Sunni Shia relations 130907

Policy provides few answers for Arab states

By Roula Khalaf,

Published: September 13 2007 03:12

When George W. Bush announced his military “surge” in January, defying domestic opposition to the Iraq war, the US’s Arab allies were among the very few to welcome it.

Alarmed by the sectarian bloodshed in Iraq and by Iran’s intensifying influence among the majority Shia there, they were relieved by the White House’s military commitment and its determination to project its power in the Gulf.

The rosy gloss put on this week’s assessments of Iraq policy – that the surge is working and US troops will start to be drawn down next summer – provides few answers to the long-term anxiety of Arab states.

“If this is the beginning of a withdrawal that will happen soon, it will be catastrophic,” says a senior Arab official. “The Sunni will be in a very difficult position if the Americans leave.”

The tide of sectarian killings may have ebbed but there is no guarantee that this will be sustainable. Moreover, the Arabs’ priority has been to push for national reconciliation and the protection of the Sunni Arab minority. Yet it is on these political benchmarks that Iraq is judged to have performed most poorly.

Unlike the US public – and Iran – Arab states are in no rush to see the Americans leave Iraq. Although Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah referred to the US military presence as “illegitimate” when he addressed an Arab summit in March, Saudi policy has been to persuade the US to stay in Iraq and protect its territorial integrity.

Officials in the region acknowledge that Arab states have few options in Iraq. Rulers have yet to come to terms with the rise of the Shia to power and political losses suffered by the Sunni Arab minority. In addition, they have not accepted that Shia Iran will inevitably have greater authority in Baghdad since its allies dominate the government.

The Arabs’ ability to influence events in Iraq is also limited. Saudi Arabia was infuriated by the lack of progress on national reconciliation, so it refused to host Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister. Its biggest concession has been to agree to open an embassy in Baghdad. The flow of Saudi fighters to Iraq has also raised domestic fears of a spillover.

The Saudis and other Arabs are said to be lobbying for a change of government in Baghdad, arguing that Mr Maliki should be replaced with a more secular and non-sectarian figure. Despite US frustration with Mr Maliki’s performance, however, officials in Baghdad say he continues to have the support of the Shia coalition in parliament. Washington, moreover, is worried about a power vacuum if the Maliki government falls.

“The Saudis feel they lack policy options and they see their policy in Iraq governed by their relationship with the US,” says a western diplomat. “A US withdrawal would mean a strengthening of [the] Iranian hand. And if a US withdrawal doesn’t bring stability, that’s a problem and that’s where the Saudis find difficulty.”

Some officials, such as Amr Moussa, the head of the Arab League, favour high-level Iraq talks between Iran and Arab states. But states such as Egypt insist it would lend more legitimacy to Iran’s role in Iraq.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has been conducting its own guarded talks with Iran over Iraq and other regional crises. But Iranian rhetoric and recent American arms deals with the Saudis have fuelled tension between the two regional powers. President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad’s recent statements have only exacerbated suspicion of Iranian ambitions to dominate the Gulf. Declaring that “soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region”, he said Tehran was ready to fill it “with the help of regional friends like Saudi Arabia” – a statement that was seen as giving Arab states the junior role.

The risk is that without co-operation between Iran and the Arabs on Iraq, Saudi Arabia will be drawn into a proxy war in which it would have to support Sunni groups more directly.

“There’s pressure from Saudi tribes and from other Arab countries for the Saudis to get directly involved, like the Iranians are,” says an analyst in Riyadh. “But the Saudis know that if they were to do that it will end up being a huge civil war.”

Source: Financial Times