Translated from Arabic
Choi Tae Bok, will be the head of the North Korean parliamentarian delegation starting on Friday an official visit to Syria that will last four days, during which talks with senior Syrian officials will be held.
The talks with the delegation of Syrian parliamentarians will not begin until next Sunday. The Syrian News Agency (SANA) explained that the Syrian delegation will address in the talks bilateral relations between the two countries and ways to develop various fields in addition to discuss the situation in the region and the two Koreas.
The talks are expected to regard the accusations of nuclear cooperation between both countries.
The Chief of the Office of Management of the Baath Party Ilya Dawood visited North Korea Nuclear after the accusations against the two countries, and talks were already held with the head of the parliamentarian delegation currently visiting Syria, Choi Tae Bok, according to Korean Central News Agency official.
Source: Syria News
Meanwhile, Syria has begun dismantling the remains of a site Israel bombed on September 6 in what may be an attempt to prevent the location from coming under international scrutiny, said US and foreign officials familiar with the aftermath of the attack.
Based on overhead photography, the officials say the site in Syria's eastern desert near the Euphrates River had a 'signature' or characteristics of a small but substantial nuclear reactor, one similar in structure to North Korea's facilities.
The dismantling of the damaged site, which appears to be still underway, could make it difficult for weapons inspectors to determine the precise nature of the facility and how Syria planned to use it. Syria, which possesses a small reactor used for scientific research, has denied seeking to expand its nuclear programme. But US officials knowledgeable about the Israeli raid have described the target as a nuclear facility being constructed with North Korean assistance.
The bombed facility is different from the one Syria displayed to journalists last week to back its allegations that Israel had bombed essentially an empty building, said the officials, who insisted on anonymity because details of the Israeli attack are classified.
While US officials express increasing confidence that the Syrian facility was nuclear-related, divisions persist within the government and among weapons experts over the significance of the threat. If the facility was a nuclear reactor, US weapons experts said it would almost certainly have taken Syria several years to complete the structure, and much longer to produce significant quantities of plutonium for potential use in nuclear weapons. Nuclear reactors also are used to generate electricity.
"This isn't like a Road Runner cartoon where you call up Acme Reactors and they deliver a functioning reactor to your backyard. It takes years to build," said Joseph Cirincione, director for nuclear policy at the Centre for American Progress. "This is an extremely demanding technology, and I don't think Syria has the technical, engineering or financial base to really support such a reactor."
While expressing concern over the prospect that Syria may have decided to launch a nuclear programme in secret, some weapons experts question why neither Israel nor the United States made any effort before the secret attack - or in the six weeks since - to offer evidence to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a move that would trigger an inspection of Syria by the nuclear watchdog.
"The reason we have an IAEA and a safeguard system is that, if there is evidence of wrongdoing, it can be presented by a neutral body to the international community so that a collective response can be pursued," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.
Israel “mole” took photos of Syrian target
20 October 2007
WASHINGTON - Israel had obtained detailed pictures of a Syrian complex from an apparent mole, which supported an Israeli belief the facility was nuclear and led to an air strike on it last month, ABC News reported on Friday.
ABC, citing a senior US official, said the person had provided several pictures of the complex from the ground, and Israel showed the images to the CIA. The US spy agency helped pinpoint “drop points” to assist in potential targeting, ABC said.
Israel urged the United States to destroy the complex, but Washington hesitated because no fissionable material was found that would prove the site was nuclear, ABC said.
The network quoted the official as saying the facility was of North Korean design and that Syria must have had “human” help from North Korea.
The White House and the CIA declined to comment on the report, in keeping with a strict US refusal to discuss the issue.
Israel has confirmed that it carried out an air strike on Syria on Sept. 6 but it has not described the target. Syria has said only that it was a building under construction.
The New York Times reported on Sunday that the targeted site was modelled on a facility North Korea used for stockpiling atomic bomb fuel. Syria has one declared, small research nuclear reactor under safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has denied hiding any nuclear activity.
The complex struck by Israel was in a remote area about 100 miles (160 km) from the Iraqi border and along the Euphrates River, ABC said.
It said the official described the pictures as showing a large cylindrical structure, still under construction, with thick reinforced walls. There was also a secondary structure and a pump station with trucks around it.
“It was unmistakable what it was going to be. No doubt in my mind,” ABC quoted the official as saying.
