Sunni Shia relations 111007

The Political Decline of Iran’s Ahmadinejad

by Kenneth Katzman

04 Oct 2007

The June 2005 upset victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad marked one of the most rapid political ascents of any politician in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In winning the election, Ahmadinejad defeated one of the regime stalwarts—a founder of the regime and a disciple of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad did not have the unquestioned authority of Khomeini to promote him and engineer his victory. He was supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, but no expert on Iran sees Khamene’i possessing the same undisputed power as Khomeini wielded when he was alive. Ahmadinejad also became the first non-cleric to be elected president since Ali Raja’i, who was killed in 1981 in one of the major bombings that characterized the early regime power struggles.

Since taking office in August 2005, Ahmadinejad has entered a long and uninterrupted political slide that leads many experts to predict that he will not be re-elected president in 2009 elections, if he chooses to run at all. Not only has his popularity and his authority diminished, but Ahmadinejad is, in many ways, now being outmaneuvered by the politician he defeated in 2005—Rafsanjani. Even though he lost the 2005 election, Rafsanjani continued to head the powerful Expediency Council, which was set up in 1988 to arbitrate legislative disputes but has acquired broader powers as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader, including on strategic issues. In September 2007, Rafsanjani’s political comeback was further in evidence when he was selected as the new Speaker of the “Assembly of Experts”—an elected body that formally oversees the work of the Supreme Leader, would select his replacement in the event of death, and can undertake major revisions to the Constitution. Rafsanjani’s elevation to the post, and particularly his defeat of the rival contender, the conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who heads the powerful Council of Guardians that ensures laws conform to Islamic precept, was viewed as a distinct setback for Ahmadinejad.

The Rafsanjani rebound follows several other rebukes to Ahmadinejad. In December 2006, pro-Ahmadinejad candidates fared unexpectedly poorly in municipal and Assembly of Experts elections. University students have openly jeered him in speaking visits. In June 2007, several days of riots and unrest followed the imposition of gasoline rationing—a clear embarrassment in a country that is a member of OPEC and a major oil exporter. Despite some early support for Ahmadinejad for his confrontations with US academics and media during his September visit to the U.N. General Assembly, eventually many Iranians will see the visit as a public relations disaster in which Ahmadinejad allowed himself to be cornered and upbraided for Iran’s nuclear, foreign, and human rights policies.

The decline of Ahmadinejad’s popularity, and the resurgence of Rafsanjani, are closely interrelated developments. These trends reflect a growing perception in Iran, at both the popular and governmental level, that Ahmadinejad’s policies have propelled Iran headlong into a confrontation with the United States and the international community, and that Iran is increasingly isolated. Rafsanjani and the Supreme Leader, among a broad spectrum of “moderate-conservatives,” are increasingly concerned that the United States is succeeding in persuading its allies to increase economic and political pressure on Iran, beyond Iran’s capacity to respond or withstand. Khamene’i and Rafsanjani probably agree with Ahmadinejad that Iran needs a nuclear weapons capability to end its historic sense of vulnerability to the United States and great power interference, but the two more moderate leaders believe that the nuclear program should be pursued more slowly in order to avoid providing the United States with a pretext for tighter international sanctions.

To a certain extent, their concerns reflect their traditional ties to the trading community—the bazaaris—and other businessmen. Khamene’i and Rafsanjani understand that international sanctions on Iran’s economy could bring about economic collapse. The Iranian economy thrives on trading, not manufacturing, and cutting Iran off from its trading patterns with Europe and Asia will bring about severe economic dislocation. This worry is not as acute among Ahmadinejad and his lower class constituents, who are less dependent on external trade. Even in the absence of UN sanctions on Iran’s civilian economy, a US-led campaign has persuaded many European banks, most recently including Deutsche Bank, to stop doing business in Iran. European countries are significantly reducing the amount of outstanding credit guarantees they will offer for exports to Iran. Iranian merchants and business owners are increasingly cut off from the international banking system and must conduct commerce with cash transactions. Iran’s ministers have openly complained that the US-led campaign to isolate Iran economically is complicating efforts to identify financing for large energy investment projects. The continuation of these trends could lead to outright economic collapse.

Perhaps even more worrisome to the Supreme Leader and to Rafsanjani is the potential for Ahmadinejad to drag Iran into an unwanted military conflict with the United States. Both Khamene’i and Rafsanjani were key leaders during the Iran-Iraq war, and they appreciate the military power of the United States, as displayed at the end of the war when the United States, in an eight hour naval battle, virtually destroyed Iran’s naval arsenal. Khamene’i and Rafsanjani tried to manage Iran’s economy through the war period, and the deprivation of that time period was significant. Ahmadinejad was a relatively low ranking officer in the Revolutionary Guard during the Iran-Iraq and he views the war as a time of heroic struggle and sacrifice. He is not as awed by US military capabilities as are the elder leaders.

Although Ahmadinejad’s prospects for victory in the 2009 presidential election are fading, as are the hopes of his allies in the 2008 parliamentary elections, there are no indications that the Supreme Leader might try to remove him. The Supreme Leader has the constitutional authority to do so, and Khomeini used that authority on President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr in 1981. The Supreme Leader might, however, compel Ahmadinejad to accept curbs on Iran’s nuclear program if doing so is needed to avoid sweeping economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations or by a coalition of countries outside the UN auspices. US diplomatic strategy has the potential to yield the desired result of suspending Iran’s uranium enrichment program if, but only if, the United States is able to persuade its allies and the other Security Council members to sacrifice the interests of their corporations and undertake decisive action to isolate Iran economically.

