The Emirates Center For Strategic Studies and Research has been publishing three reports worth reading:
Israel and Arab Peace Initiative: Changing the Text to Effect Normalization
by Ibrahim Abdel Karim
27 Aug 2007
The Israeli official position on the Arab Peace Initiative, which was ratified at the Beirut summit in 2002, has undergone two distinct phases. Initially, the Sharon government rejected the initiative outright and was unwilling even to discuss it. Thereafter, the Olmert government gave it qualified acceptance, based on certain terms and conditions. However, on closer study, one can deduce that these responses have not been at variance with the general Israeli approach toward the issue of peace with Palestinians and Arab countries. How?
Israelis have studied the timing of the Arab peace initiative, its structure, and its related implications. They have looked into the reasons for the decision to “reactivate the initiative” at the Riyadh summit of 2007, and have deliberated on the “change” in circumstances since the launch of the Initiative five years ago. They have studied developments on the Israeli and Palestinian fronts over this period: the results of the second Lebanon war, the effects of the Iraqi war on the region, and the US efforts to control the regional situation to guide it toward a coalition against Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Consequently, an Israeli stance has emerged that was summed up by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert when he said that important decision-making Arab countries now understand that Israel is no longer the “biggest calamity for the Arab world.” He said that the Middle East was witnessing strategic changes and that some moderate Arab countries were ready to confront what he called “radical Islam,” which he considered as the main threat to stability in the Middle East. Olmert also saw that “these changes would have a big influence on the will to make peace with Israel.”
A review of the published material on the Arab Peace Initiative in Israel reveals an emerging Israeli consensus that admits the initiative is based on what it proclaims in its introduction—namely, that Arab countries believe a military solution to the conflict has failed to achieve peace or security for both sides of the conflict. While Israelis do not object to the first paragraph of the Initiative that wants Israel to reconsider its policies, move toward peace, and declare that it desires a just and fair peace as a strategic choice, they object to three demands specified in the second paragraph and deem them as inapplicable. First among these demands is the call for complete withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab lands, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to borders existing on the 4th of June 1967—along with the lands that Israel presently occupies in south Lebanon. The second demand seeks a fair and just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194. The third demand is for the acceptance of a Palestinian state that enjoys full sovereignty over Palestinian territories that have been under Israeli occupation since 4th of June 1967, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as the capital.
Israeli officials have weighed Arab demands against the proposed gains for Israel, as detailed in the Initiative. The third paragraph of the Initiative states that on the fulfillment of the demands listed in the Initiative, the Arab-Israeli conflict would be considered resolved by Arab countries. It also states that Arab countries would then enter into peace agreements with Israel after the security concerns of all countries in the region have been settled, and would normalize relations with Israel within the framework of a comprehensive peace. However, Israelis have claimed that the “the value of the merchandise does not match with the proposed price.” It has raised its concerns over the formula for solving the refugee problem that seeks a resolution on the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution 194, or in accordance with the fourth paragraph of the Initiative that specifically indicates the refusal of any kind of Palestinian settlement in contravention of the special circumstances of Arab countries that host the refugees.
Israel criticizes the initiative on the pretext that it does not leave room for Israeli negotiations on the three traditional Arab and Palestinian demands, and that their complete acceptance by Israel alone would prepare Arab countries to negotiate peace and normalize relations with it. Majority of Israelis, who are ready for negotiations, want to see discussions over the issue of borders for a future Palestinian state and with Syria. However, the Initiative does not hint at an exchange of territories or border alterations that could allow the presence of some settlers. This entails that Israel would have to agree, even before the start of negotiations, to evacuate over 200,000 Israeli settlers from the West Bank.
At the memorial ceremony for David Ben-Gurion on November 27, 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at Sde Boker in the Negev stated that Israel partially accepted the Initiative, despite the fact that the Sharon government had rejected it four years ago. In his speech, he sought assistance of neighboring Arab countries toward solving the conflict in a peaceful manner so that it promotes direct negotiations, and partially accepted the move to “impress upon these countries the necessity of accepting the existence of Israel for normalizing relations.”