The United States had begun to consider ways to destroy the complex, such as a special forces raid using helicopters, ABC said. But it said the White House sent word the United States would not carry out a raid and urged Israel not to do it either.
Source: Khaleej Times
UN nuclear agency examines Syria images
By GEORGE JAHN
Fri Oct 19, 3:57 PM ET
U.N. experts have begun analyzing satellite imagery of the Syrian site struck last month by Israeli warplanes, looking for any signs it was a secret nuclear facility, diplomats said Friday.
It was unclear where the material was obtained or what exactly it showed. One of the diplomats, who is linked to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said the experts were studying commercial images, contrary to earlier suggestions they came from U.S. intelligence.
Separately, a senior diplomat familiar with the issue indicated the experts were looking at several possible locations for the Israeli strike. Two other diplomats said initial examination of the material found no evidence the target was a nuclear installation, but emphasized it was too early to draw definitive conclusions.
All of those who spoke to The Associated Press were briefed on the agency's receipt of the images but demanded anonymity because their information was confidential.
The IAEA investigation is significant because it is the first case of an independent and respected organization looking at the evidence and trying to reach a conclusion as to what was hit.
Since the Sept. 6 bombing, news media have quoted unidentified U.S. officials as saying the airstrike hit a nuclear facility linked to North Korea, which is now in the process of dismantling its nuclear weapons program. On Friday, The Washington Post cited American officials as saying the site, in Syria's eastern desert near the Euphrates River, had characteristics of a small but substantial nuclear reactor similar to North Korea's facility.
Officials of the Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog and the U.S. diplomatic mission to the IAEA had no comment Friday. But IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming indirectly rebuked Washington earlier this week, saying the agency "expects any country having information about nuclear-related activities in another country to provide that information to the IAEA."
Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, cautioned that without full U.S. cooperation, the IAEA's probe might be hampered because commercial satellite imagery "may not be of sufficient quality to figure out difficult questions."
Still, he welcomed IAEA involvement as an opportunity for a neutral organization to "provide an assessment and give the international community some guidance about what has or has not happened."
Syria denies it has an undeclared nuclear program and North Korea has said it was not involved in any nuclear program in the Mideast nation. Damascus has said the Israelis targeted an empty building, and the agency has said it has no evidence to the contrary.
The diplomats said Vienna-based Syrian diplomats have met with senior IAEA representatives since the bombing and have provided no substantive information that would indicate their country had nuclear secrets.
Syria has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and allowed agency experts to inspect its only known nuclear facility — a small, 27-kilowatt reactor, according to diplomats linked to the IAEA.
Translated from Arabic
The International Atomic Energy Agency will submit its first report on a primary feasibility study on the possibility of the launch of a GCC nuclear programme next week, assistant under-secretary for planning and studies Dr Khalid Bu Rashid said.
The IAEA will submit the report to the GCC general secretariat and this will be followed by a meeting of Gulf experts and officials in Riyadh, he said.
Dr Bu Rashid said the feasibility study will define the laws and regulations, infrastructures and protection measures corresponding to international standards that the GCC will require for establishing its joint nuclear program.
Character and Mechanism of The Iranian Institutions Holding the Nuclear Decision: From the Khatami-Rouhani to Ahmadinejad-Larijani Eras By Mustafa al-Labbad
Mustafa al-Labbad Al Hayat - 16/10/07//
The nuclear issue represents Iran's aspiration to play a regional role in a distinctive phase of the region's modern history, and Iran's confrontation with the west can be summed up as the number one issue on the international agenda at present.
This article will try to answer a question that appears to be extremely important in the context of current developments, namely: who wields decision-making power on the nuclear issue in Iran? To answer this, we must review Iran's negotiating expertise with the west and shed light on the structure of the Iranian National Security Council, which has managed the nuclear crisis since European-Iranian negotiations in 2003, through the change in mechanisms and priorities adopted by Tehran for decision-making on nuclear issues during the previous Khatami-Rouhani era and the Ahmadinejad-Larijani era today. The current phase of the management of the nuclear issue is not isolated from the period that preceded it, and does not represent a radical changed based on differing ideological motives; it is a logical continuation of this policy. The basic difference between the two eras involves the rise of the regional presence of Tehran, after the occupation of Iraq, which led to a change in Iranian negotiating tactics and the mechanism of decision-making on nuclear issues, accompanied by the arrival in office of President Ahmadinejad.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has experienced profound geopolitical changes in its regional neighbors during a short period of time. Five new countries were created on its northern borders after the fall of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. The occupation of Afghanistan in 2001 on its eastern borders and the following occupation of Iraq on its western borders in 2003 led to radical changes in the structure of the regional system surrounding Iran.
