad news is that these actors are still obsessed with weakening Israel and forcing its withdrawal from the West Bank without the foundations for durable peace and have not fully realized the necessity of working together against radical forces. The process of attaining this realization itself is likely to be painfully slow and costly in blood and treasure.

The Hezbollah war is at least the third conflict in the Greater Middle East characterized by the involvement of an advanced Western democracy on the one hand and a sub-state actor on the other. The first two are the war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and the fighting against the Sunni and Shiite anti-American insurgencies in Iraq. The three wars have important commonalities, as the guerilla forces are religiously motivated, demonstrate a willingness to fight to the end, possess superior knowledge of the local terrain; and rely on dispersal among the local population, often utilizing systems of underground bunkers and strongholds which they prepare in advance.

The Israel-Hezbollah conflict was hardly the first -- or the last -- jihadi war. Israel is already involved in a low-intensity conflict in Gaza, primarily against Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Resistance Committees, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of theplo, elements of al Qaeda, and a bevy of other jihadi organizations. The Gaza forces have used Qassam rockets, which are primitive compared with Hezbollah's Katyushas, the Zilzal 1, 2, and 3, and the Fajar low trajectory short-range ballistic rockets supplied by Syria and Iran, along with sophisticated anti-tank Russian-made missiles andsams.3 Additionally, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the global Islamic Party of Liberation founded by a Palestinian cleric in the early 1950s) called for the creation of a caliphate (an expansionist military-religious dictatorship operating under strict interpretations of Islamic religious law) in Gaza.4 The declaration of a caliphate anywhere on the globe would allow jihadi movements everywhere to shift from a "defensive" jihad to an offensive one -- the jihad to impose Islam on the non-Islamic world, something only a caliph is allowed to do.

At least two additional theaters are worth mentioning, as they are not yet attracting as much attention. The first is Somalia, until recently under the tenuous rule of the Islamic Courts. While the Ethiopian Army and the provisional government defeated the Courts in December 2006, the Islamists dispersed among the population and are in the process of making a comeback. The international links of the Islamic Courts are clear. Chechens, Arabs, and even British and Swedish Muslims were killed fighting in Somalia.

The second theater is Darfur, where the Arab Islamist militia Janjaweed, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and other jihadi organizations have promised to fight any U.N. peacekeeping contingent deployed there.5 Somalia and Sudan's combined population is 44.4 million, thus the potential of these two impoverished countries to serve as a base of jihad in Africa and elsewhere can be vast -- as long as the oil money from Islamist sponsors keeps flowing in to recruit, train, and deploy their populations as jihadi shock troops. Moreover, if Somalia reverts to Islamic rule despite the December defeat of the Islamic Courts, its location next to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait may put this strategic shipping lane at the mercy of suicide boat attackers operating from Somali coastal bases.

The future of deterrence

Even the most advanced militaries, such as the U.S. and Israeli, which relied on the deterrent capacity and reputation they gained in conventional, twentieth century warfare, will need to reaffirm or re-establish deterrence against sub-state actors by successfully destroying enemies in the future. This will not happen unless the nature of the new enemy is fully understood and new doctrines, approaches, tactics, and procedures are developed. Moreover, in the Israeli case, the reassertion of deterrence will not be complete before the appropriate reforms and training have been fully implemented in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

In the past, the U.S. relied on the power of its combined operations and technological and industrial superiority. Its aircraft and ships dominated the skies and the oceans during World War II. In addition, the two nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a clear demonstration of overwhelming force by a weapon which, for a short time, remained exclusively in U.S. hands. The U.S. military performed majestically in Gulf One, in Afghanistan, and during the opening of the current conflict in Iraq. What happened after the last two campaigns is eroding U.S. power and the perception of that power around the world.

Israel has relied on the deterrence value of its military prowess, earned in the hard-won victory against five attacking Arab armies in 1948; the four-day defeat of the Soviet-equipped Egyptian army in the Suez campaign of 1956; and the victory over the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian forces in 1967, in which Israel lost 779 soldiers while the combined Arab forces lost 21,000.