In various statements and meetings by Israeli officials, the Arab Peace Initiative has been discussed in order to produce a solution that could be acceptable for Israel—a solution that accepts Israel’s right of existence and for ensures normal relations with Arab states, but leaves out issues related to the Palestinian state, its borders, and Palestinian refugees. Many Israeli experts also emphasize that no side has the right to define “Israel’s borders,” and that this matter needs to be agreed upon by both sides. Moreover, it is averred that the solution of the Palestinian problem should be negotiated between Israel and Palestinians, and that Israel should not be asked to negotiate with Syria due to the complexities of the problem, both inside Israel and between the two sides.
However, a paper released by the Israeli Foreign Ministry (dated 16/05/2007) states that it considered the Arab League Initiative a positive step toward normalizing relations with Israel, although it contained problematic features—like the insistence on the Palestinian “right of return” and the “premature” demands on border-related issues. The document states that the establishment of a Palestinian state should be seen as a solution to the demand of Palestinian “right of return,” as the establishment of Israel was a solution for the historical aspirations of the Jewish people to return to their homeland. It also stated that the ceasefire line of 1967 was never considered a permanent border and that there never was a regional connection between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The paper also stated that the insistence of Arab countries on settling the issue of refugees and the land reveals their unrealistic desire for gains that are inconsistent with the realities that existed in 1967.
The solution of the refugee issue as formulated by the initiative, say Israeli analysts, is a “recipe for Israel’s destruction.” According to Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the Israeli solution is based on the concept of two states, Israel as a homeland for the Jews, and Palestinian state that would be the solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees. She added that consultations among Arab countries should aim at garnering Arab support for negotiations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Livni also proposed to her Egyptian and Jordanian counterparts, Ahmed Abu El-Gheit and Abdul Elah Al-Khateeb, the necessity of changing provisions of the Initiative. She stated that the normalization of relations between Arabs and Israel should not be linked to the latter’s acceptance of the peace initiative. According to Livni it would be important to normalize relations first, so that normalization becomes the road to peaceful coexistence.
As regards Israel’s response to the Arab Peace Initiative, there appear two views on the subject. According to the first view, the Arab Peace Initiative is not acceptable in its current form because it only benefits Palestinians and allegedly even gives a pretext to Palestinians to wriggle out of the first stage of the “Roadmap” peace process. It also considers the Initiative worse than other peace plans, including Security Council Resolution 242, the “Clinton plan” of 2002, and the provisions of the “Roadmap.” From the Israeli perspective, it contains the seeds of a new war and the current Israeli government must cure itself of the disease of “self deceit,” which had earlier led it to the signing of the Oslo agreement with Arafat, the second Intifada, and thousands of causalities.
The Arab Peace Initiative has also aroused a second view in Israel, whose proponents are keen on negotiating over the Initiative. Their eagerness stems from the fact that it is the first time that Arab countries have offered themselves as mediators, not only in solving issues related to the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, but also on regional issues. They have shown their readiness to deal with Israel as part of the solution, and not just as part of the problem. Again, these thinkers link the initiative with the “roadmap” and the Bush vision for two states (Israel and Palestine). They urge that the current golden opportunity should not be missed in the wake of a looming potential threat to Israel, especially with the weakening of the “moderate” Arab regimes and the emergence of radical Islamic movements that are driven by ideology, and not politics. Consequently, it would be unwise to block the road and lose the current opportunity for peace.
In addition to these two visions, several academic proposals have been circulating in Israel that call for the adoption of a policy that welcomes Arab readiness to normalize relations, and accept negotiations on contentious issues. However, it is proposed that the policy should reject any Arab precondition before the start of negotiations, seek to create a rehabilitation fund for assisting refugees outside of the ambit of negotiations, and gradually convince the Arab world against harboring the illusion of the return of refugees. Calls have also been made for a special Israeli peace initiative that should be on par with the Arab Peace Initiative, which Israel could use as a guideline for finding a solution.
Through their ploys of acceptance, refusal, hesitation, and vagueness, Israeli policies have sought to sell misleading concepts, and promote phony formulas that only tickle the toes and fail to treat the headache. This is our problem with those who want to create their history at the expense of others’ rights.