Despite these violent transformations on its borders and its ability to exploit contradictions in the region to enhance its national interests, Iran's negotiating experience after the revolution - despite all of this - numbers only two instances.
The first took place through intermediaries, with Washington, after the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis in Tehran, while the second occurred in the negotiations with the former Iraqi regime after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.
Thus, negotiations with the European troika (Germany, France and the UK) represent the most important negotiation experience in history of revolutionary Iran, which for the first time experienced very complex negotiations that had interrelated political and legal dimensions, along with technical and security dimensions. At the time, there were differences between the Foreign Ministry and the Iranian Nuclear Energy Agency over three basic items: responsibility for managing the negotiations, policies to be carried out during various phases of the negotiations, and setting negotiating priorities.
The former chief Iranian negotiator, Hassan Rouhani, revealed that these differences grew when the International Atomic Energy Agency asked for permission to inspect nuclear facilities. The Iranian Atomic Energy Agency did not give much importance to the request, while the Foreign Ministry felt the matter involved considerably more danger.
In short, Tehran realized that the complexity and importance of the negotiations required high-level official representation, and not allowing the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency to handle the negotiations alone. Since then, the center of Iranian decision-making on the nuclear issue has not been limited to the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency on Karkar street (Tehran's biggest street, which extends from the metro station at the south to the north, in Amirabad).
In the middle of 2003, for the first time in the history of Iran's nuclear program, responsibility for negotiations were transferred to Iran's National Security Council and saw Iran's Atomic Energy Agency become a mere junior partner in a process that featured interconnected technical and legal dimensions, behind the political and security considerations.
Iran's National Security Council
The National Security Council inherited the prerogatives of its predecessor, the Higher Council for National Defense, which was established in 1979, by virtue of Article 110 of the Iranian Constitution that followed the revolution. At the time it was made up of seven people: the president of the Republic, the prime minister, the minister of defense, the chief of staff, the general commander of the Republican Guards, and two advisors to the spiritual guide of the Republic. After the Constitution was amended in 1989 to match the change at the top after the death of Imam Khomeini and his succession by Sayyed Ali Khameini, the Council's situation changed as well. This was because the spiritual guide of the Republic sits atop the head of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran, enjoying constitutional and executive powers that are too many to count. Thus, not only was the name of the body changed, to become the National Security Council, but its prerogatives and number of members were increased as well. Since then, the following members have been added: the head of the judicial authority, the head of the Council for Safeguarding the Constitution, the foreign minister, the minister of intelligence, the minister of interior, and the finance minister (chairman of the Budget and Planning Committee).
The spiritual guide of the republic dominates the NSC through constitutional prerogatives that give him the right to appoint the NSC's secretary, giving him control over the majority of members. The spiritual guide is also the only party that grants the NSC the ability to implement the decisions it takes; the Iranian Constitution stipulates his approval of the NSC's decisions for them to take effect.
The National Security Council has the power to vote on important state decisions, with many more constitutional prerogatives than those granted to the Iranian Parliament. Therefore, the Council resembles a "Higher Parliament." This group of people is managing the Iranian nuclear issue and has the decision-making power - with a disparate share of prerogatives - and carries out the directives of the spiritual guide of the Republic in this regard.
In other words, the office of the spiritual guide of the Republic undertakes the strategic planning for decision-making related to nuclear power, while the National Security Council carries out planning related to administrative matters and implementation.
This basic foundation hasn't changed in the two phases of negotiations carried out by Iran, in the Khatami-Rouhani and Ahmadinejad-Larijani eras. However, the mechanism of decision-making by the National Security Council has changed, keeping up with the sudden change in negotiating positions and regional and international conditions.
Mechanism of "Nuclear" Decision-Making in the Khatami-Rouhani Era
Analyzing Iran's negotiation strategy and "nuclear" decision-making in the Khatami-Rouhani era is based on various statements by the two, as well as two detailed papers written by Hassan Rouhani on the topic. The first was published under the title "Behind the Challenges that Face Iran and the IAEA on the Nuclear Issue," in the periodical Rahbord in September 2005, issued by the Center for Strategic Studies, affiliated with the council in charge of diagnosing the best interest of the Iranian regime.
