Sunni Shia relations 200907

Signs of a Possible Rift in the Iranian Leadership on the Nuclear Issue

By: Y. Mansharof and A. Savyon

As part of Iran's diplomatic efforts to prevent increased sanctions against it in the U.N. Security Council session slated for September 21, 2007, former Iranian Supreme National Security Council secretary Hassan Rohani is planning a trip to meet with European officials, according to reports in the Iranian media.

Rohani was in charge of Iran's nuclear dossier during the era of the previous Iranian president, reformist Mohammad Khatami, and was the chief negotiator with the West; currently, he is the representative of Iranian Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamenei in the council.

According to the reports, on September 19, 2007 Rohani is to meet with senior German government officials, and to speak to the E.U. Parliament; he is scheduled to meet the following day with E.U. foreign policy chief Javier Solana. [1]

This is not the first time that Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamenei has circumvented Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and presented more pragmatic stances in an attempt to solve crises which have escalated due to Ahmadinejad's extremist policies. During the 2006-7 Lebanese crisis, Khamenei maintained a direct channel of communication with Saudi King Abdullah via Khamenei's confidant, Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, who was Ahmadinejad's competitor in the 2005 Iranian presidential election.

News of Rohani's upcoming trip to Europe as Khamenei's emissary has sparked harsh criticism in circles close to President Ahmadinejad, which stated that foreign diplomacy paralleling that of the Ahmadinejad government, "and particularly the carrying out of activity that is against regime policy, are like stabbing the officials in charge of this policy in the back." Also, President Ahmadinejad recently issued a warning about reformist Iranian officials who were formerly connected with Iran's nuclear negotiations with the West, conducting talks with elements in the West and giving them confidential information about Iran's nuclear progress - and even called them traitors. [2]

During his stint as chief nuclear negotiator, Rohani instituted a policy which supported talks with the West that would prepare the ground for advancements in Iran's nuclear program. As early as December 2006, he criticized the Ahmadinejad administration's nuclear policy. [3]

The criticism of foreign diplomacy parallel and subversive to that of the Ahmadinejad, which is being leveled by Ahmadinejad's supporters against senior reformist officials, is in effect a challenge to decisions made by Iranian Leader Khamenei and to his policy, which is more pragmatic than that of Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad's Supporters: Parallel Diplomacy - a Stab in the Back

On September 16, 2007, the Iranian website Farda reported that Iranian President Ahmadinejad had criticized Expediency Council Chairman Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is the No. 2 man in the Iranian leadership, as well as Rohani and former president Mohammad Khatami. [4]

On September 17, the Rajanews website, which is affiliated with supporters of Ahmadinejad, published an article titled "Parallel Diplomacy: A Challenge to Official Diplomacy," which stated: "...foreign diplomacy parallel [to that of the Ahmadinejad government], which brings the other side [i.e. the West] to realize that there are internal disagreements within the [Iranian] government, constitutes a stab in the backs of the officials in charge of this policy. In his most recent speech, Ahmadinejad [already] pointed at some suspicious connections of certain internal elements [i.e. reformist officials] with Western figures who are opposed to Iran..." [5]

Another item posted that day by Rajanews, titled "A High-Ranking Official Advises Rohani Not to Go to Europe," stated: "A high-level official in the [Iranian] regime responded to Rohani's request for his opinion on the matter of his trip to Germany, and his talks with some senior European officials, and recommended that Rohani refrain from taking this trip... He stressed, 'Since there is no special need for this trip, it should be avoided... In the event that the trip is made [anyway], you must be sure that they will by no means hear two voices from Iran, and that the position of Iran is the path chosen by the government.'" [6] According to the source, "associates of Rohani reported on the possibility that the trip to Europe would be cancelled following the recommendation of the high-ranking official." [7]

In response, MP and rapporteur for Iran's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Kazem Jalali denied that there had been any objections to Rohani's trip, pointing out that the trip had been planned at the invitation of the Körber Foundation in Germany, [8] and that Rohani was not bearing any message from Iran. Jalali also denied the item on the Rajanews site that stated that senior regime officials were against Rohani's trip, and noted that "Rohani is Khamenei's representative in the Supreme National Security Council, and thus any trip he makes is approved by Khamenei." [9]

In another article, the Rajanews website challenged Khamenei's decision to send his representative Rohani to talk with senior European officials, stating that even the recent arrest on treason charges of Hossein Mosavyan, who had led the negotiations with the EU-3, has not stopped the circles opposed to Ahmadinejad from acting against Iran's interests:

"Rohani's meeting with Solana is meant to take place at a stage in which Iran has [already] reached an agreement with the IAEA on a framework for resolving the remaining issues; accordingly, Europe's role as a mediator has now been considerably weakened... At this stage, [Rohani's team] is again trying, with a stupefying move, to revive this failed path [of Iran-Europe negotiations]...

