Sunday analysis

At the latest Council of Arab Foreign Ministers, the head of the Arab League, Mr Moussa highlighted that no real hopes have been emerging in the Middle East recently. Speaking about Sudan, he explained that it is the only front among many hotspots across the Arab world where progress is being made in containing the conflict. However, that does not mean that Arab countries are not trying their best to solve regional tensions. They are trying to relaunch the Arab peace initiative, and constantly stressing the importance of dialogue with Iran to avoid a war in the region that would have catastrophic consequences.

Nevertheless, a few solutions are in fact emerging.

United States are pushing for their own solution. They have been selling weapons to GCC States. Bush launched his initiative to intensify economic assistance to Sunni Arab regions where insurgents have joined U.S. forces in Iraq. But those initiatives have proved to be useless and even U.S. intelligence agencies do not believe in them. Recently, a report compiled by sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies noted that efforts against Iran in the region, including economic measures designed to pressure it, are not working.

Thus, U.S. friendship is a huge dilemma for Arab states, that are increasingly reluctant to form any long term alliance with Washington. As a result, there is an important loss of credibility for U.S. Middle East policy. Those fears lead in a loss of trust, why wouldn’t United States turn their back on GCC allies and choose Iran as a new ally, to solve their problems in Iraq, and leave the region without giving the impression that they lose a war?. On the other hand, if they strike Iran, they will leave just after winning and then Iran could strike GCC countries as a counter measure, or as revenge.

Some facts could give new hopes in the region, and new keys to U.S. for initiatives. Motaqa Sadr’s decision to halt his Mahdi Army attacks on occupation forces is such a factor. He may be trying to act against Iran to become the new Shia leader in Iraq, without Teheran telling him what to do. Therefore, he could become an counterpart/interlocutor for Washington, someone reliable to deal with.

But that is an overly optimistic view. Arabs are still concerned by Iran and the way they want to dominate the Middle East. Their actions in Palestine, and above all, in Lebanon, are viewed as serious threats for Arabs. Iran investing 250 millions dollars as an Islamic gift in Beirut and southern Lebanon is a real problem for the Saudis, who are among the top investors in Lebanon. The country could become a base for Iran against Israel and a new Shia fortress in the region. Increasing amounts of non Shia land is being bought by Iran through this “Islamic gift”, cutting links between communities that used to be linked by that land. Furthermore, President Ahmadinejad saying that “Iran is ready to fill the gap if U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq” does not help to reassure Arab countries.

Dealing with U.S., and accepting the weapons deal, appears in this case as the best, or rather, easiest solution for Arab governments even if domestic criticism is very high with the view that the deal aims to promote the interests of U.S. rather than their own. GCC countries are not a proxy for Washington in the region against Iran. They do not have the manpower to engage Iran in a war. They need superior weapons interoperable with U.S. technologies but such founds could also be used for development rather than armament.

This is the core of the Arabs’ dilemma. They are promoting peace in the region but do not have the means to impose it. So they have to accept weapons from U.S. and accept to be treated as proxies not allies. They should seek to impose their own views on those manipulating them. There are, of course, other policies being developed by Arabs at the same time but it seems that the U.S. trend is the easiest to perceive. The problem is that public opinion in the West and the Middle East only pays attention to this policy. And this policy can only lead to one outcome: a regional conflict.