Source : ECSSR
The Collapse of Saudi-Syrian Relations!!
23 Aug 2007
For a long time, Saudi-Syrian relations have been witnessing a downturn, and it now seems that only a miracle could halt the steady decline. It has become clear that points of disagreement between the two countries over the three flashpoints in the region—Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine—have become stronger and deeper than the elements of convergence between them. The commonalities between the two sides, which previously used to compensate for the incompatibilities, have also suffered and it is becoming difficult for both sides to restore them pragmatically.
In fact, it is not strange to find that differences in Saudi-Syrian relations have become public. However, it is indeed unusual to note a break in the conservative and pacifist style of Saudi diplomacy that was evident in its unexpectedly strong response to the criticism by Syrian Vice-President Farouk Al-Sharaa, who called Saudi diplomacy as “virtually paralyzed.”
However, there has been more than one reason for Riyadh to give up on the possibility of forging an understanding with Damascus. Perhaps, the most important among these appears to be Syria’s final decision to enter into a strategic alliance with Iran, which is incompatible with Saudi and Arab interests. The move has a bearing on developments on the Iraq front, which has witnessed a growth in Iranian influence with the rise of Shiite community there, and the introduction of Iran as a player on the Arab-Israeli front through Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. In fact, the latter launched a coup in Gaza—at the instance of Khaled Mashaal from Damascus against the authority of Mahmoud Abbas—even before the ink had dried on an agreement for which the Kingdom had risked its prestige.
The third factor that has contributed in Saudi-Syrian tensions is the situation in Lebanon. Saudi-Syrian relations have suffered since the assassination of President Rafik Al-Hariri, whose family accuses Damascus of the crime. These differences became evident in an unpleasant meeting between Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, as well as in Saudi displeasure at a statement by Syrian president, in which the latter described Arab leaders as “half-men,” following the July war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.
Saudi officials blame Damascus for their failure in fulfilling their commitments, made in their direct talks and with Egyptian officials, over playing a constructive role on all controversial issues. They also blame Damascus for encouraging all that contravenes Saudi interests and for thwarting attempts at rebuilding an Arab system, which seeks to secure the interests of all players in the region. It seems that Riyadh has given up on the idea of bringing Damascus into the Arab mainstream. After the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri and in spite of the reverses it had suffered as a result, Riyadh had gambled on the renewal of a Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian axis, which had survived for 25 years in trying circumstances. However, the Saudi venture achieved little, exactly as Egyptians had previously warned it. One Saudi official summed up the situation by quoting the famous Egyptian phrase, “It is of no use.” The same day, Egyptians disclosed documents that allegedly proved Damascus’ involvement with organizations that seek to destabilize Iraq. They stated that President Bashar Al-Assad had finally opted for the Iranian camp, as he sees his alliance with Iranas indispensable for his regime.
In the past few months, several developments have impeded Saudi Arabia’s will for reconciliation with Syria. Firstly, the collapse of “Mecca agreement” between the Palestinians and Hamas’ invasion of Gaza has undermined ties with Syria and, secondly, Riyadh believes Syria has become a gateway and a training base for Saudi “Al-Qaeda” extremists. Some of these extremists were recently arrested in Lebanon and in Iraq and others were killed in “Fatah Al-Islam” battles against Lebanese army or against the Iraqi and American forces in Iraq.
The third critical development has been the visit of President Ahmadinejad to Damascus and the establishment of a Syrian-Iranian front that includes both Hamas and “Hezbollah”—an axis that is fundamentally incompatible with the Saudi policies in the region. The fourth, and perhaps the most important factor, is that Saudi Arabia is certain that Syria will not facilitate the election of Lebanese president and will not help in stabilizing Lebanon as long as the threat of the international tribunal on Hariri’s assassination hangs over its head. Riyadh had pressed for the tribunal’s establishment by the Security Council, and thus it refuses to bargain over it since it is a means for achieving justice, preventing assassinations, restoring peace in Lebanon, and a way for drawing lines of interest.