The second paper was entitled "Our Peaceful Nuclear Activities and Our Constructive Dealing with the World," published in the US' National Interest, Winter 2005. According to what Rouhani later disclosed that the first meeting of Iran's National Security Council after responsibility for the nuclear issue was transferred to it in mid-2003, led to the formation of a decision-making structure of four graded levels of importance, from low to high, as follows:
First: the Department of Technical Issues and Negotiations, headed by the relevant deputy minister of defense. Second: the Department of Security Affairs and Related Political Issues, headed by the secretary of the NSC. Third: the Ministerial Department, made up ministries concerned with coordination with the NSC. Fourth: the Committee for Making Final Decisions, which obtains its instructions directly from the spiritual guide of the Republic. The NSC tasked its experienced secretary, Hassan Rouhani, with coordinating among these four levels; Rouhani has headed the NSC since 1999, as the trusted representative of the spiritual guide of the Republic.
We should note that this decision-making mechanism, even if set up to deal with negotiations with the Europeans, was more complicated than that used to coordinate only between the Foreign Ministry and the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency. According to the new mechanism, these two bodies were added as committees, out of four committees, after they were stripped of decision-making power regarding negotiations and their prerogatives limited to providing technical advice.
Thus, the NSC became the authority for negotiations on the nuclear issue and the related requirements, as Iran adopted a strategy of delaying the matter's referral to the UN Security Council for as long as possible, as Rouhani disclosed.
What is interesting here is the implicit meaning of this strategy, which means that Tehran knew beforehand that negotiations with the Europeans would not prevent the referral of the issue to the Security Council. This implicit meaning leads to a more important conclusion, namely that negotiations were seen as a way to gain time and obtain the biggest number of technical benefits, against a background of competing international interests.
The Iranian negotiator knew of the contradictions among: Europe, the US, Russia and China, despite their shared goal of preventing Iran from having a nuclear program. The US goal is referring Tehran to the Security Council, in order to target the regime and if it gives in on the nuclear issue, this goal will contradict European interests, which aren't necessarily strengthened by the fall of the Iranian regime and a pro-American regime taking its place. European interests in Iran are based on the considering the country a likely source of gas and a window on Asian markets, while European states also seek to gain a big share of local Iranian markets.
The Europeans offered Iran membership in the World Trade Organization and opening the flow of investments, in exchange for halting the uranium enrichment program. However, two elements played a role in Iran's rejection of the European offer. The first was Iran's appraisal of this offer as not bringing direct benefits, with the related negotiations taking a long time. The second element was Tehran's desire to go ahead with enrichment to enhance its negotiating positions.
Russia and Europe shared in trying to dissuade Iran from obtaining a nuclear fuel cycle and each sought to export them to Iran to reap economic benefits.
In parallel with all of this, Iran wagered on China to open a hole in the wall of the Security Council, to which it knows its case will be referred in the future. To enhance the chances of success of this wager, Iran concluded agreements giving political and economic benefits to Beijing, in order to urge it use its veto at the Security Council and prevent the issuing of a resolution that involves a military strike against Iran.
As for the management of international relations outside the Security Council, Rouhani proposed breaking the diplomatic siege on his country, involving South Africa and Brazil in Iran's negotiations with the Europeans. This proposal was based on the fact that these two countries are also interested in developing a nuclear fuel cycle and have an interest in not punishing Iran, especially since it is geographically distant and its nuclear program does not constitute an imminent threat for them.
Iran agreed to a freezing - temporary and condition - of its nuclear activities, and in return the Europeans pledged to maintain negotiations with Iran, until a lasting a solution that brings economic and technological benefits to Iran is found. However, these benefits remained conditional upon imposing strict monitoring of Iran's nuclear program, to ensure that it remains below the level of possessing a nuclear fuel cycle. What's interesting is that Iran actually halted its activities, but in areas in which it had only made technical progress, while halting a freeze in areas where it experienced difficulties.
This is how the Isfahan facility was built and operated, during the negotiations, in a rare example of Iran's abilities to gain time. This suitability of this conclusion is most logical when we observe the development of a number of centrifuges that Iran has.
