Sunni Shia relations 050907

The Shiite Power Struggle: Hardly Good News for the US in Iraq
Ramzy Baroud

The decision made by Shiite leader Moqtada Sadr to halt his Mahdi Army’s attacks on occupation forces and Iraqi security is likely to be considered the single most promising breakthrough for the US military in Iraq. Although the move comes ahead of several reports to be presented to the US Congress later this month, the decision was ultimately an outcome of a long-brewing intersectarian conflict between Shiite Iraqis, which will further complicate the devastating American failure in Iraq.

Sadr’s decision followed the widespread clashes at Karbala on Aug. 26, during one of the holiest Shiite festivals. Despite various accusations of outside involvement, the clashes were apparently Shiite through and through, involving militant members of the Badr Brigade of the Islamic Supreme Council (lead by Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, a duel ally of the US and Iran) and Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

Both of these groups are Shiite, but they differ significantly in terms of their loyalty to Iran: Sadr, although backed by Iran, often invokes an Iraqi national sentiment, while the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council is unabashedly pro-Iran. While the latter has been heavily involved both in the sectarian killings and the massacres of (mostly Sunni) civilians, it coordinates most of its work with the US military, and is in fact heavily represented in the Iraqi army, police and intelligence. Yet, it is the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council that is affiliated with the Shiite high authority Ali Al-Sistani, and both hold unquestionable allegiance to Iran. The US also claims to fight Iran’s agents in Iraq (who are blamed for the development of most destructive types of guerrilla warfare tactics) and yet Iran plays an uncontested role in determining the overall policies of the ruling Shiite parties in Iraq — who are willing collaborators with the US military.

Sadr’s recent decision was, predictably, welcomed by the Americans, who are likely to take any opportunity to prove the successes of their most recent operations. Top official Gen. David Petraeus has already boasted about the troop surge leading to a reduction in sectarian fighting. Statistics, however, directly contradict such claims. Figures from the Associated Press show that the month of August registered the second highest civilian death toll in Iraq — 1,809 civilians — since the US invasion of March 2003. The sharp rise is largely attributed to the quadruple suicide bombings on Aug. 14, near the Syrian border, which killed 520 people.

The significance of that incident — aside from its devastating death toll — is of less consequence than the inner Shiite fighting, considering that the targeted group is a small minority that played next to no part in the raging conflict. However, it will most likely be underlined further by the US to detract from the fact that their once reliable allies in Iraq are now engaged in a perplexing fight over control of the southern part of the country, where most of the oil wealth is concentrated. Southern Iraq is also important to groups vying for power because the city of Basra directly borders Iran, the main ally for Iraqi Shiites and their major source of political validation, and Najaf and Karbala, two of the holiest cities for Shiites around the world are located in the south (the recent clashes in Karbala were about controlling these shrines). With the British vacating their positions in Basra, Shiite groups, who had hitherto displayed a degree of unity in their fight against Sunnis, are now increasingly likely to lock horns; those who control the south seem set to emerge as the future power brokers of the country.

Although capable of inflicting widespread damage, Sadr’s chances of becoming this power broker are slim. For one, his Shiite rivals receive greater backing from Iran, which has displayed a largely Machiavellian attitude towards the situation in Iraq, choosing never to bid on the underdog. The advent of the Americans has also worsened the position of the Sadrists as they became largely excluded from all government institutions. The new Iraqi hierarchy favored the followers of Al-Hakim, who apparently represented a more dominant and perhaps more trustworthy (from an American point of view) branch of Shiites.

However, despite his seemingly erroneous strategies and media depictions as a “radical”, Sadr has actually adopted a very careful balancing act. He has continued to appeal to his Shiite followers in a way that sets him apart from Sistani, while simultaneously maintaining good relations with Sistani and Iran. He has even occasionally appeared sympathetic to the plight of the Sunnis.

Yet his relative political shrewdness could hardly bridge the gap between the various Shiite groups, which remains essentially ideological and an extension of the theological contention between the Hawza followers of Sistani and the followers of Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father. The divide between the two religious Shiite schools is as real as ever and the new economic woes and power struggles are likely to bring back to the fore — and further fuel — these differences.

We know very little of why Sadr decided to send the Mahdi Army into hibernation. He claims that his militias are being infiltrated by Iran, but this is unconvincing given that Sadr uses Iran as a personal escape hatch whenever his safety is threatened at home.

A lenient Sadr may well inspire revolt amongst his followers and send the inner Shiite fight on an early and destructive path, or he might find himself compelled to resume the fight on behalf of his own group. Both scenarios would be bad news for the Americans, who would be forced to watch an escalating Shiite power struggle in a country they supposedly control.