In the 1973 war, Israel was stunned by a Syrian-Egyptian surprise attack. Nevertheless, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) recovered in time to take back all of the Golan Heights, put Damascus within artillery range, and surround the Third Egyptian Army at Suez, with no effective fighting force between the Israeli troops on the African side of the Suez Canal and Cairo, within three weeks. In1982, the IDF was at the gates of Beirut within a week, forcing the evacuation of Yassir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to Tunis, Iraq, and Yemen and destroying a third of the Syrian airforce (86 planes) in one day. While Israel lost 675 soldiers, close to 10,000 Syrian and PLO combatants were killed. Between 1982 and 2000 Israel lost over 1,200 soldiers in Lebanon. But the defeat handed to Syria and the PLO in Lebanon, despite the war having been strategically bungled and the occupation domestically unpopular, bought Israel a quarter of a century without a major war.

The deterrence value of these victories could not last forever, however. The 1982-2000 South Lebanon conflict ended with Israel's poorly managed withdrawal and abandonment of the South Lebanon Army in May 2000. Prime Minister Ehud Barak and then-Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz supervised the retreat, which was primarily triggered by internal Israeli protests and dismay over casualties being suffered by Israeli troops deployed in the self-styled "security zone" in South Lebanon. The fact and the form of the withdrawal generated a perception of Israeli weakness. Shortly thereafter, Yassir Arafat unleashed the Terror War (the Second Intifada) which lasted until 2004, in which over 1,100 Israelis were killed in bombings and shootings, 75 percent of them civilians. Many speculated that the hasty retreat from Lebanon contributed to Arafat's decision to launch the Second Intifada. However, if this was correct, the Israelis certainly failed to internalize the lesson. Their 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, including the abandonment of Jewish villages there, did nothing to stop the volleys of short-range Qassam rockets from Gaza into pre-1967 Israel. Many analysts now argue that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, billed by the Sharon government as yet another "painful concession for peace," only contributed to the Hamas electoral victory in January2006 and increased the Arab perception of Israeli weakness. In fact, in June 2006 Hamas conducted an assault and kidnapping operation similar to Hezbollah's subsequent attack, which triggered the latest war.

Systemic failure

Many israeli and foreign commentators are focusing, correctly, on the failures of the political leadership and top military to anticipate, evaluate, prepare for, and defeat the Hezbollah threat. They cast the net broadly, to include sociological, morale, bureaucratic and political issues -- not only narrow military ones. All these categories of analysis are valid. They point out that the Tel Aviv-based secular leftist European elite of Israel, including many in theidf high command, bought into the same approach to military transformation that had been promoted by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The current generation of Israel's political and military leaders had dismissed the concept of overwhelming military victory in favor of a dysfunctional technocratic reliance on a "Revolution in Military Affairs," emphasizing high-tech systems and air power.6 While high-tech gives an important advantage to developed countries and modern militaries, it cannot replace good old intelligence and boots on the ground.

There clearly was a misguided belief that Israel is so powerful, nothing bad could happen to it. The political, military, and strategic results of this, yet another failed Israeli "concept," are there for all to see.

The process of self-examination, investigation, and conclusions will be heart-wrenching. Israel went through a similar exercise after the perceived "earthquake" of 1973. However, the current war is viewed as a limited one but an even more decisive Israel failure than the Yom Kippur War was ever perceived to be. In 1973, the Israelis believed that the Arabs would not attack after the disaster of 1967 -- and paid for the misconception with 3,000 lives in a country of 3.6 million. Then, as now, the Israeli political class and the military became enamored of a concept which turned out to be a self-defeating construct rather than a valid reflection of reality.

In 2006, the political and military leadership suffered from a severe case of negligence and neglect. Israeli government and military institutions had been focused on "unilateral withdrawal" -- first from Gaza and, with an eye toward the future, from the West Bank -- to combat the perceived "drawbacks of occupation." The Olmert cabinet, and especially then-Defense Minister Amir Peretz, a former trade union leader, were busy championing social welfare issues instead of preparing the country for the forthcoming confrontation. At the same time, Syria and Iran were busily arming Hezbollah. The Israeli leadership also did nothing to prepare the country for the crucial realization that Hezbollah is not a conventional army, and that a repeat of the lightning victories of the past was highly unlikely.

