Bush to say Iraq is front line against Iran, Al-Qaeda
Mon Aug 27, 10:16 PM ET
US President George W. Bush on Tuesday will describe Iraq as the front-line against Shiite extremism championed by Iran and the Sunni extremism of Al-Qaeda, an aide said Monday.
Bush was due to level the charge in a speech to the American Legion veterans group, the second of two presidential addresses meant to bolster support for the war in Iraq ahead of a critical September 15 progress report.
"The president will talk about Sunni extremism and Shia extremism. Neither represents Islam. They represent a brutal and heartless ideology of death and destruction," a senior aide told reporters in a preview of the speech.
"Sunni extremism is embodied by Al Qaeda and its many affiliates. Shia extremism by Iran and its support of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban and its pursuit of nuclear technology," the official said on condition of anonymity.
"Iraq is at the heart of where these two extremisms must be dealt with," the official said as Bush traveled here for a political fundraiser.
"Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian armed and supported Shia militias continue to undermine the Iraqi struggle for security and stability and continue to kill Americans forces," the official said.
Bush will plead for patience from lawmakers pending an assessment on the war from the US commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, and the US ambassador to Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, the official said.
Bush is to deliver the speech in Reno, Nevada, after attending a political fundraiser here.
Source: AFP via Yahoo News
Huge Saudi force to defend oilfields from al-Qaida
Ian Black, Middle East editor
Tuesday August 28, 2007
Anxieties about al-Qaida attacks and a US-led war against Iran have prompted Saudi Arabia to establish a special force - being trained by an American defence contractor - to protect its oilfields. Saudi authorities have already recruited 5,000 members of the Facilities Security Force and plan to raise the number to 8,000-10,000 over the next two years, in a project being run by the Lockheed Martin Corporation, officials confirmed.
Nervousness has been growing recently about the impact of attacks by al-Qaida-related groups and possible retaliation by Iran in the event of US or Israeli strikes on its nuclear installations.
Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil producer and home to 25% of its proven reserves. It has more than 80 oil and gas fields and 11,000 miles of pipeline.
The plan to set up a force that will eventually number 35,000 to guard oil and other installations was announced in July by the country's interior minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz. The Middle East Economic Survey (Mees) reported: "The scale of the latest security initiative is immense and several years are likely to elapse until the new force is fully capable." The total cost was likely to reach $5bn (£2.48bn), it said.
According to Mees, recruits are being trained in the use of laser security and satellite imaging surveillance equipment, countermeasures and crisis management under a programme managed by Lockheed Martin. Members of the force are being heavily vetted and largely recruited from outside the Saudi security forces. The protection of oil facilities is currently the responsibility of a 15,000-strong force run by Aramco, the state oil corporation.
Saudi Arabia has seen several attacks on its infrastructure, but none has so far disrupted the flow of oil. In February 2006, al-Qaida attacked the Abqaiq oil facilities in Eastern Province, which supplies almost 10% of the world's oil. The attack did not stop exports, but pushed up oil prices by $2 a barrel.
Saudi officials say the kingdom, the birthplace of Osama bin Laden, has foiled 180 operations by al-Qaida since 2003. In April, the interior ministry said 172 terrorist suspects had been arrested, and weapons and cash seized. Some had gone abroad to learn to fly aircraft and were allegedly plotting attacks on oil facilities and army bases. The most sensitive energy targets are Abqaiq and the refining and export facilities at Ras Tanoura and Juaymah on the Gulf and the Rabigh and Yanbu complexes on the Red Sea.
The US recently announced it had put together an arms package worth at least $20bn over 10 years for Saudi Arabia.
Source: Guardian Unlimited
About-face on Iran coming?
A new US strategy for victory in Iraq may be in the works, warns Hassan Nafaa
That the US is knee-deep trouble in Iraq is hardly in dispute. Few inside or outside the US contest that fact or doubt the reasons that led to it. And yet, some still argue that the whole thing is little more than correctable "mistakes" by a reckless administration. Others wonder if a face-saving exit is still possible. But at least a few maintain that a "strategic victory" is attainable in Iraq.
For a long time, the current US administration refused even to admit committing mistakes in Iraq. For a long time, it maintained that victory was around the corner. The admission that a real problem exists came hesitantly and late. It came only after the Baker-Hamilton Commission issued its well-known report last year. Even then, the current administration kept arguing that the problems it was facing in Iraq were no more than "snags" attributed to "tactical errors" that can be corrected and that a complete and unambiguous victory was not to be ruled out. In short, the US administration rejected the prognosis offered by the Commission and went on doing things its own way.
