sunni shia relations 100108

The Egyptian government has not resolved its problems regarding the establishment of a nuclear station in the coastal area of Al-Dabaa (north), which was dedicated in the seventies for this purpose before the halt of the nuclear program. With last year's decision of President Hosni Mubarak to resume work on nuclear program to establish plants to generate electricity, the controversy escalated about the feasibility for dabaa to host the site.

Prime Minister Dr. Ahmed Nazif has ruled out the establishment of a nuclear station in Al-Dabaa a month ago in an interview and said the study «conducted to select sites (nuclear plants ) indicated that« Al-Dabaa site was chosen in the seventies, under parameters and standards quite different because we need to establish our program as more of station and not one station ».

But the Minister of Electricity and Energy Hassan Yunis said yesterday that the nuclear plants to generate electricity began to conduct studies on the «DABAA» to evaluate the aim of establishing the first nuclear plant for peaceful purposes, pointing out that Al-Dabaa «sites Egyptian ideal for this purpose».

Source: Al Hayat, Ahram

The Arabian Gulf States and the US-Iran Rivalry

by Imad Harb

27 Dec 2007

The tug-of-war between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran over the ultimate disposition and alignment of the Arabian Gulf States is at its height. The United States wishes them to clearly side with her against the mullahs of Qom while Iran wants them to decisively choose the neighbor next door. The former offers diplomatic and military support and incentives while the latter counts on the facts of geography and foggy notions of collective security to woo them. American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates urged them at the security conference in Manama, Bahrain, to be vigilant against Iran while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lectures them on American imperialist designs at the GCC summit. Both the United States and the Islamic Republic entice them with potential opportunities but hide the likely risks. What is patently clear, however, is that both Washington and Tehran are advancing their own interests in the Gulf, regardless of what its states might think. Consequently, Gulf states must evaluate the two contestants according to their own measures of security, prosperity, and long-term stability.

A number of key issues dear to Gulf states are at stake in this beauty contest. The Gulf states need a firm commitment by the United States that it will not resort to outright military force to resolve any disputes with Iran, and a similar commitment from the latter that it will not try to punish them for being friends with the former. They are also apprehensive about the on-again, off-again chaos in Iraq, and whether American attempts to pacify Baghdad and other parts of the country will be met by Iranian non-interference there. In the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts, the Gulf states are looking for a changed American position vis-à-vis Israel that recognizes Arab and Palestinian rights, but also for Iranian discouragement of Palestinian extremism. Finally, the Gulf Arabs want the United States to stay firm in supporting Lebanese calls for independence and constitutionalism in the face of efforts to sabotage all attempts by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and other opposition groups to elect a president for the country and to revive state institutions.

Militarily, the Gulf states still have clear concerns about Iran’s nuclear file despite the clean bill of health the latest American National Intelligence Estimate has given the Islamic Republic. The Gulf Arabs may take solace in the fact that Iran halted its weaponization program in 2003. But what concerns them is Tehran’s ability to renew its efforts to produce weapons since it continues its plans to develop 50,000 centrifuges that would prepare her to produce enough fissile material for the project. On the other hand, the Gulf states have fears that the United States will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, notwithstanding the facts of the latest NIE. Between Ahmadinejad’s belligerence and Bush’s messianic discourse about preventing a Third World War, the states of the Gulf see themselves potentially paying an unnecessary price for others’ ambitions and follies.

The Gulf states have also tested Iran’s willingness to accommodate their interests around the Gulf and found it lacking. Primary among these is the clear path toward the resolution of the issue of the three Iranian-occupied islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tumbs. In his speech to the latest GCC meeting and in bilateral discussions, President Ahmadinejad avoided proposals of negotiations and arbitration about the issue and behaved as if the problem did not exist. On the other hand, the United States has not made ending the occupation of the islands an important foreign policy issue in its relations with the Gulf states or with Iran, thus leading the UAE and the GCC to fend for themselves while asking them to commit to the American agenda in the area.

On matters of economics, the GCC states fully understand the repercussions of a cutoff of their petroleum exports through the Strait of Hormuz should Iran try to close it for any reason, an act that would itself give the Americans a casus belli. Over twenty million barrels of oil per day flows through the Strait and constitutes an essential supply to an increasingly globalized world economy, atop which sits the United States. Although it would be ultimate folly for the mullahs of Iran to decide to block the Strait, Gulf states do not trust the masters of Washington to be as short-sighted and initiate hostile actions that could set the stage for a long period of military confrontations in the area. Instead, they prefer to be the peaceful arbiters of whatever disputes erupt in the Gulf; otherwise, they would trust their economies to equally ideological adversaries, each playing the zero-sum game with their wellbeing.

There obviously are those who argue that the United States has proven over the years that it is willing and able to provide the necessary security framework the Gulf states require. After all, only a few months ago, Washington announced that it will provide them with $20 billion of military hardware over the next decade, and has large military assets in the Gulf to challenge Iranian designs. On the other hand, there are those who dispute the claim that Iran is a threat and the Gulf states would do well organizing their security with Tehran. They bolster their argument by pointing to the fact that Iran benefits from Gulf ports to circumvent international sanctions and would do nothing to jeopardize the status quo.

While both positions may be defended vigorously, it remains true that the Gulf states have been disappointed, though to differing degrees, by both American and Iranian behavior. The United States continues to threaten Iran with military strikes that could spill over the area and hurt everyone’s interests. It also continues to ignore Gulf Arabs’ wishes in a more equitable peaceful resolution of the Palestine Question. Iran, on the other hand, seems to be on a quest for hegemony in the Gulf and behaves with impunity regarding occupied Gulf land. Its nuclear file could easily be handled in a less confrontational manner, if it so chooses. And its interference in many issues such as Lebanese politics and Palestinian schisms speaks of obstructionism. It, thus, behooves the Arab Gulf states to remain vigilant about their national interests and to evaluate their relations with the two contestants according to the degree of their respect for these interests.