During the period leading up to the war with Hezbollah, Israel under then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and then under Ehud Olmert failed to prepare ample bomb shelter space or to deploy the anti-missile defenses it claimed to have developed. It also failed to acquire vital intelligence (such as the location of Sheikh Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, in the early days of hostilities; the scale of presence of Syrian short- and medium-range missiles in Lebanon; and the deployment ofc-801/802 Iranian-made anti-ship missiles). Most important, the idf did not implement existing plans to destroy Hezbollah through a ground operation and ad-libbed almost until the war's end.7 Reports from the field of failures to plan and lead operations; disasters in supply and evacuation of the wounded; missing weapons, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies indicate that the country and the army, which had not been engaged in fighting a major war since 1982, needs a massive shake-up.8

Losing in the battlefield of perceptions

Public diplomacy/strategic information is yet another area in which Israel utterly failed and which requires a major revamping. Throughout the world, Islamist insurgents masterfully use images and propaganda, relying on sympathetic elements among Western media and nongovernmental organizations to focus international attention on civilian collateral casualties (even to the point of staging them). They use these images to stir the outrage that increases recruitment for future rounds in the conflict.9

The Israelis have been particularly inadequate at perception management at least since the 1982 Lebanon war, when they were attacked for allegedly high civilian casualties. In the ensuing years, Israel was systematically smashed in the international media and by thengo community for the "occupation" of Arab lands, the alleged incarceration of 10,000 Palestinian prisoners, and other much-publicized misdeeds. In the most recent fighting, many anngo, such as Human Rights Watch, simply refused to recognize that Hezbollah and Hamas deliberately used civilians as human shields and practiced a consistent policy of locating rocket launchers in civilian dwellings, schools, mosques, and hospitals, despite ample reporting in the mainstream, including liberal left, English language media.10

With almost astounding ease, the media fell for every Hezbollah trick and deception, including doctoring Reuters photos;11 publishing a picture of a non-existing Israeli frigate being hit by a Hezbollah rocket (it was an Australian demolition explosion);12 falling for a sob story about an Israeli missile hitting a Lebanese ambulance right in the middle of its Red Cross;13 or using the same ruins to claim Israeli missile hits on different dates and deploying rehearsed "city criers" to feed tear-jerking stories to Western correspondents. Most of these hoaxes were exposed by Western bloggers, not by Israeli information officials, whose job it should be to debunk enemy propaganda.

But, most important, in the war with Hezbollah -- and in previous conflicts, as well -- the media fail to comprehend, and the Israelis fail consistently and adequately to explain, that those who are and were fighting Israel (including theplo's Yassir Arafat, Hezbollah's Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, and his Iranian sponsors) seek genocide and the ultimate demise of the state of Israel in its totality. Similarly, the media often compartamentalize descriptions of jihadi atrocities and the overall strategic goal of jihadis to force the demise of Western civilization. Representatives of Western governments almost never explain these key points, or they explain them without sufficient facts. Western publics are rarely afforded coherent information through which to frame and understand events.

Stigmatized yet again by the conflict with Hezbollah, Israel lost what little support it enjoyed at the beginning of the conflict in Europe, among the American left, and in many developing countries, while the hatred of the Arab world was easily further inflamed by the daily stream of "atrocity news" being served up by Al Jazeera and Al Manar, the Hezbollah satellitetv network. However, Israeli efforts to engage in strategic information operations were and remain virtually nonexistent. The budget of Al Manar is greater than the entire Israeli foreign ministry public diplomacy (hasbara) budget. The architect of this failing public diplomacy/strategic information policy under former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Raanan Gissin, has admitted himself that Jerusalem was particularly lacking on this battlefield.14

The Israelis aren't facing this particular battle alone. The U.S. and the West faced similar difficulties after the liberation of Afghanistan and the "desecration of the Koran" allegations; and continue to encounter a media barrage over Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, the Prophet Muhammad cartoons, and other perception crises, both real and media-generated. Winning hearts and minds is and will remain the greatest challenge for Israel -- and the West -- in the forthcoming wars against the jihadis.

Lessons learned

Jihadi organizations, supported by anti-status quo powers such as Iran and Syria, do not threaten only individual states, but are bringing about instability and the destruction of regimes throughout entire regions (Iraq, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Indian subcontinent). At the same time, state support is a source of sub-state actors' vulnerability which is not sufficiently understood, let alone exploited. As nation-states have leaderships, assets, and interests, those need to be put under pressure to promote a cessation of support for sub-state or supra-state actors.

The Israel-Hezbollah war, as well as conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, yielded many important lessons vital for the success in the conflict against Islamist radicalism world wide. These include:

Do not underestimate the enemy. Not being a conventional army, Hezbollah elicited the contempt of Israeli political and military elites. The deputy chief of staff and Israeli Air Force intelligence commanders referred to Hezbollah as a "terrorist gang," discounting its lethality.15 Hezbollah wasted no time, putting down roots in Gaza and attempting to penetrate the West Bank. The Pentagon leadership and the U.S. military top brass were slow to recognize the nature of the conflict in Iraq as an insurgency, not just a terrorist campaign.