At the beginning of negotiations with the European troika, Iran had 164 centrifuges and at the end of 2004, it had 500, working at full capacity. When Rouhani left his position in 2005, Iran had 1,000 such devices and in 2007, the figure has risen to 3,000, working at full capacity.
Iran had no option but to let international inspectors enter its nuclear facilities, to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, and this was a condition for the negotiations to continue. Rouhani says, "We were concerned with drawing a complete picture of our previous nuclear activities, without getting referred to the Security Council. We did not lie, but we provided some information late."
From 2003 to 2005, Iran was keen to affirm on every occasion that it voluntarily and temporarily agreed to halt its uranium enrichment. Tehran linked its return to enrichment to two scenarios: seeing the negotiations arrive at a dead end and non-recognition of its right to possess a nuclear fuel cycle. This is what actually happened, after Ahmadinejad became president. Iran halted enrichment at a technical point permitting it to return to it and arrive at the 3.5% level within a few months. It was known that "the state, which could enrich uranium to the level of 3.5% can also reach 90%," and Rouhani arrives at the conclusion that reveals the ultimate goal of the Khatami-Rouhani negotiation policy, namely "at that time, the situation will change and Iran will have to recognize Iran's right to possess a nuclear fuel cycle. The world did not want Pakistan to have a bomb or Brazil to have a nuclear fuel cycle, but it was obliged to deal with these realities."
The Iranian tactics show that negotiations, in the end, benefited Iran's nuclear program and did not slow its course, as the events which followed showed that Iran was precise in its appraisal of the international position at the time, which didn't permit more than Iran's complete stop before arriving at the phase of possessing a complete nuclear fuel cycle.
"Nuclear" Decision-Making Mechanisms under Ahmadinejad-Larijani
We can see how a change took place in Iranian nuclear priorities due to the improvement of its negotiating position and the difference in regional and international conditions, while Khatami's smile and the dialogue of civilizations, which targeted the European negotiating partner was replaced by the intense heating up that was headed for a region filled with injustices, headed by the Palestinian issue.
This tension allowed Iran to cover its growing regional reach, from the Khanaqin crossing in the north to Gaza in the south, and exploiting this reach in managing the nuclear issue.
This transformation is due to the Iranian leadership's appraisal that a return to uranium enrichment until arriving at the possession of a nuclear fuel cycle will certainly lead to Iran's case being referred to the Security Council.
The importance of possessing a nuclear fuel cycle is outweighed by the limited number of states that have nuclear energy, although most of them do not have a nuclear fuel cycle, or the possibility of enriching uranium themselves. To make up for the loss of the Europeans as a negotiating partner, and the low ceiling of economic sanctions in the Security Council, Iran can negotiate once again with the IAEA, but from the position of possessing a nuclear fuel cycle. Iran's the negotiating strength of Iran's position is enhanced by Tehran's regional presence in a way that allows it to defuse international pressure exercised and sponsored by the US, so that managing the nuclear issue is tied to regional developments in a strict and interconnected fashion.
After Ahmadinejad won the presidential elections and the change in the NSC's secretariat, Tehran began to announce it was returning to uranium enrichment - with the US bogged down in Iraq - on the basis that its earlier halt had been temporary and voluntary. Then Tehran announced that it had succeeded in reaching a 3.5% enrichment level. Two connected events represented the high point in Iran's regional rise; the first was Hizbullah's hanging on against the Israeli military machine during the July 2006 War, and the second was Tehran's announcement that it possessed a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which Ahmadinejad declared meant that his country had "joined the nuclear club."
Perhaps the mechanisms of nuclear-related decision making in Iran underwent a change to keep up with the benefits earned by increasing technical nuclear capacity and Iran's jump on the regional stage, to match in the end the increasing international pressure on the country. This is logically followed by building new mechanisms for this decision-making based on what has already been achieved, but things will become more complicated if the regional rhythm is merged with the nuclear negotiation process.
Based on this, it's expected that the mechanism will approach the following model:
First, the Committee for Technical Issues and Negotiations, with the following members: Foreign Minister Manousher Mottaqi; the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency Gholamreza Agha Zadeh; the coordinator of the NSC, Jawad Waidi; the assistant to the minister for legal and international affairs, Abbas Araqji; Iran's permanent representative to the United Nationas, Jawad Zarif; the head of Iran's delegation to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Sultanieh; and the minister of energy, Pervez Fattah.