In light of these differences, the last meeting of Arab foreign ministers that took place at Arab League headquarters was unsuccessful and was followed by the absence of Riyadh from regional international meetings, which was held in Damascus to discuss the security situation in Iraq.
Within the framework, a campaign has been initiated by allies of the Syrian regime in Lebanon over the Kingdom’s role and its quest to secure the election of a president through consensus—which is certainly not General Michel Aoun. Damascus seems to be supportive of Aoun’s election to counter “March 14” forces and to ensure Christian backing for Hezbollah.
The collapse of Saudi-Syrian ties is not just the result of rivalry between two Arab countries that is engendered by the media, which would cease with the end of campaigns and reconciliatory visits. It marks the end of hopes for the revival of an Arab system that could ensure protection of the Arab world from all challenges. These include the challenge of the US war on terrorism, the challenge of domestic terrorism, the challenge of Iranian ambitions, the challenge of Israeli arrogance and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the challenge to the stability of Arab states.
For Saudis, Syria has lost its ability to be a force for stability, which had been the reason behind their long-standing cooperation for over a quarter of a century. All that remains now are sordid details of boycotted meetings, sporadic verbal exchanges—such as the unexpected criticism as expressed by Riyadh in reference to reported statement by Farook Al-Sharaa. Sharaa has become one of the hard-line figures in the Syrian regime and a strong advocate of an alliance with Iran, who favors regional confrontation as opposed to a stagnant stability.
Source : ECSSR
American Military Deals… Restructuring Alliances in the Region
by Shehata Mohammed Nasser
09 Aug 2007
Recent developments in the Middle East region highlight a general trend toward restructuring political and military alliances, and the building of new fronts of confrontation. The recently held conference in the Egyptian city of Sharm El-Sheikh falls within this ambit, wherein foreign ministers of Arab countries—the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt and Jordan—conferred with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, under what has become known as the (1+2+6) formula. This conference was held in the context of building a “moderate axis,” that would include many Arab countries, as opposed to a “hard-line axis,” which includes Iran, Syria and the Lebanese movement, Hezbollah. With clear US suggestion of an “Iranian threat” to the security of the region, the final communiqué of the conference reiterated the pledge of taking a strong collective stand, in case any Gulf state is subjected to foreign threat.
The important fact to be noted here is that the United States has been working on building a “coalition of moderates” along side Israel against the oft-repeated “Iranian threat.” Meanwhile, the US has also announced new military deals and aid for Gulf States, Egypt, and Israel to the tune of $63 billion—with $20 billion worth of arms sale to Saudi Arabia, $13 billion in military aid to Egypt, and $30 billion in military subsidies to Israel. These grants, the US Secretary of State stated explicitly, are aimed at confronting the threat posed by Iran and Syria. It is also noteworthy that Israel, for the first time in its history, has not objected to the military deals between Washington and Arab countries. On the contrary, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that his country understood the position of the United States in supporting “moderate Arab states.”
Washington has been working on developing two principal tacks for drawing alliances and for carrying out historic moves to promote its proposed alliance in the region. The first relates to promotion of the idea that Iran is the main threat to the security of the region, and not Israel. The US is projecting the view that Iran is interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq, that Iran is spreading the Shiite influence in the region, that it is preventing a breakthrough in the Lebanese political crisis, and that it is also interfering in regional affairs with its support for Hamas and Hezbollah. To top it all, Iran is said to be acquiring nuclear weapons that will enable it to impose its hegemony on the Gulf region, and even the whole of Middle East. On the other hand, the US is mooting the idea that it is possible to achieve peace with Israel, and that it is possible to coexist with Israel’s nuclear capabilities because the latter is a democratic state where decisions are taken by democratic institutions, as opposed to Iran where individuals and religious ideology dictate political and military decisions. In this context, the reason for US drive to push Israel into making more concessions for peace with the Palestinians becomes clear. It is in this backdrop that the international peace conference called on by US President Bush should be viewed, as well as the visit of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Arab countries, where his talks about the “Iranian threat” has been interspersed with statements about reviving peace prospects.