"The arrest of Hossein Mosavyan on espionage charges was [caused] by the same parallel and unofficial connections [that he conducted with Western officials]. Thus it seems that the circle to which Mosavyan belongs and which is displeased with Iran's nuclear progress, [remains] unwilling to end its suspicious unofficial diplomacy even after [Mosavyan's] arrest." [10]

Source : MEMRI

Syrian Airspace

Fri. Sep 21, 2007

Only time will tell whether the alleged Israeli air attack on Syria two weeks ago was reckless bravado, a cynical blow to peace or a bold strike that makes the Middle East and all of us a bit safer. From the available evidence, though, the smart money is on bold and safer.

It’s true that nobody knows exactly what happened, other than those who were there. The Israelis aren’t talking. The Syrians aren’t talking sense. Smart pundits all around the world have their own pet theories: that Israel sent in a squadron of warplanes to test Syrian air defenses; that it was scouting out air routes to Iran for a possible attack on Tehran’s nuclear installations; that it was bombing a shipment of Iranian arms bound overland for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Each theory has its fatal flaws, though. Israel has better air routes to Iran, and Iran has better ways of shipping arms to Lebanon.

The theory that’s begun emerging as the favorite is the one coming from official-sounding sources in Washington: that the target was a secret nuclear installation. This wouldn’t be the first time that Washington officials have talked about secret Middle Eastern nuclear installations, and their track record isn’t good. But that doesn’t mean they’re wrong this time.

Syria, of course, flatly denies that there were any nuclear plants in the northern desert where the Israeli jets allegedly struck. Similar denials come from North Korea, which supposedly gave Syria the nuclear gear — in violation of its promises to destroy its nuclear material, not give it away. The Syrians insist the Israeli planes dropped tons of munitions over empty desert before being chased off by Syrian ground defenses. In effect, Syria accuses Israel of attacking its territory in an unprovoked aerial bombardment.

Curiously, though, Syria’s official protests are wildly out of proportion to its accusations. In a formal complaint to the United Nations Security Council, Damascus accused Israel of “violating Syrian airspace.” That’s a strange understatement for a country that believes it was under bombardment.

Curiouser still, the Syrians did not follow up their complaint with a demand for an emergency Security Council meeting to condemn Israel’s actions. They’ve never hesitated to convene the council before, even with far less alleged provocation. This time, it seems, they weren’t in a hurry to have the international community scrutinize the desert sands to see what the Israelis actually hit. The target may or may not have been nuclear, but it whatever it was, Syria wants to hide it from the world.

Even more telling was the reaction from the rest of the Arab world: a giant yawn. The League of Arab States issued a tepid statement protesting Israel’s “unacceptable maneuvers” — as though the raid were an aerial stunt show that drifted too close to the beach. The individual Arab states didn’t even go that far. A few tut-tutting editorials, a column or two in Al Jazeera, and that was it.

The fact is that Syria said it had come under direct Israeli military attack, and nobody cared. No one came to its defense except Iran and North Korea — not the best company for a country that’s desperate to escape pariah status.

Even the Chinese joined the yawn; they canceled a scheduled negotiating session over North Korea’s nuclear project, in apparent protest of Pyongyang’s reputed role in Syria.

Why did the Arab world turn its back on Syria? Because, as we have reported before, the mainstream leaders of the Sunni Arab world — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, the Gulf emirates — are tired of the global conflict raging around them.

It’s bad for business. They’re afraid of Iran, with its delusions of Shi’ite revolution and the popular unrest it stirs up. They want to create a new regional front that isolates Iran, and to do that they want to lower the flames between Israel and the Palestinians. They’re angry with Syria for its support of Palestinian terrorism, for its mischief-making in Lebanon and for its alliance with Iran. If Israel manages to humiliate Syria and reduce its strategic capabilities, that’s fine with the neighbors.

Israel accomplished three important things with its raid on Syria this month. First, it showed the Syrians that it can get to them anytime, anywhere. It showed that its vaunted ability to mount lightning raids far from home is undiminished, notwithstanding its bungled war in Lebanon last year.

More to the point, it showed the Syrians that renewed hostilities are not an alternative to peace talks, because they will gain nothing. It’s no accident that Israel chose this week, on the heels of the raid, to restate its willingness to talk peace with Damascus and express “respect” for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Nor is it coincidence that Syria’s foreign minister ended his condemnation of the Israeli raid with a reiteration of Syria’s desire to make peace with Israel.