Source: Arab News

Ayoon Wa Azan (The Truth On Intentions)

Jihad el-Khazen

04/09/07//

In addition to all other disagreements, the United States and the United Nations disagree over Iran.

The Bush administration demands an immediate cessation of uranium enrichment. It led a campaign in the United Nations Security Council which resulted in the imposition of sanctions against Iran last December and last March, and now it wants the Security Council to impose new sanctions on Iran in case it does not stop uranium enrichment.

The IAEA, International Atomic Agency, says that Iran has expressed a willingness to cooperate that the agency has not seen in the past three years. There are specific questions and a schedule to abide by in answering them. The truth about Iranian intentions will be known in three months' time or so, and it will be known whether it is honest or it is trying to gain time.

When I asked the IAEA Director General Dr. Mohammad El-Baradei about the issue, he said that the agency needs time to test Iranian intentions, and the required time is not long.

The agency's duty is to determine whether Iranian nuclear activities are aimed at producing a nuclear bomb, and whether Iran has undeclared programs or secret underground facilities, and so on.

The American administration is concerned about such matters, but it is pursuing a long-term objective which consists of preventing Iran from possessing a technology that can be used to produce nuclear arms. Dr El-Baradei describes the objective as 'a risk assessment of future intentions" and says that he can not determine what Iran's intentions will be in ten years from now, since this is the duty of states and the United Nations Security Council.

When I asked Dr El-Baradei about the work of the international inspectors and whether there might be things the agency is not aware of, he said, 'We have not seen an active nuclear program that poses a clear and present danger … We have not received intelligence information on the existence of a secret underground thing.'

The agency director wants to go back to the previous inspection system that used to give the agency more prerogatives and to enable it to exercise pressure on the Iranian party to display more transparency, and it also enabled the inspectors to visit the sites more frequently. Dr El-Baradei sees that Iranian intentions should be put to the test, especially that the probation period is limited and the sanctions have never succeeded in changing any position. In the case of Iran in particular, they have only strengthened the extremists' wing. If the sanctions are meant to be fruitful, they have to be coupled with incentives that promote moderation.

Dr El-Baradei's official position prevents him from expressing his views unless they are kept within the narrowest margin. He restricts his talk mostly to information without expressing opinions, so I can add from my own data on Iran and the United States.

Whether Iran is ruled by the 'moderate' Mohammad Khatami or the hardliner Mahmoud Ahmedi Nejad, it has never given up its old Persian dreams and it intends to exercise power over the Gulf area and beyond if possible. In my view, it is ultimately seeking the possession of nuclear arms.

The United States is not better than Iran. The active wing in the Bush administration also harbors imperial dreams of world domination starting from us in the Middle East. It also intends to impose its domination and Israel's hegemony, in addition to controlling oil wells. The allocation of $ 50 billion for armament in the region is none other than an indicator of the confrontation policy it is pursuing against Iran. The IAEA report came as an impediment to American foreign policy, hence the anger of the pro-Israelis and other hardliners at the agency, its director general, and the entire United Nations. The Bush administration has allocated to Israel alone $ 30 billion and to all Arab countries $ 20 billion, and then it asks, 'Why do they hate us?'

I need to say what Dr El-Baradei can not say by virtue of his position: Iranian policy poses a threat to the Arabs and their interests but American policy is worse and more dangerous.

American pressure, in the absence of alternatives or incentives, is like a pressure cooker without a release opening, and it is more likely that it will lead to an explosion whose repercussions will cover the entire region. The only way to prevent the coming explosion is an American-Iranian agreement about sharing the spoils of the Middle East between themselves.

The flame of the explosion will reach us and the deal will be done at the expense of our interests. In both cases the reason is that Arab policies are worse than American and Iranian policies, that they are very detrimental to the Arabs, and they do not further their interests. They rather mirror a state of cleavages, absenteeism, powerlessness, and consent, if not surrender.

Whether Arab countries like Iran or not, they have to communicate with it and establish direct relations with it. It should be noted that Egypt, the most influential Arab country, has not had diplomatic relations with Iran for over twenty years, due to the disagreement over a street name. Iran is a large and powerful country and denying this fact is of no avail. Then, any agreement between the Arabs and Iran will be better than an American- Iranian agreement concluded at the expense of our interests. The communiqué issued by Gulf foreign ministers regarding the Iranian question is firm but the implementation remains to be seen.