The second tack is to change the conflict in the region from an ‘Arab–Israeli’ struggle to an ‘Iran-versus-the region’ clash, whereby it would be important to underline the threat posed by Teheran to Arabs and Israel alike. Based upon this rationale, Arab countries that are wary of the Iranian threat are candidates of this alliance. This explains why Arab countries—such as the Gulf States, Egypt, and Jordan—are part of the “moderate axis,” even as other more moderate Arab countries do not feature in this alliance. Therefore, the criteria for membership of this alliance are not actually related to the standards of moderation, but on how concerned an Arab country is about the “Iranian threat.” Based on this reasoning, Washington has now included Israel into its “coalition of moderates,” through the planned activation of the peace process.
Thus, Washington is reverting to its old method of countering Iran by engaging it in a regional confrontation. This method was employed soon after the Iranian revolution of 1979, when the US had pushed Saddam Hussein into a war against Iran for eight years, which with the backing of Arabs. This is happening again, through moves to forge a coalition of moderates that includes both Arabs and Israel. In fact, a recent study published Brookings Institution advised the US administration to support its regional allies and to push them into confronting Iran.
With the new coalition that the United States is trying to forge in the Middle East, the Bush administration has backed out on the three policies that it had espoused for the region soon after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. These policies included support for democracy, formation of a Greater Middle East, and an alliance with Shiite Islam. However, after less than three years of her famous speech at the American University of Cairo—in which she said that her country’s policy in the region will be based on supporting democracy— by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has backed out of the policy and has forged alliances with the very countries she had earlier demanded to reform. Similarly, the vision of “Greater Middle East,” which along with Arab countries was supposed to cover countries, such as Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan among others, has faded out and Washington is now talking of a “lesser Middle East,” which would include a few “moderate” Arab countries, along with Israel. Similarly, the United States had earlier forged an alliance with Shiite Islam, which it had then termed as a “flexible and peaceful Islam,” as opposed to the radical Sunni “Bin-Ladenism.” This alliance was clearly in evidence in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. However, Washington again changed its Iraq policy, and it now seeks to forge a coalition of “moderates,” that in reality is a “Sunni coalition” to counter the raging Iranian “Shiite tide” in the region.
This turnaround reveals the state of disarray in which the Bush administration find itself and highlights the drawbacks of its policies in the region, which have been largely guided by unrealistic ideological convictions and theorizing. In fact, the plan for a new coalition against Iran may end up as another failed policy, and may reconfirm the US inability to understand the complexities of the region.
Despite the fact that the Iranian policy and many political speeches emanating from Iran raise the specter of danger for Arab and Gulf countries, one does not find a collective vision emerging from “moderate” Arab countries over the “Iranian threat,” because GCC member countries do not have a common position on Iran, or even the threat it poses. In fact, the Foreign Minister of the Sultanate of Oman does not see it as a source of danger. The same applies to Egypt and Jordan where positions differ regarding the nature of this threat. Even if a consensus over the Iranian threat is evolved, it will still pose a danger, as there will be a difference between the Arab and the US perspectives.
As for Israel, many factors make it difficult for Arab countries to forge an alliance with it against Iran. The most important factor is that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, and occupies Arab countries. Moreover, there are still no signs that it seriously intends to establish a viable Palestinian state, on account of its technological and military supremacy. In addition, a clear contradiction is evident in the US proposal on this matter, because just as it is trying to form an alliance with moderates to confront Iran, we find it holding dialogue with Iran as well. In fact, it has been insisting on the continuation of its dialogue with Iran, and is also supporting Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, one of the main allies of Iran in Iraq and the region.
The problem with the US policy in the Middle East, under the presidency of Bush Jr., is that it has adopted significant and radical measures that are based on unrealistic and ideological precincts. For this reason, they have failed on implementation. However, instead of forcing US policymakers to better understand the region, These failures have driven them into ensuring that progress on the new proposal of an Arab–Israeli coalition against a common threat is made before the end of Bush’s second term in the White House. However, all signs indicate that this scheme will not prove to be more successful than any of the previous ones, diversely labeled as the policies of “constructive chaos,” “Greater Middle East,” the “democratic domino effect” etc., which eventually failed and have led the region to its current state of tensions and instability.
Source : ECSSR
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