Second, Israel reminded the Iranians that it can send its jets anywhere, drop bombs and get home. Third, and most important, it showed Iran and the world that if it does act against a clear and present danger, the Muslim world will not erupt.

The old days of pan-Arab unity and utter Israeli isolation are gone. Iran’s supposed trump card — that an attack on its nuclear facilities will touch off a global tsunami of Muslim rage — turns out to be so much hot air.

By all the available evidence, the world owes Israel a debt of gratitude this month. But statements of thanks are unnecessary. The silence says it all.

Source: Forward

Why We Should Not Arm Saudi Arabia

By Gamaliel Isaac

When one reviews the history of Saudi-American relations, one sees a relationship based not on friendship but on oil for protection and money.

In 1933 when lavish spending King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia signed a concessionary agreement with Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) allowing them to explore Saudi Arabia for oil, he was in dire financial straits and kept demanding more money. After oil was discovered and developed, the Saudis eventually took over the oil fields.

Their opposition to U.S. support of Israel during the 1973 Arab attempt to annihilate her led them, together with OPEC, to impose an oil embargo on the West. The reason the embargo was ended was not friendship to the West but loss of oil revenue.

Perhaps the illusion of a Saudi-American military alliance was created because King Fahd authorized the deployment of U.S. troops there before the Gulf war. This was a decision based on pragmatism, not friendship, because after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraqi combat forces moved toward the Saudi border.

Even though allowing U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia was necessary for the survival of the country, it created widespread hostility among the Saudi population to their government, because it meant contamination of the land of Mecca and Medina with infidels. This hostility is a result of extremist Wahhabi indoctrination, funded by the Saudi government that teaches that the infidel is impure.

The government of Saudi Arabia lives in constant fear of being overthrown by the radicals that its own money creates. King Abdullah expressed this concern in a letter to President in Bush in which he wrote:

“Those governments that don't feel the pulse of their people and respond to it will suffer the fate of the Shah of Iran.”

The fear that this will happen is a fear our policy makers should share when thinking about arming Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi government does nothing to stop Saudi extremists from crossing the border into Iraq and attacking American soldiers there. More insidiously, Saudi money spreads anti-American propaganda, creates propaganda institutions out of some of our best universities, think tanks and media, spreads their form of extremist Wahhabi Islam, finances terrorists and influences our government officials. According to ex-CIA agent Bob Baer:

“There’s hardly a living former assistant secretary of state for the Near East; CIA director; White House staffer; or member of Congress who hasn’t ended up on the Saudi payroll in one way or another.... With this kind of money waiting out there, of course Washington’s bureaucrats don’t have the backbone to take on Saudi Arabia.”

An illustration of the extent of influence the Saudis have was the reaction of both the U.S. government and the media to an analysis by Laurent Murawiec in which he said that the Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain and that if the Saudis did not cease to support terror the United States should seize the Saudi oil fields. Mr. Murawiec wrote:

“An experienced observer of the Washington scene confessed his surprise to me: ‘In my career of twenty-five years, I have never seen the propaganda machine get moving so quickly and with so much fury.’”

The response of Secretary of State Colin Powell is indicative of the Saudi influence over the U.S. government. Despite the extensive evidence supporting Mr. Murawiec's statements, Secretary of State Powell called Prince Saud al-Faisal, to tell him that Mr. Murawiec’s briefing did not represent the administration’s vewpoint.

Saudi influence leads to immoral and self destructive U.S. policy. In 1994, after a State Department official had the audacity to say at a press conference that the United States had "serious concerns about human rights" in Saudi Arabia, the Clinton Administration apologized to Riyadh. An investigation by journalist Joel Mobray revealed that several of the perpetrators of 9/11 would not have been able to enter the country without special U.S. immigration favors toward the Saudis.

Arms sales to the Saudis has not bought the loyalty of the Saudi people or for that matter of the Saudi government.

The main argument given by the Bush Administration for arming Saudi Arabia is that we need to strengthen Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis Iran because Iran is on the verge of mass producing nuclear weapons. What is ignored in this argument is that the Saudis pose a nuclear threat as well. Saudi money funded Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistani nuclear technology helped make Iran the nuclear threat it has become, and Saudis, with Pakistani help, are developing their own nuclear weapons. One shudders to consider what would have happened if the 15 Saudis who struck on September 11th had access to nuclear weapons.

Arming the Saudis with smart bombs isn’t smart and although this policy may bring in more Saudi gifts and donations and the like, it is not in the best interest of the American people.

Source: American thinker