Source: ECSSR

US urged to engage with Syria

By Daniel Dombey in Washington

Published: October 10 2007 22:02 | Last updated: October 10 2007 22:02

Several former senior US officials on Wednesday warned President George W. Bush that next month’s conference on the Middle East risked having “devastating consequences” if it failed – and called on the administration to engage more with Syria in the push for a deal.

The bipartisan letter, whose signatories include Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisers, Carla Hills, former trade representative, and Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, also argues that the US and its international partners should push through a template for a settlement via the United Nations, even if the Israelis and Palestinians object.

They believe such a template should reflect previous peace initiatives and include the principles of two states, with “minor” and “reciprocal” adjustments to the 1967 borders, and both with their capital in Jerusalem.

“The Middle East remains mired in its worst crisis in years,” the letter says. “Because failure risks devastating consequences in the region and beyond, it is critically important that the conference succeed.”

The meeting, scheduled for late November in Annapolis, near Washington DC, is perhaps the Bush administration’s most ambitious attempt since taking office to make a breakthrough in the conflict. Condoleezza Rice, US secretary of state, has repeatedly called for a “substantive” conference.

But some Arab diplomats say the US has yet to make sufficient preparation or a strategic choice on whether to engage with Syria, despite having invited Damascus to the event. “If Syria or Hamas [which controls the Gaza Strip] are ostracised, prospects that they will play a spoiler role increase dramatically,” the letter says.

Speaking on Wednesday, Sean McCormack, state department spokesman, said the administration would look at the ideas in the letter.

“Failure is not an option,” he said of the conference. “The stakes are too high for the people of the region.”

The debate over US relations with Damascus has also been inflamed by speculation set off by an Israeli strike on Syria last month, amid allegations that North Korea is continuing to helping Syria to develop weapons of mass destruction. The New York Times on Wednesday suggested Dick Cheney, vice-president, recently pushed for the US to rethink its diplomatic initiatives regarding Syria and North Korea but that Ms Rice successfully resisted a change of course.

“On any given issue, they might have – you know, might have different views,” Mr McCormack, said on Wednesday of Ms Rice and Mr Cheney, adding that “they have a great working relationship”.

Source: Financial Times

Why Are Foreign Powers Getting Involved in the Iraq war?

Iran Not the Only Country 'Meddling' in Iraq

BY ANDISHEH NOUAREE

The top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David “Don’t call him ‘betray us’” Petraeus has once again spoken out against Iranian meddling in Iraq.

The Surgin’ General said last Saturday that Iran is “responsible for providing the weapons, the training, the funding” for operations that have left American soldiers and Marines dead.

Taken literally, Petraeus’ words are a simple statement of fact. Iran is indeed militarily active in Iraq.

In the context of the Bush administration’s increased saber-rattling directed at Iran, Petraeus’ statement is also a threat. It’s one of the administration’s ways of saying, “Hey, American public, if the United States launches air strikes against Iran, it’s ‘cause they’ve been meddling in Iraq. We’re the only foreign power allowed to meddle in Iraq.”

Iran’s arming of Shiite militias in Iraq — and the United States’ vocalized annoyance over it — has been going on for years now. It raises a simple question: Why would Iran choose to antagonize the most powerful military in the world, particularly when the United States has already contemplated attacking Iran to cripple its nuclear fuel-enrichment program?

Are Iran’s leaders crazy? Or are they strategists engaged in actions they believe furthers their national security agenda?

The answer is yes and yes.

As sure as there are, in fact, gay people in Iran, its country’s leaders are a bit wacko.

But their meddling in Iraq, just like Turkey’s meddling and Saudi Arabia’s meddling, is part of an overall national security strategy that does have logic.

In 1980, with American aid and encouragement, Iraq invaded Iran. It was, at the time, the deadliest land war between opposing armies since Ken Burns’ The War. With a green light from Reagan administration envoy Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein’s army used chemical weapons and mustard and nerve gasses against the Iranian infantry. Infantry isn’t really the right word. Much of Iran’s army consisted of children armed with little more than plastic keys imported from Taiwan. Why plastic keys? To open the gates of heaven, naturally.

An estimated 1 million people died in the war, which ended in a draw between Iran and Iraq but a win for the United States and its ally, Saudi Arabia.

At the time, the United States feared that the Shiite fundamentalist government of Ayatollah Khomeini would attempt to expand beyond Iran’s borders into southern Iraq, and south into predominantly Shiite areas of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is ruled by a fundamentalist Sunni Muslim monarchy, but its best oil fields sit beneath sand occupied by the country’s Shiite minority. With Iraq and Iran pounding the crap out of each other along their shared border, Iranian expansion was impossible.

With Saddam now sharing a junior suite in hell with Pol Pot, Iran is meddling to make sure the eventual order replacing him in Iraq will not be a threat to Iran. If 3,000 dead Americans on the morning of 9/11 is our justification for trying to remake Iraq in our image, hundreds of thousands of dead Iranians over eight years is Iran’s justification for trying to remake Iraq in its image. It’s not right. It just is.

Even though Iran is the only meddling country that Americans regularly hear about, it is not the only country meddling.

Saudi Arabia is funding Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq — groups that are in fact responsible for many more American deaths and injuries than Iranian-backed Shiite groups. That’s not conspiracy theory or speculation — that’s the conclusion of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group’s report. The Bush administration isn’t happy about it, but with Saudi Arabia’s leverage over world oil prices, it’s hard for Dubya to stay angry with them for long.

And don’t be surprised if our NATO ally Turkey invades Iraq one of these days. Kurdish separatists are using Iraqi Kurdistan as a safe haven for launching raids into predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey. Turkey’s government is under mounting pressure to send its soldiers into Iraq to go after the separatists. The United States would not welcome the move, but how could we object? If we can invade pre-emptively, surely we can’t pitch too much of a fit if they invade in response to an actual attack.

Source: Free Times