Find sponsors and leaders. More intelligence penetration of Hezbollah and of Iraqi militias is necessary, both in terms of human intelligence and signal intelligence. More scrutiny needs to be focused on the location of Hezbollah's leadership; the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah link, including the identities of liaison officers; the type and volume of hardware supplied to Hezbollah; the nature and location of the joint Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah command-and-control center in Syria; the identities of Iranian experts and trainers working with Hezbollah; the identities of Hezbollah personnel trained or training in Iran; and the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that the Iranians are teaching Hezbollah and their allies in Iraq and elsewhere now or in the future.

Similarly, the leadership and connections to foreign states and funders of the Ba'ath underground and the Shiite militias need to be further mined for actionable intelligence of the kind collected in the January2007 raid on the Iranian representative office in Mosul. Such information can assist in putting down the insurgency.

Local knowledge, language skills, and understanding of political, historical, and religious dynamics of the theater of operations are weapons in themselves. Hezbollah spent a tremendous amount of resources spying on Israel, including recruiting Israeli military officers and gaining a deep understanding of Israeli doctrine and tactics. A similar effort is afoot in Iraq and Afghanistan. Every war is a war of intelligence, of strategic and operational deceit and subterfuge, but twenty-first-century wars will be outstanding for their heavily reliance on and integration with intelligence activities. Gathering and analysis of intelligence are impossible without linguistic and cultural knowledge.

Safe havens are crucial. These wars are not local. Just as Syria provided Hezbollah a safe haven, and Iran supplied money, weapons and training, the Taliban and other jihadi groups are using safe havens, such as in Pakistan, to train, equip, treat the wounded, and learn military and technological innovations. A task for the twenty-fist century war against radical jihad will be to render safe havens unsafe, using diplomacy where possible and force where necessary.

The Hezbollah victory is empowering Iran and threatening to destabilize the whole Middle East. Iranian leaders from Ayatollah Ali Khameini to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have called the outcome "the divine victory." Arab commentators have already opined that the Hezbollah success will boost jihadis (Both Sunni and Shiite) from Iraq to Jordan to Egypt.16

Riyadh, Amman, and Cairo were deeply uncomfortable about the Iranian involvement with Iraqi Shiites and support of Hezbollah. Sunni adicals, however, sided with Iran. Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's top lieutenant, welcomed Hezbollah's resilience, opening the way to expanded cooperation between extremist Sunnis and extremist Shiites in toppling pro-Western regimes. Cooperation between the United States, European powers, out-of-area actors, and the moderate/pragmatic Arab nation-states, as well as Israel, needs to be boosted to stem the Iranian expansion and a possible anti-American Sunni-Shiite jihadi alliance.

Information warfare and perception management is paramount. Without effective hearts-and-minds strategies that are an integral part of the overall war strategy, the West and its allies in the area have very little in terms of soft power to counter Iran and the jihadis. This information strategy has to affect not just the Western and Muslim media, but also the mosques and the education systems. Modern states and militaries have repeatedly failed to clearly recognize, much less effectively counter, the deliberate campaign of manipulation and propaganda being carried out by militant Islamists/jihadis through the mass media, especially the internet. The largely pacifist Western nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector is often a target of Islamist propaganda that vilifies the U.S. and its allies. Islamists consistently score points through the media, academia, and the NGO community in the court of the public opinion. A case in point for an information warfare offensive would be pressuring the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, to further cut support not just to al Qaeda and other jihadi organizations, but also to radical Islamic charities and madrassahs, and to deligitimize jihadi-supporting preachers and imams. More efforts are needed to boost the profile of those clerics who promote a message of tolerance and to facilitate the launch of satellitetv channels and websites with agendas aimed at reconciliation and peace. This should be the highest priority in the war of ideas -- information warfare that so far the U.S. has been fighting only half-heartedly, and unquestionably losing.