We do no need arms, but rather good governance, better education, and anti-poverty campaigns, not a war bringing about killing and destruction. This does not happen by ignoring the Iranian threat, as if ignoring such a threat would eliminate it, or by following an American policy formulated by the anti-Arab and anti-Muslim war cabal. Regarding the Iranian issue, the cabal does not say that Iran possesses nuclear arms, but it sums it up as, 'We have the suspicion that they have the ambition…'

I fear that if the Arabs do not wake up and become aware of the plots made against them, years will pass and only three powerful countries, namely Israel, Iran, and Turkey, will remain in the Middle East. I know that this is Dr El-Baradei's view even if he does not express it openly.

Source: Al-Hayat

Iran's covert plan in Lebanon

09/05/2007

By Amir Taheri,

While being squeezed out of the global markets because of sanctions imposed by the UN, Iran's banks have landed new business opportunities in Lebanon.

Operating through front men and companies, they are financing land purchases that could, in time, redraw Lebanon's complex ethnic and religious map.

Soon after last year's war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Islamic Republic set up a "Lebanon Committee" ostensibly to rebuild Shi'ite areas damaged during the fighting. This started with a $250 million "Islamic gift", distributed by Hezbollah among its supporters. However, those who received the cash did not use it to rebuild their homes in Shi'ite villages south of the Litani River. When I visited the former war zone last spring, I was surprised to see that there was very little reconstruction work in Shi'ite villages close to the Israeli border.

Is Tehran developing a new strategy in which Lebanon south of the Litani would serve as a buffer zone in a future war against Israel? Until last year's war, the area was Hezbollah's stronghold and host to more than 90 per cent of its arsenal, including thousands of rockets and missiles. Now, however, Hezbollah, though still present, is not allowed to bear arms south of the Litani. More importantly, from Tehran's point of view, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is no longer able to maintain a presence there. Today, some 12,000 UN troops and almost as many men from the Lebanese regular army control the area.

It is against that background that Tehran's new strategy makes sense.

The strategy pursues three goals.

First, it aims at creating a string of bases north of the Litani from which rocket and missiles could be launched against Israel. It would also enable the the Revolutionary Guards and its Hezbollah allies to cut the route through which the central government in Beirut and/or the UN might send reinforcements to the south.

Second, acquiring land and building new villages in non-Shi'ite areas north of the Litani will provide territorial contiguity for the portion of the Shi'ite community loyal to Hezbollah and thus to the Islamic Republic. Tehran would be able to ferry aid and arms to its Lebanese allies through the Syrian border without having to cross areas controlled by other Lebanese sects. The state-owned Iranian Telecommunication Corporations is already building fibre-optic lines for internet, television and telephone networks out of control by the Lebanese government.

Finally, the new strategy could cut off part of the warrior-like Druze minority, some five per cent of Lebanon's population and currently the most dedicated supporters of democratisation, from its traditional stronghold in Wadi Al Taym. The Christian community could also be divided, with its traditional Greek Orthodox stronghold, Marj Ayoun, cut off from Maronite and Orthodox villages in southern Beka'a Valley.

That this may be one aim of Tehran's strategy is corroborated by the fact that most of the land bought with Iranian money in recent months has been sold by Christian and Druze families, often at prices too attractive to refuse.

The Iranian-financed land grab could also isolate the Sunni Muslim population in the disputed She'eba'a Farms, still under Israeli occupation.

If the scheme is fully implemented, Lebanon's Shi'ite could end up as the only one of the country's 18 communities to have a contiguous area of their own from the Syrian border to the frontier with Israel, and passing by southern Beirut. That would give the Hezbollah, considered as a state within the Lebanese state, a clear territorial expression as well.

A chunk of Lebanon controlled by Hezbollah plus Gaza under Hamas control would form the two arms of a pincer that the Islamic Republic could use against Israel in case of a broader conflict in the region.

Iran's "buy Lebanon" drive affects other sectors of the economy. Pro-Iranian groups already own five of the eight television stations and two of the four top-selling newspapers in Lebanon.

Add to this Hezbollah's rebuilt military machine, including some 2,000 new fighters, and the "state-within-the-state" would look like a fully-fledged state controlled by Tehran.

New strategy

Tehran's new strategy is strengthened by the fact that Shi'ites represent the fastest growing community in Lebanon. Most estimates indicate that Shi'ites, accounting for at least 35 per cent of the population and already the largest community in Lebanon, may achieve a demographic majority within the next decade.

Encouraged by special funds set up by Tehran, Shiite families produce more children than other Lebanese communities. At the same time, Shi'ites represent the only community gaining in numbers because of expatriates returning home, often from West Africa. Lebanon's other big communities, the Maronites and Sunni Muslims, are losing numbers due to smaller families and rising immigration. While giving the impression that a war against the United States may be imminent, Tehran appears to have assumed that President George W. Bush's administration, sailing towards the sunset, is in no position to take action. This, Tehran strategists believe, gives them time to fortify Iran's positions in Gaza and Lebanon as bridgeheads against Israel. The assumption is that, faced with the possibility of massive losses of life in Israel, no future US president would think of attacking Iran.