The commission said that the situation in Iraq would get worse unless a major policy change occurred. It reviewed a number of options, but ruled them all out because of concern for the US reputation and Iraq's stability. Those options included: quick withdrawal from Iraq, maintaining the current policies with no change, increasing the number of troops, or dividing Iraq into three parts. After excluding those options, the report suggested a new policy based on two components. The first component was external, involving a "new diplomatic offensive" to rally international support and help Iraq.
The second component was internal, focusing on helping Iraq help itself. The commission made 78 recommendations, suggesting that the US launch a diplomatic offensive in an attempt to reassure the world that the US was not after Iraq's oil and didn't want to have military bases in that country against the wishes of its people.
It made two main conclusions. One was that the US couldn't get out of the Iraqi morass without the help of others. The second was that the Middle East crises were interlinked, and the US needed to address all of them simultaneously. The report urged the current administration to build bridges with both Syria and Iran and make a renewed bid to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
But the US administration went for the exact opposite. Instead of gradually reducing its fighting troops and redeploying them outside turbulent Iraqi towns, the US administration decided to increase troops and send them into more battles inside turbulent areas in the hope of quashing or at least weakening the resistance.
Instead of courting Iran and Syria, the US administration decided to tighten sanctions against them and isolate them internationally. And instead of doing more to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, a matter that would have required serious pressures on Israel and attempts to unify the Palestinian position, the US administration decided to alienate Hamas and impose a stricter blockade on the Palestinian people. The US administration blocked all attempts to unify Palestinian factions and encouraged Israel to adopt hard-line and belligerent policies.
This approach, which hardly differed from earlier US policies, deepened the dilemma of the US administration. As a result, the security and military situation in Iraq got worse. And the Lebanon war last year didn't, as some hoped, weaken "the axis of the extremists" in the region. On the contrary, Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas, and Jihad emerged stronger, while pro- US forces looked hapless and lame. Consequently, the US administration found itself in a more awkward place than it was at the time the Baker-Hamilton Commission was issued two years ago. All the US administration did was waste time and money to no avail.
Because the US administration knows that time is running out, it has to do one of two things. Either it accepts defeat and pulls out immediately, which would damage the US standing as a superpower. Or it escalates the confrontation through an all-out attack on the "axis of the extremists." The latter option cannot be ruled out, considering how rightwing and dogmatic this administration is and how inept is the man who leads it. The only problem is that this second option is too perilous, for the prospects of a decisive victory are nil in the long run.
Some members of the neoconservative US elite, who haven't yet despaired of winning the war in Iraq, are now busy looking for a third option. Among the barrage of ideas that surfaced of late, the views of William S Lind are interesting. Lind is the director of the Centre for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. He summed up his views on the Iraqi debacle in an article published 30 July in The American Conservative under the title, "How to win in Iraq".
In that article, Lind notes that the US administration still defines victory as it did at the war's outset: an Iraq that is an American satellite, friendly to Israel, happy to provide the US with a limitless supply of oil and vast military bases from which American forces can dominate the region. None of these objectives, he argues, are now attainable. Lind believes that the attempts to quell urban disturbances in Iraq are based on the wrong assumptions. He argues that the war can still be won on a strategic level, not through "small tactical gains." Lind suggests that the new US strategy must employ what the British military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart called an "indirect approach."
The threat facing the US is not coming from any state, but from a collection of groups using non-conventional methods commonly labelled "terrorism", Lind argues. Such groups can only flourish in situations where governments are weak. He calls for a new strategy of three elements to win the war on a "strategic" level.
The first element is to engage Iran in a rapprochement, just as the US did with China in the early 1970s. At the time, China was creating more than one Vietnam in order to sap the US power. Likewise, the groups hostile to the US are trying to create more than one Iraq in order to baffle the Americans. Lind believes that it would be hard to undermine such groups without having a strong government in Iraq, which requires rapprochement with Iran. He admits that pro-Iranian Shiites may end up dominating the Iraqi government, but that should not be a problem so long as a strong Iraqi state evolves.
The second element of Lind's strategy is to allow the Sadr group, which is popular in Iraqi streets, to achieve its full political potential. The US will have to pay a price for that, such as giving up the prospect of military bases in Iraq. So far, the US has been trying to suppress the Sadr group while favouring unpopular, pro-American groups. This approach, Lind says, has weakened successive governments and reduced their ability to control the situation on the ground. Lind admits there is no guarantee Al-Sadr would be able to form a strong Iraqi government, but the chance is worth taking. The US administration, he says, must allow Al-Sadr, or anyone who can, to establish a strong government in Iraq.