The U.N. is an unreliable agency for peace. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the permanent members of the Security Council, especially France and Russia, did precious little to fight terror in Lebanon or Iraq. As far as France is concerned, things are improving under the new administration of President Nicolas Sarkozy. The UN peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, has collected and published detailed data about Israeli force movements in wartime, endangering the lives of Israeli servicemen and women, and violating its own neutrality mandate.17 Just as the unsc sat on its hands when Lebanon and Hezbollah failed to implementunsc Resolution1559, which stipulated the disarmament of Hezbollah and deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the South, the violation ofunsc Resolution 1701, which demanded the same and more, began the day it was signed. Specifically, Hezbollah announced that it refused to consider procedures to disarm, and it refuses to stop the resupply of weapons from Syria; it considers Israeli troops legitimate targets -- with no repercussions from theun. Syria and Iran are openly defying the UN and furnishing arms supplies to Hezbollah, with no sanctions and no calls for sanctions against these terror-sponsoring states. Those U.S. and Israeli decision-makers who actively lobbied for Resolution1701 as the solution for the conflict now look naïve at best, and possibly worse than that. All this is hardly surprising in view of previousun failures in the Middle East (such as the hasty evacuation from Sinai of the UNEF by Secretary General U Thant in 1967) and the UN "peacekeeping" disasters in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

Under-promise and over-deliver. The best strategy is not to advise the enemy of your strategic goals. Policymakers should not have promised "a new Middle East" safe for democracy; they should not have proclaimed that Hezbollah would be destroyed, disarmed, or denied the ability to fire rockets into Israel. All Israeli leaders needed to say was "Hezbollah will pay the price" -- and strike at a time and place of their choosing. Instead, they fought when and where Hezbollah wanted them to. Rather than under-promising and over-delivering, the Israelis inflated expectations, articulated maximum goals, and managed to snatch a public perception of failure from the jaws of potential victory. Similarly, the U.S. over-promised in Iraq by talking about turning the country into a model of democracy for the New Middle East. Now Washington needs to find ways to exercise the art of the possible and achieve pacification with the least number of American and Iraqi casualties. Whether this is in fact possible remains to be seen.

The time is now

When facing sub-state actors, conventional, twentieth-century military doctrines aimed at wars against nation-states and industrial-era mass armies are effectively dead. Even the best traditional militaries, such as the U.S. and Israeli armies, face formidable difficulties when confronted with irregular, well-motivated, and foreign-supported forces, which enjoy media battlefield advantages. The Israel-Hezbollah conflict was not so much a defeat of Israel as it was a defeat of the old-style warfare by the new. The same can be said about the U.S. military in Iraq. The best nineteenth-century cavalry army would be impotent against small and well-trained tank and mechanized infantry divisions. And with modern warfare becoming increasingly political, intelligence-based, and waged on the information battlefield, it is time to restructure the military to answer these challenges. The time to wake up and rethink the paradigms is now. Tomorrow may be too late.

Source: realclearpolitics

Syria Unlikely to Join Peace Conference

By SAMAR KASSABLI – 7 hours ago

DAMASCUS, Syria (AP) — Syrian President Bashar Assad all but ruled out his country's participation in a U.S.-sponsored international peace conference on the Middle East, suggesting in an interview published Thursday that the meeting has no chance for success.

His comments come amid growing skepticism of the conference among some Arab governments, which have expressed doubts the planned gathering in November will tackle the main issues of the conflict with Israel.

Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have not said whether they will attend.

"Syria has not received an invitation to the conference, and even if it did, it will not take part in a conference that lacks the chances of success," Assad said in an interview with two Tunisian newspapers.

The Bush administration has said it will invite adversary Syria to the conference. But Assad had said earlier that his country would not attend the meeting if it did not address Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria during the 1967 Mideast war.

In Thursday's interview with the Ach-Chourouk and Le Quotidien newspapers, Assad said the conference should have serious and clear goals and "should include all peace tracks including the Golan issue."

The United States has kept quiet on the most basic details about the meeting, including precise dates, the guest list and the location — though it is expected to be in Annapolis, Maryland.

Arab League chief Amr Moussa warned of a likely failure of the conference during an international economic forum Wednesday night in Cairo. He said the United States was only hoping for a photo-op between Saudi and Israeli officials rather than real progress.

In the Saudi capital Riyadh, the head of the six-country Gulf Cooperation Council Abdul-Rahman Attiyah called Thursday for "joint Arab-Palestinian action to set the conditions for the success the conference." He also expressed skepticism that the meeting would be successful "because Israel does not want peace."

Assad also referred to a reported Israel jet raid on a target in northeastern Syria on Sept. 6. Syria has described the site as an "unused military building." Israeli officials have maintained an unprecedented wall of silence over the affair, though there have been reports — denied by Syria — that the target was a nascent nuclear facility being built with North Korean help.

Assad, in the interview, said Israel's silence reflected "the failure of Israeli or U.S. intelligence."

"They are trying to cover up their failure by shrouding it with mystery," he said.

Source: AP