Having invested some $20 billion in Lebanon since the 1980s, Tehran appears to have opted for a long-term strategy there. This may help calm things down, especially as Lebanon moves towards a potentially explosive presidential election this month.

There is, however, one big question: Will Syria, Iran's indispensable ally in the region, also have an interest in calming things down in Lebanon?

Traditionally, Syria has pursued a policy aimed at presenting itself as the only power capable of imposing stability on a chaotic Lebanon. If Tehran decides to buy Lebanon rather than grab it by the force of arms, Syria might find itself marginalised. That, in turn, might persuade the Syrians to reassess their ties to Tehran. But, that is another story.

Source : Gulf News

Arming Against Iran

9-5-2007 15:28:14

The best argument for the necessity of American victory in Iraq was made by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Aug. 28 when he declared his regime was "prepared to fill the gap" if U.S. forces withdrew. To give meaning to Tehran's claim, the Iranian-backed Mahdi Army of Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr appeared poised to take control of the key Iraqi city of Basra in the wake of a British pullback. And attacks by the Mahdists on rival Shi'ite groups in Karbala took more than 50 lives during a major religious festival. Sheik al-Sadr plans to strengthen his militia over the next six months to prepare for the end of the U.S. surge.

President Bush responded to the Iranian threat in his speech to the American Legion, but he is already doing more than just threatening to declare the Iranian Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organization. At the end of July, the State Department unveiled a series of arms sales in the region to help contain Tehran. In her July 30 announcement of the potential sale of $20 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia and the other five members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the arms will "support a broader strategy to counter the negative influences of al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran." The military aid to the Saudis and Gulf states will run in parallel with an increase in military aid to Israel ($30 billion) and Egypt ($13) over the next decade.

The memorandum with Israel was signed Aug. 16 in Jerusalem. According to Miss Rice, the arms sales to Cairo will "strengthen Egypt's ability to address shared strategic goals." The best way to build new diplomatic and security alliances is to pull diverse states together against a common enemy.

Last summer, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan openly criticized Iran's Hezbollah proxy for raiding into Israel. The Sunni Arab states gave Israel the diplomatic room it needed to conduct four weeks of military operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran, with its support for militias in foreign lands, its nuclear ambitions, and its aggressive Shia faith, poses a much greater threat to the Sunni world than does Israel, which has no intention of toppling Arab regimes and converting their people to its religious doctrines. Iran does have these ambitions, directed at both Jews and Sunni Muslims.

The new steps to solve the Palestinian problem have been hastened by a sense of common danger to both Israel and the Fatah regime in the West Bank posed by Hamas in Gaza, a terrorist group backed by Syria and Iran. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has said Israel will not lobby against the new arms sales to Saudi Arabia, as it has against previous sales.

On August 9, the Tehran Times, the self-proclaimed "loud voice of the Islamic Revolution," highlighted a speech given in Lebanon by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah that attacked the U.S. arms sales as an attempt "to drown the Mideast in war." Earlier, Sheik Nasrallah had announced his terrorist group had been fully rearmed and was ready for a new round of combat. It's rather clear where the flood of violence is coming from, and that American aid is needed to dam it up.

Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states do not have the manpower to match Iran, so they need superior weapons interoperable with those of the United States. Cooperation on missile defense, maritime patrol, counterterrorism and energy security is moving ahead with U.S.-led joint exercises. American trainers, advisers and support personnel will have to accompany the new weapon systems.

The "cut and run" caucus in Congress has already voiced it opposition to the arms sales: 114 members of the U.S. House (96 Democrats, 18 Republicans) rushed a letter to President Bush Aug. 2, declaring their intention to vote against any sale of advanced weapons to the Saudis. The letter was organized by New York Democratic Reps. Anthony Weiner and Jerrold Nadler, two very vocal antiwar activists. Those who signed their letter don't just want to "redeploy" from Iraq, they want to withdraw completely from the region. Such a retreat would leave a security nightmare in its wake.

The thrust of their stated argument is that "Saudi Arabia has not been a true ally in the war on terror or furthering the United States interests in the Middle East." Yet, the purpose of the arms deal is to draw the kingdom into a closer alignment against a common regional enemy.

For Congress to block the arms sales would undermine what trust there is between Washington and the Sunni world (including the tribal leaders in Iraq who are vital to the defeat of al Qaeda). It would also fuel the propaganda of both al Qaeda and Tehran that alleges America is at war with all of Islam, when, in fact, U.S. security interests are in line with those of a majority of Muslims.

By William R. Hawkins

The Washington Times