The third element of the strategy is to withdraw all US forces within 12-18 months. This move would provide enough time for Al-Sadr or other parties to put together a government. This wouldn't be the withdrawal of a defeated army, Lind argues, but a step toward strategic victory. Withdrawal would be good for the army and for the US public, he argues.
The above strategy may exacerbate the Sunni- Shiite divisions not just in Iraq but across the region, but Lind is not worried about that. In fact, he believes those divisions might prove beneficial to the new US strategy in the region.
These are quite disturbing proposals. Lind's ideas entail certain risks to the Arab world and Iran. Admittedly, Tehran may be temporarily pleased to see a friendly government in Iraq, but the cost may prove too high. The US is likely to use Shiite-Sunni divisions to turn Sunni Arab countries against Iran. The main beneficiary of Lind's proposed strategy would be Israel and the US. The implications for the Sunnis and the Shiites are frightening. It seems that the US is heading toward a dual containment policy of both Shiite fundamentalism and Sunni Wahhabism. So perhaps this is time for Shias and Sunnis, as well as Arabs and Iranians, to sit together and talk.
The Gasoline Crisis in Iran
By: Y. Mansharof and A. Savyon
In late June 2007, the Iranian government launched a comprehensive gasoline rationing policy, necessitated, in part, by the growing demand for gasoline in Iran's domestic market that could not be met by its oil production infrastructure.
Although Iran is among the world's major exporters of crude oil, it has limited processing and refining facilities, and thus must import most of its refined oil for domestic use. There has been no significant investment in developing its oil refining facilities since the Shah's era, and Iran depends entirely on imported gasoline.
It also appears that the gasoline rationing was launched in anticipation of additional sanctions against Iran, including a ban on oil imports and exports, which may be imposed in response to Iran's refusal to freeze its uranium enrichment. [1] Additionally, there have been recent reports that foreign companies are significantly curtailing their investment in developing Iran's oil fields, with the result that many projects have been suspended. [2] The reduced activity by foreign companies is probably the result of heavy pressure by the U.S., as part of the sanctions against Iran.
Iran was subjected to sanctions against oil trade as early as 1951, following the nationalization of oil resources by Iran's then-president MohammadMossadegh. Though the Iranian economy was able to withstand these sanctions, and the resulting oil crisis, they had a lasting psychological impact on Iranian society. [3]
Iran has recently extended the duration of the rationing. Originally, a monthly ration of 100 liters per private vehicle was imposed, for a period of four months. However, in July 2007, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's advisor Ali Akbar Mehrabian, the newly appointed minister of industries and mines who is in charge of implementing the rationing, announced that the new policy would remain in effect until March 2008. [4]
Despite the rationing, it seems that per-capita gasoline consumption has not falled. On August 19, 2007, the Iranian news agency Baztab reported that "most of the citizens, especially in the large cities and in areas with heavy traffic, exceed their monthly ration by about 100 liters." [5] Figures posted by the reformist online daily Rooz indicate that, during July 28-August 3, 2007, Iran's gasoline consumption reached 416.6 million liters, and in the following week, it rose even further, to 431.9 million liters. [6]
Nevertheless, the rationing system is impacting all areas of life in Iran, [7] and has led to the emergence of gasoline black market as well as to profiteering, which the authorities are trying to stamp out.
Following is a review of reactions to the gasoline rationing in Iran.