Second, the Department of Security Affairs and Related Political Issues, with NSC Secretary Ali Larijani, the chief of staff of the armed forces, Ataollah Salehi; Interior Minister Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi; the commander of the army, Mohammad-Hussein Dadres; Minister of Defense Mustafa Mohammad Najjar; and Asghar Hijazi, responsible for the special security office of the supreme guide of the Republic.
Third, the Committee on Coordination and Follow-up, headed by Ali Larijani, and which follows up the work of ministries concerned with the issue (intelligence, foreign affairs, science and technology).
Fourth, the Presidential Committee, grouping Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vice-President Pervez Daoudi, and the chairman of the Budget Committee, Farhad Rahbar; this committee's role is quite marginal. This group does not enjoy decisive prerogatives and often it sees the reining in or promoting of President Ahmadinejad, depending on regional developments.
Thus, the president's role appears to be limited to competing against Ali Larijani in announcing negotiating positions and technical successes, but only during times of escalation, while he disappears during periods of calm.
Fifth: the Committee on Regional Affairs, concerned with developments in the region, and particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories, to recommend what should be undertaken in negotiations based on the developments.
The committee comprises the head of the Revolutionary Guards' intelligence apparatus, the leader of the Quds Brigade in the Revolutionary Guards, the assistant foreign minister for Arab and African Affairs, which heads the Iraq committee at the Foreign Ministry, and a number of Iranian experts in Arab affairs and Iran's ambassadors to Arab countries.
Sixth: the Final Decision-Making Committee, made up of Spiritual Guide Ali Khameini; Mohammadi Gholbaikani, the director of Khameini's office; Intelligence Minister Mohseni Ijehi; the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Mohammad Ali Jaafari; the Speaker of Parliament Gholamreza Haddad-Adel; the head of the judicial authority, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi; the secretary of the NSC, Ali Larijani; and Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Assembly of Experts and the head of the Council in charge of diagnosing the best interest of the Iranian regime.
The differences of opinion between Rouhani and Larijani do not lie in the first part of their last names, or even their differences over Iran's nuclear negotiating strategy, but in the stages of negotiations. The former has prepared the suitable technical foundation and negotiating conditions; the latter - at a suitable historical moment - announced a return to enrichment and launched "nuclear successes," one after another, to put pressure on the parties to the negotiations.
In order to achieve the phased goal of acquiring a nuclear fuel cycle, Tehran is pressuring the international parties by using the time element, since the gap between a acquiring nuclear cycle and the theoretical ability to possess a bomb maybe bridged by a political decision. Ahmadinejad's confirmation of Iran's success in possessing a nuclear fuel cycle can only be a message to America, saying that the period of preventing his country from uranium enrichment through negotiations has ended. While the Khatami-Rouhani era involved making precise estimations, the Ahmadinejad-Larijani era has seen calculations based on logical estimations but based on uncertain wagers.
The logical appraisal in the coming negotiations between Tehran and the IAEA will lead to seeing the agency accept Iran's nuclear fuel cycle, but this is based, ironically, on a necessarily uncertain wager, which is that Washington is drowning in its Iraq crisis and has no way to confront Tehran.
Members of the Iranian National Security Council:
1-The head of the executive authority, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
2-The head of the legislative authority, Parliament Speaker Gholamreza Haddad-Adel
3-The head of the judicial authority, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi
4-Chief of staff of the armed forces, Ataollah Salehi
5-The vice president and the chairman of the Budget Committee, Farhad Rahbar
6-The vice president, Pervez Daoudi
7-The secretary of the NSC Ali Larijani
8-The foreign minister, Manousher Mottaki
9-The interior minister, Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi
10-The minister of intelligence, Mohseni Ijehi
11-The commander of the army, Mohammad-Hussein Dadres
12-The commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Mohammad Ali Jaafari
13-The head of the Assembly of Experts, Hashemi Rafsanjani
14-The minister of defense, Mustafa Mohammad Najjar
15-The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency, Gholamreza Agha Zadeh
16-The minister of science and technology, Mohammad Mahdi Zahedi
17-The minister of energy, Pervez Fattah
18-Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations, Jawad Zarif
*Mustafa al-Labbad is an Egyptian expert in Iranian and Turkish affairs
Source: Al Hayat