Public Protest and Official Reactions
The decision to ration gasoline sparked riots in Tehran, resulting in the arrest of 80 individuals. According to reports, over 40 gasoline pumps were torched, public facilities were severely damaged, and shops were looted. The conservative new agency Fars posted a video showing a mob looting a supermarket following the authorities' announcement of the rationing program
(http://switch3.castup.net/cunet/gm.asp?ClipMediaID=1140593&ak=null ). [8] There were also unconfirmed reports that a number of people had been killed during the riots. [9]
By order of the authorities, the Iranian media is not permitted to cover the negative effects of the gasoline rationing, or to publish analyses or criticism on this issue. In a July 5, 2007 article in the reformist daily Rooz, dissident journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi condemned the government censorship, saying that "the restrictions have increased to such an extent that it is no longer possible to write or to publish [articles] on any issue that affects [life] in Iran. These days... in addition to the prohibition against [publishing] reports or op-eds on the nuclear crisis [or] on the possibility of an American [military] attack... there is a prohibition against writing [anything] serious about the gasoline rationing, about Ahmadinejad's visits [to the provinces], about the inflation - or, in short, about any important issue that affects the fate of our society..." [10]
While placing restrictions on the media, the authorities have been waging a propaganda campaign touting the benefits of the rationing, stating that it allows the channeling of resources into developing the country. [11] Ahmadinejad said that the program "is an opportunity to make great changes in Iran's economy and industry." [12] He also asked MPs to support the government on this issue and to refrain from discussing the option of permitting gasoline to be sold on the free market. [13]
The rationing program is also supported by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. On June 30, 2007, he declared that "the present conditions in Iran are excellent... The decision to ration gasoline was one of the government's courageous steps. We must continue to implement it, while examining all its aspects..." [14] At the same time, Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai criticized the "unsatisfactory" way in which the program was being implemented, and proposed that citizens be allowed to buy high-priced gasoline on the free market to supplement the rations. [15]
Protest in the Majlis
Despite Ahmadinejad's demand, Majlis members have been protesting against the rationing program and against how it is being run. MP Sanati Mehrabani, who, following the rioting proposed a bill to cancel the rationing, said during a Majlis session to Iranian Interior Minister Mostafa Pour Mohammadi: "If the purpose of your gasoline rationing [policy] is to destroy the country - you have succeeded, and I congratulate you on your success. But if the purpose is to help the impoverished farmers, the government has not succeeded [in attaining this goal]." [16]
MP Hassan Shojaee asked, "Do you know what problems the people are forced to face in their daily lives because of the gasoline rationing?... Do you think that busing [companies] haven't stopped transporting tourists around the country because of the rationing, causing substantial losses to owners of hotels, rental houses, and shops catering to tourists? Do you know that after months of toil in the fields, the farmers need to use their vehicles to bring their produce to market, but [that since they are prevented from doing so] the crops remain in their possession, and they can find no one to buy them, even at a reduced price?... Ambulances have no fuel to carry the sick... Was it a courageous [step] to inflict all this damage and catastrophe upon the people?..." [17]
An article on the Iranian website Alef, which is affiliated with MP Ahmad Tavakkoli, head of the Majlis Strategic Research Center, criticized the fact that the implementation of the rationing program was entrusted to associates of Ahmadinejad who lacked the necessary experience: "Fifty days after the introduction of the rationing policy… the reports of its implementation… are worrying and despairing… It seems that the honorable president [Ahmadinejad] either does not assign enough importance to this issue or is unaware of how the program is being run. In light of the security and ethical ramifications [of the rationing program], and its [grave] ramifications in the lives of the people, the people's representatives in the Majlis should give the government a resounding slap [in the face]… Today, the honorable president must explain to the nation's representatives why he has entrusted the implementation of the gasoline rationing program… to individuals who lack experience." [18]
Iranian Website Warns of Impending Crisis
An analysis posted July 22, 2007 on the Alef website criticized the government propaganda, which is emphasizing the achievements of the rationing program while disregarding the hardships that the people are experiencing under it. The following are excerpts:
"The reports concerning the implementation of the gasoline rationing program and the policy which disregards [the difficulties faced by the population]... are becoming increasingly disturbing. If we liken the public transportation system and the [problem of] gasoline consumption to a [hospital] patient, and the gasoline rationing [program] to surgery, [we can say that] 24 days after this complicated surgery, the patient's condition is deteriorating. Instead of keeping watch at the patient's bedside around the clock and monitoring his vital signs, the medical team (the senior officials in charge of the rationing program)… have left him on his own, and are busy discussing the initial benefits of the surgery (i.e. the significant decrease in gasoline consumption, the elimination of smuggling, traffic improvements, and reduced air pollution). They do not realize that if the healing process does not continue rapidly and under close supervision, their patient will expire, and all those initial benefits of the surgery will be lost.
"During the past two or three weeks, confidential reports have given an alarming picture of the state of the urban and intercity public transportation: [Public] services are shutting down; some taxi drivers are trading in gasoline [rationing cards], while others do not [even] receive [the cards]; taxi services are gradually coming to a standstill; prices of intercity public transportation have significantly risen… The public is feeling the effects of this [crisis] directly.
"Right now, in mid-summer, when the demands on urban public transportation are minimal, [these] reports may appear negligible. However, each one of them is a piece of a puzzle which, if put together, would present an alarming picture of impending crisis: torched buses, looted banks and shops, gas stations set on fire by people fed up with the inflation, apartment shortages, and interminable lines of [standing] buses, trains and taxis - [and all this] by mid-September 2007 (when the demands on public transportation will be at their peak)." [19]
* Y. Mansharof is a Research Fellow at MEMRI; A. Savyon is Director of MEMRI's Iranian Media Project.
Source : MEMRI
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